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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Boundaries of Home and Work: 
Social Reproduction and Home-Based Workers in Ahmedabad, India 
 
by 
 
Natascia Boeri 
 
 
Advisor: Hester Eisenstein 
 
 
This dissertation critically questions the use of women’s labor in international development 
and global capitalism by examining women’s participation in the informal economy, a significant 
source of work for women in the Global South. Based on ten months of fieldwork in Ahmedabad, 
India, this study considers women’s experiences with informality when they participate in home-
based work, the production of goods for the market in one’s own home. I ask how women’s place-
based activities redefine their roles and positions across three spheres of social life: the family, the 
economy, and civil society (through their participation in a non-governmental organization, or 
NGO). I argue that the material consequences of neoliberal capitalism for workers can only be 
fully understood by also accounting for ideological and symbolic relations of power, which is 
possible with the analytical framework provided by social reproduction theory. Working with the 
Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), a membership-based organization for women in 
the informal economy in India, I conducted a survey of one hundred home-based garment workers, 
follow-up interviews with thirty of the workers and spatial analysis of their homes, content analysis 
of SEWA documentation and media, and interviews with five SEWA directors and four local 
academics and activists. 
 v 
This dissertation presents four main findings. First, the temporal and spatial aspects of 
home-based work create a worker who is always available, even when caring, and easily disposed 
of in the subcontracting system. Second, the characterization of informal workers as entrepreneurs, 
exemplified by the micro-entrepreneurial woman, contradicts actual experiences with informality. 
Third, women express agency in their choices and practices, yet, these actions are informed within 
a set of socio-cultural and economic boundaries, reproducing feminine domesticity. However, in 
my final empirical chapter, I argue that women envision resistance to the reproduction of power 
through their aspirations that their children find secure work in the formal economy. Notably, for 
their daughters, women emphasize the importance of mobility and leaving the home to “come 
forward in life,” and so transgress boundaries of feminine domesticity. These aspirations point to 
women’s understanding of their social position in this economic system, an acknowledgement that 
was left unsaid earlier in the interviews. 
Analyzing women’s place-based activities reveals the role of their social reproduction labor 
across the institutions of the family, economy, and civil society. Women employ practices and 
discourses that reproduce, redefine, and at times resist these power dynamics. It is necessary to 
acknowledge the interdependence of production and social reproduction when considering the 
growing presence of informality in the contemporary economic landscape and the continuing use 
of women’s labor to support international development. Lastly, this dissertation highlights the 
necessity for transnational sociological knowledge, since individuals and communities of the 
Global South have faced precarity in social life long before the term entered Western discourse. 
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Chapter 1. Women’s Labor in the Home, Community, and Economy 
 
Invisible workers, in the shadows, the hidden assembly line—this is some of the imagery 
used to describe the workers and production process of home-based work. Home-based workers 
are workers who produce goods for the market from their own homes, and because of the location 
of their work contemporary forms of home-based work have historically been overlooked, 
misunderstood, and difficult to capture by researchers, the state, and development institutions 
(Allen and Wolkowitz 1987; Chen, Sebstad, and O’Connell 1999; Chen 2014). Women make up 
a high percentage of these workers, and in countries with low female labor force participation 
women informal workers are more likely to be working in the home (Chen 2012; ILO 2013). The 
high rate of women home-based workers is attributed to gender norms that restrict women’s 
mobility and gendered divisions of labor that encourage women to stay close to home because of 
domestic responsibilities (Chen 2014).  
There are economic factors that support the presence of home-based work as well. Home-
based work’s decentralized, flexible labor force and the advances in technology that have 
facilitated the use of outsourcing for global assembly lines have encouraged the proliferation of 
home-based workers to produce goods for local and international markets (Balakrishnan and 
Sayeed 2002; Carr, Chen, and Tate 2000). Home-based work is one of the most widespread forms 
of informal work—work outside of state protection and regulation—and represents a significant 
share of urban employment, especially in India where home-based work is 23 percent of urban 
informal employment (ILO 2013).1 All of these factors have compelled scholars to make this 
                                                
1 When including formal and informal employment in India, home-based work makes up 18 
percent of urban employment (ILO 2013). 
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invisible labor force visible, and so bring focus to the exploitative work conditions, lack of social 
protection, and miscalculation of their role in contemporary production processes and contribution 
to the economy (Balakrishnan 2002; Chen 2014; Sudarshan and Sinha 2011).  
The mutual reliance between capitalism and gendered social relations has fostered the 
proliferation of home-based work in modern production processes, especially in the garment 
industry, which is the focus of this dissertation. Feminist sociologists, economists, and 
development scholars have been interested in examining how these processes intersect to explain 
women’s role in modern society. Early scholarship considered home-based work according to 
theories of capitalist and patriarchal relations of production and social reproduction (Benería and 
Roldan 1987; Mies 1982). Mies’ (1982) study of lace-makers in North India questioned the 
tendency for development institutions and practitioners to frame this work as an opportunity for 
women to join the global production process, pointing to the reproduction of material and 
ideological systems to support capitalist accumulation on a world scale, such as the construction 
of these workers as “nonworking housewives” to justify their low pay rate.  
In The Crossroads of Class and Gender, Benería and Roldan (1987:10) examine women’s 
involvement in industrial homeworking in Mexico City to support a unifying theory of class and 
gender, in which “material and ideological factors are an integral aspect of our understanding of 
gender subordination, while women’s subordination is an integral part of our understanding of 
economic and social reality.” Home-based work in industrial and developed countries has also 
been a site of inquiry for feminist scholars, notably, Boris’ (1994) historical analysis of the 
gendered politics surrounding home-based work and attempts to regulate it and Allen and 
Wolkowitz’s (1987) study that addressed misconceptions of homeworking in the UK as 
advantageous for women seeking to balance work and family.  
 3 
Beginning in the 1990s, academics, researchers, and policy makers turned their attention 
to defining and measuring home-based work and the informal economy in general (Chen et al. 
1999; ILO 1997) and highlighting the role of home-based workers in the global assembly line 
(Balakrishnan 2002; Carr, Chen and Tate 2000). As unions and activists mobilized to bring social 
protection and regulation for home-based workers (Jhabvala and Tate 1996), free market 
supporters increasingly pointed to micro-finance as a tool of economic development, encouraging 
a misreading of the dependent homeworker as a self-employed micro-entrepreneur (Prügl and 
Tinker 1997). Elisabeth Prügl (1999) documents the historical and transnational discourses 
surrounding this “global homeworker movement,” finding that global constructs of gender and 
work were prevalent throughout the different approaches on how to define home-based work and 
workers’ needs, from exploited working mother, to handicraft producers of Third World culture, 
to micro-entrepreneurial heroine, to the androgynous home-based consultant or freelancer in rich 
countries. 
These debates employ a definition of home-based work that relies on where the work is 
completed; yet, there is a dearth of literature that examines the significance of the space of work 
in home-based work (for exceptions, see Alikoç 2013; Bose 1999; Miraftab 1994). The meaning 
associated with space is important to capture because of the gendered reasons women have for 
participating in this work, which reproduce notions of private and public, but also because 
subcontracting is a production system that relies on these ideological divisions to provide a cheap 
and decentralized workforce. Studies of home-based workers and intra-household power relations 
account for space, arguing that because of work occurring in the home the empowering potential 
of work is minimized (Bose 2007; Kabeer 2000; Kantor 2005); yet, intra-household bargaining 
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theory reproduces neoclassical economic theories and attempts to address differences without 
tackling the power relations inherent in a capitalist economy (Bergeron 2009; Charusheela 2003). 
In this dissertation, my aim is to return to Benería and Roldan’s call for a study of class 
and gender in ways that avoid analytical dualism of material and ideological relations, while also 
accounting for the significance of space. Adopting the approach used by Benería and Roldan as 
well as Mies, I argue that the best analytical tool to avoid this dualism is to examine relations of 
production and social reproduction (social reproduction being work that supports the sustenance 
of individuals and communities on a daily and generational basis, as well as the reproduction of 
the material and social relations of capitalism). Returning to Vogel’s (1983) Marxism and the 
Oppression of Women, feminist scholars of social reproduction theory argue that this analytical 
approach allows for the inclusion of both material and ideological relations of power (Bakker and 
Gill 2003; Ferguson and McNally 2014; Ferguson 2008). It accounts for the subjective experiences 
of identity and agency, while remaining rooted in the possibilities of political intervention 
(Ferguson and McNally 2014). In this period of global capitalism and the continuing legacy of 
imperialism, examining the changing nature of social reproduction exposes the costs of 
globalization (Katz 2001a; Mitchell, Marston and Katz 2004) and maps out the spatial organization 
of global capitalism to explain individuals’ socio-spatial location in these relations (Katz 2001, 
Ferguson 2008).  
Additionally, I apply this analytical framework to study home-based garment work across 
three sites, the family, the economy, and civil society, examined here in the form of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Previous studies that examined interactions of 
class/patriarchy and material/ideology often limited themselves to the institutions of the family 
and economy. However, the inclusion of social factors in international development (Bergeron 
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2003),2 the proliferation of NGOs in civil society (Kamat 2003), and their replacement of state 
actors in development projects (Eisenstein 2009) requires the inclusion of these organizations in 
an analysis of women in the informal economy. Rather than examining women’s experiences in 
these three institutions as separate sites, I center my analysis in the space of the home. This 
approach is a place-based analysis of home-based work that examines the exploitation of women’s 
subordinate position in these three sites of power, but also asks if women’s daily practices can be 
examples of “resistance but also reappropriation, reconstruction, reinvention and relocalization” 
in transforming place through political struggle (Escobar and Harcourt 2005:3). Home-based work 
is a compelling production system to study this process as it is an example of the interdependence 
between productive and reproductive labor, private and public spheres, and informal and formal 
economies (Agarwala 2014).  
In the following pages, I present findings from ten months of fieldwork in Ahmedabad, 
India to examine women home-based garment workers’ experiences with the family, work, and 
civil society. Working with a major and well-established membership-based organization for 
informal workers, the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA),3 I ask how, with the 
entrance of paid work and civil society in their homes, women employ discursive and spatial 
practices that reconceptualize their roles in the public and private spheres. I apply a feminist social 
reproduction theory to examine how women’s labor is exploited in a flexible and fragmented 
production process, and I compare this process to the construction of the entrepreneurial subject 
in the mainstream development paradigm that relies on women’s labor to hide systemic 
inequalities. Examining women’s daily practices and experiences with these three institutions, 
                                                
2 The inclusion of social factors in economic theory is characterized as the social turn in 
international development (Bergeron 2009). 
3 Pronounced sēvā.  
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family, economy, and civil society, I ask where women reproduce relations of power and where 
they employ tactics to contest the social reproduction of power. 
The remaining sections of this chapter include an overview of scholarship on the informal 
economy, home-based workers, and approaches to studying gender and globalization. I then 
present the theoretical framework that guides my research analysis. I end with an overview of the 
dissertation.  
Introduction to the Informal Economy 
The broad range of work that comprises the informal economy entered the development 
lexicon as the “informal sector” in the 1970s. Hart’s (1973) study of urban employment in Ghana 
illuminated a part of the economy that had been previously labeled (and dismissed) by 
development economists as the “traditional” sector by both orthodox and Marxist economists. Hart 
challenged Western understandings of informal sector activities as marginal and unproductive, 
arguing that this sector was in fact productive, dynamic, and had potential for growth. His 
contributions shaped future approaches to the informal economy and its role in economic 
development.  
Responses from both ends of the ideological spectrum maintained a dualist approach to the 
formal and informal economy. Free-market economists viewed the informal economy as a 
response to onerous state regulation that was smothering the formal labor market and economic 
growth of the country. They found that strict licensing and overregulation restricted access to 
formal labor market, and one argument for deregulation and greater labor mobility was so  that 
those in the informal economy would move into the formal (Mazumdar 1976). The World Bank 
(1989) began viewing the informal economy more optimistically, as a site of unfettered, 
innovative, and flexible entrepreneurism. De Soto (1989) reaffirmed the presence of informal work 
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as a response to excessive state regulation, arguing that workers choose to operate informally 
because of the costs associated with the formal economy. This literature emphasized people’s 
innate entrepreneurialism and the need to foster it through market access. Rather than formalizing 
labor, the answer was to formalize capital, even in petty commodity production, an offshoot of 
which is seen today in the form of microcredit. 
 At the other end of the spectrum, neo-Marxists viewed the informal economy from a 
structuralist perspective, analyzing the exploitative and hierarchical relations between these two 
modes of production. The work of Davies (1979) and Obreegon (1974) examined the informal 
economy as a marginalized economy on the periphery that enhanced the surplus value of the formal 
economy in the center. Others explained the relationship between the informal and formal 
economy as a continuum, in which the two are integrated with each other, with the informal 
economy in a subordinate position (Leys 1975; Moser 1978). These debates maintained the view 
that the informal economy played a marginal role in capitalist development. 
Portes, Castells, and Benton (1989), on the other hand, argued that the informal economy 
reflects a process of informalization arising from capitalist accumulation. Rather than the informal 
economy being a subsidiary, it is an integral part of the economy, and is found in both 
industrialized and less industrialized countries. In fact, their definition of activities in the informal 
economy is similar to those activities in the formal economy, with the defining and differentiating 
feature being that informal activities are unregulated (Castells and Portes 1989:12). They argued 
that informalization was a growing phenomenon, partly in response to the global economic 
restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s (Castells and Portes 1989).  
This approach pivoted the discussion of the informal economy toward being seen as an 
integral part of global capitalism (Hill 2010), and scholars understand informalization as a process 
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in capital’s need for a low-wage and flexible labor force (Standing 1999). Breman (1976) was an 
early dissenter from the dualism theory of informal/formal economy, arguing that the two cannot 
be demarcated as separate parts of the economy. Analyzing the economy along a continuum is a 
more useful analytical tool as it captures the dynamic and heterogeneous characteristics of 
informality (Hill 2010). It has also shifted attention to the precarious and socio-economic 
vulnerability associated with this work (Hill 2010), as evidenced in the ILO’s adoption of the 
“Decent Work” platform (ILO 2002a). 
Governments and multi-lateral organizations recognized that there was a need for a 
common definition and measurement guidelines for the informal economy. The International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) in 1993 defined the “informal sector” as unregulated 
production units or enterprises depending on their size, such as microenterprises with one or two 
employees or the self-employed that would utilize family or occasional workers (ILO 2002b). The 
reframing of the informal economy through the decent work agenda expanded the definition of 
informal work to include the nature of employment (Chen, Vanek, and Heintz 2006). In 2003, the 
ICLS broadened the concept to include “informal employment.” The aim was to capture not just 
the share of work outside of legal and regulatory frameworks, but also the high degree of 
vulnerability faced by informal workers, due to the lack of secure work, worker’s benefits, social 
protection, and representation or voice (ILO 2002a). Because of the emphasis on working 
conditions as well as enterprise, the definitions would now include both persons employed in the 
informal sector (including own-account workers, employers, employees, contributing family 
workers in informal enterprises, and members of informal producers’ cooperatives) and persons 
employed informally outside of the informal sector (including employees in formal enterprises and 
paid domestic workers not covered by social protection, legislation or entitlement to employment 
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benefits, and contributing family workers in formal enterprises) (Vanek et al. 2014:5–6). The 
“informal economy” is the umbrella term that covers the range of units, activities, and workers 
within these definitions and their output (Vanek et al. 2014:6). 
Among developing countries for which there are data, around 60 percent of workers find 
work in the informal economy (WTO and ILO 2009). There are some variations across regions, 
but in most regions of the developing world, informal employment accounts for more than one-
half of non-agricultural employment, including 82 percent in South Asia, 66 per cent in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 65 per cent in East and Southeast Asia, and 51 per cent in Latin America (Vanek 
et al. 2014). In many regions of the world, including South Asia, women are more likely to be 
working in the informal economy than men (Vanek et al. 2014), and more likely to be in lower-
earning and more precarious forms of informal employment (Carr et al. 2000; Vanek et al. 2014).  
Informality is not just a phenomenon of developing countries, though, as the numbers 
above show, it is definitely a defining characteristic of their economies. Scholars have argued that 
informalization is present in developed countries as well in the form of non-standard employment 
(Standing 2011; Vosko 2010). Non-standard employment, employment that offers limited benefits 
and social protection, such as temporary, part-time, and own-account employment, has risen in 
high-income countries as a share of total employment since 1990 (ILO 2013). 
Approaches to the Informal Economy 
Recognizing the significance of the informal economy, institutions, policymakers, and 
scholars differ in their explanations of the role of the informal economy in capitalist economies 
and their suggestions for appropriate responses to it. This has been of particular concern in India, 
a country with the highest rate of informal employment in the world, 84 percent of non-agricultural 
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employment (ILO 2013).4 At the end of the last century, as it became apparent that the informal 
economy was not a “buffer zone” for workers waiting to enter formal employment, the informal 
economy began to be viewed favorably among free-market proponents. In fact, this flexible labor 
market with little government oversight was exemplary of the neoliberal doctrine. Economists tend 
to agree that the informal economy is a result of restrictive trade and labor regulation, high tax 
rates, and other red tape obstacles, and workers choose informal employment as a preference (Ihrig 
and Moe 2004; Loayza 1996; Macias and Cazzavilan 2009; OECD 2015; World Bank 2001; WTO 
and ILO 2009). In its annual reports, the World Bank (World Bank 1995, 2001) has repeatedly 
called for greater wage flexibility and labor mobility with the aim of making informalization work 
for the poor. Remarkably, after the economic recession of 2008, pro-market institutions such as 
the World Bank and the IMF maintained their optimism about the informal economy and 
reaffirmed the need to deregulate the market. Rather than calling for financial reforms and stronger 
state intervention to prevent future crises, these institutions point to the informal economy as a 
source of job creation and a “safety net” (Loayza 1996; Singh, Jain-Chandra, and Mohommad 
2012; World Bank 2013).  
There is growing interest in the informal economy as a site for entrepreneurialism (Thanh 
Thai and Turkina 2013; Webb et al. 2013; Williams and Nadin 2010). The literature follows the 
view that those who choose to operate outside of formal regulations are rational actors weighing 
economic and social considerations within institutional and resource constraints and opportunities 
(Webb et al. 2013). Rather than a welfare approach that frames informality as a survival tactic, 
                                                
4 Analyses of the informal economy tend to restrict definitions of informal employment to non-
agricultural employment, though agricultural employment in developing countries is often 
informal and lacks basic social protection, as is the case in India (Vanek et al 2014). If informal 
agricultural employment were included in India’s informal employment rates, it would rise to over 
90 percent (OECD 2014). 
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policies should be implemented to cultivate entrepreneurial activities (Gurtoo 2009). In searching 
for the entrepreneur, a range of workers in low-paying and menial jobs have been enveloped under 
its label, including waste scavengers (Rogerson 2001), day laborers (Valenzuela 2001), and 
homeworkers (Gough 2010). The development field has also begun to encourage developing 
entrepreneurialism in the informal economy, and, in particular, has targeted women’s potential for 
entrepreneurialism. The ILO project on Women’s Entrepreneurship Development and Gender 
Equality (WEDGE) was created to foster and support entrepreneurship among women to “create 
decent employment, achieve women’s empowerment and gender equality, and work toward 
poverty reduction” (ILO 2016). The World Bank (2012) considers microcredit schemes that 
support women’s entrepreneurship to be the most effective way to address unequal resource access 
for women. 
Critical scholars of the informal economy, however, hold a different view on the role of 
informality in global capitalism. They argue that the lack of regulation, flexibility, and labor 
mobility found in informal employment is the result of unequal relations of production between 
workers and capital. With its degradation and fragmentation of work, informality plays a 
significant role in the accumulation of capital (Harriss-White 2003) within the flexible labor 
regime of neoliberalism (Harvey 1989; Lipietz 1986). These scholars debunk two myths of the 
informal economy—that informal workers are entrepreneurs and that the informal economy is 
outside of the purview of the state—by emphasizing the social relations of production (Breman 
2013; Harriss-White 2003; Hill 2010). The informal economy is not a “safety net,” but a 
production process that is part of a new economic regime that relies on the downgrading and 
fragmentation of work for the profit of capital (Breman 2013). 
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Social relations of production in the informal economy are similar to those of the so-called 
formal economy as understood in classical Marxist thought, whereby the capitalist class owns the 
means of production and the proletariat owns only its own labor power (Marx 1976). In the formal 
economy, separated from the means of production, the proletariat has only her labor power to sell, 
and capitalists earn a profit through appropriation of the surplus value of commodities produced 
by workers. The informal labor is distinct from other forms of the capital-labor relationship, 
however, in that it is “incompletely separated from the means of production and subject to a range 
of non-capitalist methods of surplus production and extraction” (Hill 2010:36-37). A home-based 
worker is a good example of how informal work is incompletely separated from the means of 
production; she often invests her own money to buy the tools and material to produce goods, 
however, the contractors and suppliers have a great deal of authority over her during the production 
process. Furthermore, the socio-cultural processes that shape a home-based worker’s need to 
participate in this exploitative work provide the conditions in which capitalists can extract labor 
from workers at the lowest costs (Hill 2010:37).  
Economists tend to focus on the technical relations of production and so mislabel informal 
workers as self-employed entrepreneurs. Breman (1996) argues that the subcontracting and own-
account production system common in the informal economy is actually a disguised form of wage-
labor. As in a formal wage-labor relationship, the production process of informality is one of 
dependency and vulnerability; for example, street vendors pay for their day’s produce on credit to 
the wholesale dealer and homeworkers depend on their subcontractors to provide orders. Neither 
of these are examples of the ingenious micro-entrepreneurs depicted in Hernando de Soto and the 
World Bank’s writings.  
Though the informal economy is commonly understood as unregulated and beyond the 
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reach of the state, the state is not absent. The state’s legal power plays a crucial role in capitalism’s 
accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2005). The struggle between capital and labor is one 
shaped by the state (Burawoy 1985), and this is no different with informal labor (Harriss-White 
2003). In this era of global competitiveness “informality should be understood as an expression of 
the state’s inability and/or unwillingness to control capital and those who own it” (Breman 
2013:22). The state’s role is apparent when considering the consequences after implementation of 
the “Washington Consensus” in developing countries. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, IMF-
imposed structural adjustment policies (SAPs) of trade liberalization, privatization, and 
deregulation resulted in a shrinking working class and growing informal proletariat (Carr and Chen 
2002; Portes and Hoffman 2003). The establishment of Export Processing Zones (EPZs), industrial 
zones with special incentives to attract foreign investors, provided economic incentives, including 
tax exemption, state subsidies, and streamlined administrative services, and social incentives, such 
as limited application of labor legislation and suppression of unions (McCallum 2011). In India, 
establishment of such zones in India (called Special Economic Zones, or SEZ) relied on eminent 
domain to displace thousands from their homes and their means of livelihood in the name of 
development (Sampat 2008). Land displacement through SEZs and other development projects 
feed the circulation of labor, as workers migrate to urban areas in search of work, most often in 
the informal economy (Breman 1996).  
 In India, the state’s lack of protection and regulation for the majority of its workers is 
another form of the state’s affirmation for labor informality. State-mediated protection, such as 
social security and pensions, only cover workers in the formal economy, around eight percent of 
all workers in India (Jhabvala and Subrahmanya 2000). A universal welfare state that would 
overwhelmingly benefit the poor is seen as a “luxury” that India cannot afford. Instead, India 
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implements targeted anti-poverty and development schemes, such as food subsidies and 
guaranteed rural employment (Sen and Drèze 2013). Some have criticized these policies as 
subsidizing labor for capital, with the state intervening for the market, but not for workers (Harriss-
White 2003:36). 
 The heterogeneity and fragmentation of informal workers have raised questions about the 
possibility of a class-based movement. Conventional trade unions are ill equipped to voice the 
needs of informal workers (ILO 1997), and a main consequence of informalization is the 
undermining of organized labor (Castells and Portes 1989). In Latin American, Portes and 
Hoffman note that the informalization of class structure is political as well as economic, as the 
transformation has “weakened the basis for organized class struggle and the channels for the 
effective mobilization of popular discontent” (2003:77). Movements have arisen in the form of 
erratic community-based mobilizations rather than sustained activities of union-based parties 
(Portes and Hoffman 2003). Attempts to incorporate informal workers in labor unions have had 
little success because of unions’ strategies to transform informal work rather than adapt their own 
strategies to the needs of informal worker (Chinguno 2010). Others argue that changes in the class 
structure still allow for the formation of class-based mobilization (Silver 2001; Wills and Simms 
2004), and suggest that these new forms of mobilization might better address needs of workers 
beyond the workplace (Munck 2002) and on an international scale (Lindell 2010; Munck 2002). 
Studies have shown that informal workers are finding ways to organize in rich countries (Milkman 
2006) and developing countries (Agarwala 2013; Cross 1998; Hill 2010). The ability of the labor 
movement to form new strategies that address the informalization of work will determine its future 
importance or decline (von Holdt and Webster 2008; Munck 2002). 
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The informal economy is a dominant feature of developing countries’ economies (Breman 
and Linden 2014; Harriss-White 2003), and it is growing in rich countries as well (Breman and 
Linden 2014; Sassen 1997; Standing 2011; Vosko 2010). Views of what to do about it differ 
widely, from free-market laissez-faire to welfare state intervention, but there is growing 
recognition that supporting the working poor is a means to reducing poverty and inequality. In this 
endeavor supporting women is key as they are overrepresented in the informal economy, and are 
often the most marginalized and exploited of informal workers (Carr et al. 2000; Swaminathan 
2000).  
Women and Home-Based Work 
One of the most common sources of work in the informal economy, especially for women, 
is home-based work (ILO 2013). Home-based work is defined as remunerative work conducted in 
a worker’s own home or adjacent grounds, though it actually refers to two categories of work: the 
self-employed worker and the dependent subcontracted worker, or homeworker (ILO 2002a).5 
Home-based workers are often assumed to be self-employed, as the International Classification of 
Status in Employment (ICSE-93), used to determine employment status in survey collection, does 
not differentiate between the two types of home-based workers.6 Yet, home-based employment is 
best understood to be “along a continuum of dependence, from being completely independent to 
being fully dependent on the contractor/middleman for design, raw material and equipment and 
unable to negotiate price of the product” (Unni and Rani 2005:4).  
                                                
5 In this study, I included both self-employed worker and homeworker participants in the survey, 
but because the majority of the interviewees were homeworkers and most of the findings are based 
on these interviews, I focus on homework in the literature review. 
6 There has been some attempt to design survey questions that better capture the differentiation 
within home-based work. India’s National Sample Survey of Employment and Unemployment 
Survey for 1999-2000 included questions on the nature of contract that allowed for estimates of 
homeworkers, but further surveys discontinued these questions (GOI 2007:5). 
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Industrial homework challenges dichotomous categories of work and home, and so theories 
must also bridge these binaries. It is both the modern economic system of deregulation and 
causalization as well as gendered divisions of labor in the home that have supported the 
proliferation of this work (Allen and Wolkowitz 1987; Mies 1982). Scholars agree that homework 
production is a compelling site to examine both economic and cultural factors that shape 
experiences with work and family. Homework provides possibilities to critically examine the 
“complex relation between gender definitions, women’s paid labor, and family labor” (Boris 
1994:5), while Benería and Roldan (1987:1) write that home-based work reveals the “connection 
between economic processes and the dynamics of social relations.” The intersection of multiple 
social locations, such as gender, class, race, and caste, raises a number of possibilities in 
reconceptualizing our understanding of women, capitalism, and patriarchy.  
In Boris’ (1994) overview of the history of homework in Europe and North America, she 
writes that homework preceded factory production, but it is undeniable that the shift from a family-
labor system to the wage-labor system intensified its growth. Technology would change the type 
of work found in the “putting-out” system, for example, the introduction of the sewing machine 
made it more efficient for factories to produce shirts in-house, and so homeworkers’ tasks changed 
from creating the whole shirt to adding only the buttons. However, employers came to rely on the 
savings that homework provided them, and it became a required employment practice in face of 
“competition, low start-up costs, undercapitalization, and a highly seasonal and variable product” 
(1994:12).  
Home-based work has a long history in India as well, but it was the arrival of colonialism 
that introduced the putting-out system (Hahn 1996). Similar to the experience in North America 
(Boris 1994), while rural homeworkers had greater autonomy in the production process, the system 
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transformed into the modern form of homeworking when it expanded to urban areas in India, as 
workers become dependent on the middlemen for their livelihood (Hahn 1996). With 
industrialization, and later liberalization, women lost their traditional occupations and were left 
out of the emerging male-dominated waged workforce (Hahn 1996). However, despite being 
pushed to the margins of the economy, women’s work in the informal economy remains linked to 
the formal economy; this is especially clear when considering the subcontracting system that many 
factories employ (Hahn 1996). 
Capitalist production exploits the flexible and decentralized characteristics of homework 
to its advantage (Balakrishnan and Sayeed 2002), with the homeworker at the bottom end of global 
production chains (Unni and Scaria 2009). Employing casual workers allows for a degree of 
flexibilization and decentralization of production that cannot be achieved when workers are 
employed at a factory (Allen and Wolkowitz 1986; Balakrishnan 2002). Sub-contracted work, 
where the risks and costs of production are diverted onto workers, is especially attractive as an 
alternative to factories (Boris and Prügl 1996).The fluctuation of markets according to peak and 
lean season and changes in fashion allow owners to easily shift or stop production as necessary 
(Balakrishnan 2002). With work orders fluctuating from day to day, or the threat of it, workers 
cannot rely on a steady income. This benefit for suppliers comes at a cost to workers, who become 
burdened with unstable and vulnerable working conditions, in addition to footing overhead costs 
of production, such as machinery, utilities, and sometimes even the raw material (Sudarshan and 
Sinha 2011).  
Economic factors alone cannot explain home-based work. There are clear socio-cultural 
factors involved in women’s participation in this work. For one, women choose to work at home 
in order to continue their care-giving and household responsibilities (Balakrishnan 2002). In 
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communities where women’s mobility is restricted, home-based work is their only opportunity to 
participate in paid work (Khattak 2002). Historically, the use of home-based work as a system of 
production and attempts to regulate it employ gendered constructions of women, the home, and 
their roles in the home and workforce (Boris 1994; Prügl 1999).  
Despite working at home and the flexibility associated with this type of work, time is still 
a significant concern for home-based workers. A homeworker especially has limited control over 
the amount of work she receives (Allen and Wolkowitz 1987). Subcontractors have no obligation 
to provide orders regularly; they only do so when they have an order. It is common for days or 
weeks go by without providing any work; though, when there is a large demand, the homeworker 
is expected to accept the work and finish the orders within a given time frame. Earnings are linked 
to the number of pieces produced, encouraging the worker to complete as much as possible in her 
day—if she finishes only a few pieces, the blame is on her for the day’s limited earnings (Allen 
and Wolkowitz 1987). Subsequent orders arrive only once an order is completed and returned, so 
it is in her best interest to finish orders as quickly as possible.  
Home-based work, much like capitalism, is a site of contradictions. This work has the 
potential to be both exploitative and liberating (Alikoç 2013; Miraftab 1994). Home-based work 
provides women with the opportunity to enter the public sphere of work without threatening their 
caregiving roles. However, the labor conditions for home-based work are exploitative and 
insecure. The economic involvement of women at home can encourage male members of the 
household to participate in unpaid work, yet women’s very participation in this work reproduces 
gendered divisions of labor (Miraftab 1994). Allen and Wolkowitz (1987) point out that because 
women’s social reproductive work is assumed to be their full-time job the entrance of paid work 
in the home is seen as woman’s use of her free time rather than a job. Despite women joining the 
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workforce through home-based work, the status quo of women’s subordination is maintained 
(Khattak 2002). 
Scholars and activists working to bring attention to home-based work, including its classed 
and gendered constructions and its role in capitalist production, contribute to the rich debates 
surrounding women’s work in a globalized world. In the next section, I review this broader 
literature of women, work, and globalization. I present the changing nature of work as a result of 
globalization and its particular consequences for women.  
Globalization and Women’s Work 
The neoliberal restructuring of much of the world’s economy has had a far-reaching impact 
on the labor market and people’s experiences with work. One of the most dramatic phenomena 
during this period was the global feminization of work. The feminization of work signifies both 
the mass numbers of women joining the workforce and the increase of low-wage work and 
precarious work conditions. For decades, scholars have highlighted the rise of this feminized 
workforce, including in export-oriented production (Alarcón-González and McKinley 1999; Elson 
and Pearson 1981; Fernandez-Kelly 1984), the informal economy (Benería and Roldan 1987; Mies 
1982), international and domestic migration for work (Kabeer 2000; Lim and Oishi 1996; Parreñas 
2001), and sex work (Kempadoo and Doezema 1998; Lim and Oishi 1996). The major trends of 
economic globalization—deregulation, privatization, liberalization, and the shift to a flexible and 
export-oriented production—helped to construct these global production networks that are 
distinctly gendered (Pyle and Ward 2003). Feminist scholarship has been instrumental in 
highlighting the relationship between gender and global capitalism; debates vary, however, on the 
experience and interpretation of women’s participation in the workforce and the impact of 
women’s work on gender relations. 
 20 
In her classic text on gender and development, Boserup (1970) argued that the 
modernization approach to economic and social development had marginalized women. Women’s 
traditional labor contributions at home and on the land were displaced in the shift from subsistence 
production to industrialization, leading to changes in women’s status and roles in the family and 
economy. The incorporation of women in the industrial workforce beginning in the 1970s reversed 
this position, as women came to be the preferred choice for a cheap, docile, and productive labor 
force (Elson and Pearson 1981). The continued economic marginalization of women despite their 
inclusion in the labor market raised questions regarding Boserup’s argument and that of the 
Women in Development (WID) school that capitalism could be a liberating force.  
Benería and Sen (1981), in a counterargument to WID thinking, wrote that these earlier 
analyses of women and development were limited because they did not account for capitalist 
accumulation and women’s role in social reproduction, and they argued that the inclusion of both 
would allow for analysis of differences across gender and class. These insights, developed in the 
Gender and Development (GAD) agenda, broadened analyses of global capitalism to consider the 
social construction of gender and its intersection with class, race, ethnicity, and nation (Benería 
1995, 1999; Bergeron 2001; Pyle and Ward 2003; Sassen 2000). Economic and social policies 
result in asymmetrical outcomes because of existing inequality in social relations. This is 
especially apparent when examining the harmful consequences of SAPs for poor and working-
class women in the Global South (Afshar and Dennis 1992; Bakker 1994; Cornia, Jolly, and 
Stewart 1987; Sparr 1994). Economic restructuring increased women’s participation in paid 
productive work (Sparr 1994; Vickers 1991), while adjustment policies of cuts and privatization 
of government’s social services assumed women’s unlimited and unpaid social reproductive labor 
(Tsikata 1995).  
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Feminist critiques of the economic development model have persisted, and, beginning with 
the 1995 UN World Conference on Women in Beijing, women’s movements and organizations 
began to influence the international agenda (Bergeron 2003). Work by feminist scholars and 
activists was successful in encouraging development institutions, such as the United Nations and 
the World Bank, to include a gendered analysis in their research and policies on globalization and 
development (see UNDP 1999; UNIFEM 2000; World Bank 1995). Finally, women began to be 
seen as key actors for economic development, and the solution was to build women’s capabilities 
for their empowerment (Sen 1999). 
The inclusion of gender analysis was accompanied by a larger shift in discourse from 
market-based development to a post-Washington Consensus that sought to integrate social and 
economic dimensions in development and to encourage sustainability over rapid economic growth 
(Stiglitz 1999). It would be, as the UNDP noted in its subtitle for the Human Development Report 
1999, “globalization with a human face.” The agenda would strive for social, economic, and 
political transformation, rather than relying on a universal logic of the self-regulated economy (Sen 
1999). This was the result of years of work and pressure by activists to develop an alternative 
development model, but some scholars note that the post-Washington Consensus, as supported by 
the World Bank and the likes, maintain colonial neoliberal practices (Bergeron 2003). The 
inclusion of feminist thought throughout these development initiatives raised questions of 
mainstream feminism being co-opted for the benefit of global capitalism (Eisenstein 2009) and the 
underlying political agendas (Eisenstein 2004). As evident in its World Development Report 2012: 
Gender Equality and Development, the World Bank is clear in its support for gender equality 
because “it is smart economics” (2012:xiii). Of its three reasons why gender equality matters for 
development, one is for more efficiency and productivity and the other for improvements for the 
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next generation7—gender equality is important because of the ability to utilize women’s 
productive labor and social reproductive labor (in supporting the next generation of workers) for 
economic interests. The post-Washington consensus relies on a notion that paid work is inherently 
liberating for women, and competing discourses on the empowering potential of work have framed 
the gender and development debate in the past two decades. 
Before revisiting this debate, a definition of “empowerment” is needed. Kabeer (2005) 
defines empowerment as the “ability to make choices,” and it is most useful to consider it in 
relation to three dimensions: 
Agency represents the processes by which choices are made and put into effect. It is hence 
central to the concept of empowerment. Resources are the medium through which agency 
is exercised; and achievements refer to the outcomes of agency. (p. 15, emphasis added) 
Many scholars of gender and development have used women’s participation in the labor 
market as an indicator of their increasing agency and thus empowerment (Chen et al. 2005; Kabeer 
2000; Lim 1990). One popular argument that relies on this framework is the intra-household 
bargaining model, which maintains that when women participate in paid work their earning 
potential has a positive impact on intra-household power relations (Agarwal 1997; Anderson and 
Eswaran 2009; Basu 2006; Kabeer 2005; Rahman and Rao 2004). There are limits to this model, 
however, as some of the authors cited above have noted. For one, intra-household bargaining 
theory does not account for extra-household dynamics, such as the quality of work. Women’s 
access to work is often determined by already existing intra-household dynamics, limiting their 
options to less desirable work (Basu 2006). For example, home-based work has limited 
empowering potential for women because of the social determinants that shape women’s uptake 
                                                
7 The third being more inclusive governance. 
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of this type of work, its exploitative work conditions, and the isolation from other workers (Kantor 
2003). Others have also noted that the model does not easily account for qualitative factors, such 
as social norms, social perceptions, self-interest, and altruism that impact intra-household 
dynamics (Agarwal 1997) and might shape women’s decision to choose familial and communal 
harmony over individual autonomy (Agarwal 1997; Kabeer 2005).  
Beginning in the 1980s, development institutions increasingly sought to support initiatives 
that foster women’s income-generating activities, such as microfinance and business development 
services (Chen et al. 2005). Microfinance, in particular, is seen as a powerful tool to reduce poverty 
(Arnopoulos 2010; Karim and Osada 1998; Khandker 1998) by delivering financial services to the 
poor (Khandker 1998) and supporting women’s entrepreneurial activities (Arnopoulos 2010; 
Rahman 1999; Torri and Martinez 2014). Donors, NGOs and finance institutions were swept up 
in the appeal of microfinance (World Bank 2000); though, some cautioned that microcredit is not 
a panacea, and that it is but one step in a process towards women’s empowerment (Khondkar 
2002). Including capacity-building projects, such as financial literacy programs, in addition to 
access to capital is considered a more multi-dimensional approach to supporting and sustaining 
women’s economic wellbeing (Khondkar 2002; Torri and Martinez 2014).  
The critique from critical feminists is that gender mainstreaming in development is 
implicated in the power structure of global capital. For one, feminist thought in development 
institutions “replaces real economic development with the ‘empowerment’ of women” without 
addressing the disastrous consequences of capitalist and neoliberal development (Eisenstein 
2009:168). Empowerment has been misconstrued to be women’s economic participation, 
overlooking the exploitative practices inherent in our contemporary economic system and ignoring 
historical gender inequalities, while capacity building has been appropriated and depoliticized 
 24 
from its leftist origins in the writings of Paolo Freire and liberation theology to support neoliberal 
ideology (Eade 2007:632). Approaching empowerment as the desired outcome disconnects its 
original meaning to bring "transformed power relations in the household or in public spaces” 
(Visvanathan and Yoder 2011:52). The reliance of these state and international institutions on 
women’s empowerment to combat global poverty reveals a move to avoid state responsibility 
(Eisenstein 2009). Furthermore, their dismissal of historical and geographic specificity for women 
risks a universalized (and exclusive) notion of what empowerment looks like. Postcolonial and 
anti-racist feminists have long contended that work has been a form of exploitation for historically 
marginalized groups (Charusheela 2003; Wood 2003), and the conditions of work in a capitalist 
structure will always be a source of exploitation, not liberation, for the poor and working class 
(Eisenstein 2009; Gimenez and Vogel 2005). Empowerment and capacity building have become 
development jargon with little meaning. The lack of critical analysis of global structures and 
processes places an unrealistic responsibility on women to “fix” global problems, and evades the 
underlying reasons for global inequality, and gender inequality more particularly.  
The mainstream feminist empiricism of intra-household bargaining and microfinance 
development initiatives discussed above are examples of the influence of neoclassical and 
neoliberal economic models on feminist thought. In both, women are reduced to their economic 
contribution and the liberating potential of work is assumed without accounting for power 
dynamics. The household bargaining model, an economics theory that women’s increased earnings 
can translate into increased power in relations in the household, widely adopted as the essential 
feminist economic analysis because of its supposed value neutrality and scientific rigor, reproduces 
the positivist and rationalist epistemological boundaries of economic science (Bergeron 2009). 
This analytical framework does not consider what Charusheela (2003) terms the intersubjective 
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dimensions of economic interaction. According to Charusheela, intersubjective differences emerge 
from interactions within unequally structured relationships. The neoclassical economic model and 
feminist models based on it, “simply [note] that differences exist, but [do not see] the differences 
themselves as the product of interaction between the two differing parties” (p. 298, emphasis in 
original). 
Despite the influence and inclusion of feminist theory, mainstream development models 
reproduce contemporary economic structures. As a social business enterprise, microfinance offers 
the opportunity to combine the seemingly contradictory goals of businesses and NGOs—profit 
and social goals (Karim 2011). But, as some scholars have noted, by integrating women in formal 
market and finance institutions, microfinance has become a neoliberal strategy for accumulation 
that captures previously untapped resources for capital (Elyachar 2005; Karim 2011; Visvanathan 
and Yoder 2011). From its early forms of informal savings and loan groups (centuries before 
organizations such as Grameen and SEWA Bank institutionalized microcredit) that emphasized 
“mutual assistance, cooperative initiative and organized worker unions…economic practices for 
the poor” have been restructured as a profit-making industry (Visvanathan and Yoder 2011). 
Microfinance is just another form of debt, a neoliberal strategy of dispossession by financialization 
(Harvey 2003) that produce crisis just as major financial institutions do. In India, where 
microfinance has proliferated with over 70 million borrowers, there are numerous examples of 
microfinance institutions charging exorbitant interest rates, forced loan recovery, and debtor 
suicides (Shylendra 2006).8 Observers have seen the commercialization of microfinance as 
profiting from the poor (Nair 2010). The non-repayment crisis of SKS Microfinance, a $250 
                                                
8 Microfinance loans tend to charge interest rates of 20 percent or higher. Institutions justify the 
high rate to administrative costs and future development and add that it is lower than the rates of 
local moneylenders. 
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million company in Uttar Pradesh, India, which led to the collapse of smaller organizations and 
the near collapse of SKS Microfinance in 2010, uncovered the reckless lending practices among 
for-profit institutions (Ramakumar 2010; Venkateshwarlu 2011).9 While NGOs and the media 
promote the success stories (Martinez 2008; Video SEWA 1995), researchers have found that 
microfinance is often used for subsistence and survival rather than entrepreneurial activities, and 
tends to place households in a cycle of debt (Pyle and Ward 2003).  
When considering the investment in empowerment projects that focus on income-
generating activity, such as micro-finance, it is important to ask in what ways Third World women 
are being reduced to their economic value for society (Charusheela 2003; Wood 2003). Feminists 
argue that the goal of women’s empowerment should be a transformative process whereby women 
decide their own means to empowerment (and what that is), not just inclusion in the current 
economic paradigm (Keating, Rassmussen, and Rishi 2010). As it is, microfinance constructs 
women as merely economic agents, without allowing for the potential of women as political agents 
(Radhakrishnan 2014). 
These debates surrounding gender, work, and development have often revolved around the 
role of agency and structure in women’s labor market outcomes. Early feminist analysis of 
globalization’s effect on women’s work focused on structural accounts of capital and work. Elson 
and Pearson’s (1981) widely cited article on female employees of export factories, while revealing 
important aspects of exploitation in global production, was criticized by some for providing a 
limited understanding of women’s experiences with work (Lim 1990). These analyses framed 
women as passive and did not account for “women’s own resistance and struggles that…derive 
                                                
9 The founder of SKS Microfinance, Vikram Akula, had published an article in the Harvard 
Business Review exalting the profitability of microfinance just a couple years before the crisis (see 
Akula 2008). 
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from a strategy of their own” (Benería and Roldan 1987:8). Women’s employment patterns are 
not only responses to the needs of capital, but also arise from women’s “perceived opportunities 
and constraints” (Kabeer 2000:xvii). To account for agency and subjectivity, one needs to expand 
the analysis outside of the factory and examine power (and resistance to it) across multiple sites. 
Postmodern theorists argue that flexible accumulation, a mixed system of formal and informal 
production, occurs not only through relations of production, but in social and cultural spaces as 
well, and so we must theorize beyond a single measure of class identity as workers “struggle 
against new and varied forms of domination, and seek new ways of grappling with social realities” 
(Ong 1991:304). Examining sites and performances of agency recognizes the multiplicity of 
voices, and avoids representations of Third World women as victims in fixed oppressive and 
patriarchal structures (Mohanty 1984; Spivak 1988). However, the massive political and economic 
restructuring that has accompanied neoliberal capitalism necessitates an analysis of these 
structures and the violence that has accompanied it through patriarchal and racist relations of 
power. As Marxist and socialist feminists have noted, it is only by confronting the conditions that 
allow for capitalism that we can imagine an alternative vision to it (Eisenstein 2009; Gibson-
Graham 2006).  
Theoretical Framework 
These debates have helped shape transnational feminist scholarship as it seeks to be more 
“attentive to the micropolitics of context, subjectivity, and struggle, as well as to the macropolitics 
of global economic and political systems and process” (Mohanty 2003:223). With that aim, in this 
section I discuss the theoretical frameworks that I employ in examining home-based workers’ 
experience with and resistance to power across multiple sites—the family, work, and civil 
society—that take place in the space of home. 
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Social Reproduction Theory 
In seeking to capture dynamics of power across different institutions, this research benefits 
from feminist contributions to the concept of social reproduction. Bedford and Rai (2010) 
summarize social reproduction as having three key components:   
1)   biological reproduction, the production of future labor, and the provision of sexual, 
emotional, and affective services (such as are required to maintain family and intimate 
relationships);  
2)   unpaid production of both goods and services in the home, particularly goods and 
services of care, as well as social provisioning (by which we mean voluntary work 
directed at meeting needs in the community); and, 
3)   reproduction of culture and ideology, which stabilizes dominant social relations. (p.7) 
Feminist theories of social reproduction accounts for the complexities of social locations 
while understanding that these locations interact within a dynamic set of social structures 
(Ferguson 2008). Located across a nexus of the state, the market, the family/household, and civil 
society, a social reproduction framework allows us to examine how institutions interact and 
balance power in those activities for the sustenance of life on a daily and generational basis 
(Bezanson and Luxton 2006). At the same time, gendered divisions of labor and cultural constructs 
of care oblige certain people to take on the bulk of social reproductive work, which limits their 
roles in economic, social, and political life. By examining people’s everyday material and social 
practices, social reproduction theory is a helpful tool to capture the abstract and material 
consequences of globalization (Katz 2001a).  
Feminists in the 1960s and 1970s built upon Marx’s underdeveloped writings on 
reproduction to examine how these unpaid activities are necessary for and exploited by a capitalist 
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system (see Benston 1969; Dalla Costa and Selma 1972; Reed 1970).10 Questions remained as to 
the ability of a strictly class analysis to explain women’s oppression, and in Marxism and the 
Oppression of Women, Vogel (1983) approached the social reproduction of labor power as a 
concept that unifies capitalism and patriarchy as an integrated process. Yet, the argument to 
analyze patriarchy and capitalism as related yet distinct systems gained ground, most famously 
articulated in Hartmann’s (1981) “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism.” There were 
also well-founded critiques of the inability of Marxist feminism to account for multi-cultural 
variations of gender inequality (hooks 1984; Joseph 1981; Molyneux 1979). A materialist feminist 
analysis diminished in the ensuing decades, unable to account for the multiple sites of inequality 
and power that would always come second in a structural Marxist analysis.  
In recent years, feminist theorists have renewed interest in the centrality of social 
reproduction for a critical analysis of capitalism (see Bakker and Silvey 2008; Bedford and Rai 
2010; Federici 2012; Gill and Bakker 2003; Katz 2001, 2001a; Mitchell, Marston, and Katz 2004). 
Social reproduction not only supports and sustains capitalist production, but it also contributes to 
capital accumulation (Gibson-Graham 2006). This scholarship provides an approach that 
overcomes dichotomous analytical categories of structure/agency or material/symbolic (Bedford 
and Rai 2010; Ferguson 2008; Laslett and Brenner 1989). In support of social reproduction theory, 
Katz argues that, “by looking at the material social practices through which people reproduce 
themselves on a daily and generational basis and through which the social relations and material 
bases of capitalism are renewed…we can better expose both the cost of globalization and the 
connections between vastly different sites of production” (2001:709). Below, I outline some of 
                                                
10 Marx acknowledged the need of the reproduction of labor for capitalist processes, but his 
writings on it are limited. See Capital Volume 1, Chapter 23 and Volume 2, Part 3.  
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these contributions and how social reproduction theory provides an analytical framework to 
examine the everyday practices and experiences of women in the informal economy in relation to 
changes in the domains of production and social reproduction.  
First is the historical role of social reproduction in capitalist processes and, more recently, 
for neoliberalism. In Caliban and the Witch (2004), Federici presents a gendered reading of 
primitive accumulation through social reproduction. Primitive accumulation during the transition 
to capitalism, according to Marx, included the dispossession of common lands in medieval Europe. 
Without a means of subsistence, a workforce was created that became dependent on capitalists for 
wage labor. Centering the analysis on the witch-hunts of the 16th and 17th century, Federici argues 
that this transition to capitalism also relied on a process of subjugation of women’s social position 
and control of their bodies (and reproductive functions) for the production of labor power. The 
construction of “femininity” is “constituted in capitalist society as a work-function masking the 
production of the work-force under the cover of a biological destiny” (2004:14). Since Marx and 
his contemporary followers accept capitalism’s definition of work, and, in turn, what constitutes 
class and class struggle, they fail to adequately recognize the significance of reproduction for 
capitalism and its potential as a site of struggle (Federici 2012). 
The arrival of neoliberalism reinforces the centrality of social reproduction in an analysis 
of capitalism. Social reproduction feminists agree with others that the neoliberal restructuring of 
the global economy is a continuing process of capitalist accumulation (Harvey 2003), but they add 
that the process relies on the restructuring of the domain of social reproduction (Bakker and Gill 
2003; Federici 2012; Katz 2001a). This accumulation by dispossession relies on 1) the destruction 
of subsistence economies, 2) de-territorialization of capital and financialization of economic 
activity, 3) disinvestment in the welfare state, and 4) the appropriation and destruction of the 
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environment (Federici 2012:101-102), all of which have caused tensions, contradictions, and crises 
of social reproduction as people struggle to secure the social and material practices necessary to 
support everyday life (Katz 2001a). Structural adjustment programs, which brought about many 
of these conditions, were implemented with the assumption that there is an infinite supply of 
women’s labor to replace the recently privatized social services (Elson 1998). As women joined 
the labor market, women’s time became more constrained since they continued to provide the same 
amount of care expected of them. The importance of assessing social reproduction needs, absent 
from the discussions of economic development in the 1980s and 1990s, began to appear with the 
shift in emphasis to gender issues found in the post-Washington Consensus (Bergeron 2003). As I 
discussed in the previous section, the development practices that came about from this social turn 
reaffirm a neoliberal ideal of self-empowerment, self-reliance, and individual responsibility 
(Hindess 2004), an apt example of this being the promotion of microfinance for economic and 
social development (a practice that I address as the construction of the gendered entrepreneurial 
subject in Chapter 5). 
These processes are linked to the informalization of work as experienced by half of the 
world’s working population and the vast majority of India’s. Informalization is a desirable 
production system for capitalism because it shifts the costs of production onto the worker; it also 
shifts the costs of reproduction onto households and communities. I already discussed how the 
restructuring of India’s economy encouraged a pauperization of work (Breman 1996, 2013; 
Harriss-White 2003). Capitalism relies on the reproduction of labor, but its dependence on labor 
power conflicts with its need to accumulate surplus value. A common method is to lower the costs 
of labor, as we see with the paltry wages, lack of security, and fragmentation of work associated 
with informality, but these working conditions negatively affect workers’ ability to attain an 
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adequate level of social provisioning, and so can also be a potential threat to capitalism’s ability 
to reproduce itself. Working becomes work for survival rather than for earnings. It is on the 
shoulders of workers and their households to address the increasing difficulty to provide for their 
social reproductive needs. The consequence of this is an exacerbation of existing structural and 
even cultural inequalities. For example, Acharya’s (2008) study on marriage practices in Nepal 
finds that market penetration in the region upset the traditional organization of production, and, 
while development diversified job opportunities, prevailing discriminatory structures maintained 
women’s disadvantage in the labor market, and the arrival of consumer culture intensified practices 
of dowry in the region, even among communities that had not practiced it before. 
Home-based work is one strategy to address the increasing tensions between production 
and social reproduction. Social reproduction theory acknowledges the structural changes that 
promote this fragmented production process, while also maintaining the cultural specificities of 
the work experience. As I will discuss in the empirical chapters, women justify starting or 
continuing paid work because they are able to work from home, which I argue reproduces 
expectations of feminine domesticity while allowing them to contribute economically to the 
household. Writing of the U.S., Staples (2006) writes that homework is a capitalist strategy to 
bring the production process into the home, taking advantage of the invisibility of this work to 
drive wages down and undermine collective action. This is the case in India as well. Homeworkers 
are paid at much lower wages than comparable work completed in a factory, and the fragmentation 
of work and workers’ isolation make it difficult to organize as a class of workers (Sudarshan and 
Sinha 2011). Social reproduction theory compels us to examine how, in an economic system that 
relies on the exploitation of labor and places the costs of social reproduction onto the worker, 
individuals and households employ strategies that attempt to resolve this conflict. Because it also 
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accounts for cultural practices, social reproduction theory is able to explain how market forces 
interact with social and cultural contexts that maintain women’s subordinate position in the 
economic and family spheres (Acharya 2008). 
The distinction between work and labor is a second analytical tool of social reproduction 
theory that is useful for this study. Bakker and Gill (2003:19), drawing on Gramsci, define work 
as a process that “broadly mediates relations between social and natural orders,” while labor is “a 
particular aspect of work” which is “appropriated and controlled by capital in the labor-capital 
relation.” This approach uses a much broader definition of work, which includes the social, 
economic, and cultural activities of human beings, while labor is the alienated form of work within 
capitalism. With the commodification of labor, the worker, now dispossessed from her means of 
subsistence, is dependent on wage labor for subsistence; social reproduction forms of work become 
subordinate to productive labor, yet it remains just as necessary (Bakker and Gill 2003). In a 
capitalist system that relies on the production of labor power much of social reproductive activities 
are not “free,” but are “subject to all the constraints that derive from the fact that its product must 
satisfy the requirements of the labor market” (Federici 2012:99), and so these social reproduction 
activities can be considered part of estranged labor. This distinction of work/labor avoids purely 
structural analyses and allows for the inclusion of agency. In Gramsci’s definition of work, while 
much of their work is exploited by capitalism in the form of labor, human beings employ strategies 
to actively participate in and transform social life (Bakker and Gill 2003:22). Social reproduction 
feminists thus do not limit themselves to abstract concepts of households or economies, but rather 
“start with the concept [of] labor as a lived, creative experience, and train our analytic lens on the 
‘survival strategies’ (and not just the formal paid labor) of those whose lives are the grist for the 
globalization mill” (Ferguson 2008:49). 
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There are two aspects of this approach that contribute to an analysis of home-based work. 
First, it adds nuance to women’s strategies in response to tensions created between the need to 
complete productive labor and address social reproductive needs. Rather than the home-based 
worker being a pawn to structural and cultural limitations, she is also actively addressing her 
particular circumstances. As I discuss in Chapter 4 and 7, through their labor, women believed that 
they could have an effective impact on their household’s wellbeing in the present time and, through 
their aspirations for children’s future economic and social mobility, in the future. Their survival 
strategies to support their and their families’ wellbeing are not solely located within the domain of 
paid labor, but encompass a variety of work activities (broadly defined) to address and potentially 
transform their situations. 
This broader definition of labor also avoids conceptual frameworks that define unpaid care 
work as distinct from paid work. It is not the type of activity that defines it as labor, but its relation 
to the human subject; thus, activities can be considered estranged labor if it is appropriated and 
controlled in a labor-capital relationship. With this definition, can women’s domestic duties be 
understood as estranged labor? And if so, how does this reframe our concept of women’s daily 
experiences with home-based work? This approach contributes to a more complete understanding 
of how production processes penetrates diverse spheres of social life, and it questions the common 
analytical separation of public/private and work/home. 
The daily schedules of women who are informally employed are not neatly divided into 
work and non-work time, and this especially true for home-based work. Research on home-based 
work has highlighted that women (more so than men) lack consistent blocks of time to focus solely 
on work activities and that they are frequently interrupted by family or community needs (Floro 
and Pichetpongsa 2010; Michelson 1998), yet this research relies on the distinction that unpaid 
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care work and paid work are separate. Even Alikoç’s (2013) gendering of Marx’s working day 
maintains domestic and maternal labor as separate and derived from patriarchal oppression, but 
not capitalist exploitation. In Chapter 4, I discuss the scheduling of women’s days and the 
techniques they employed to address an unsystematic work schedule. I argue that women’s unpaid 
work contributes to the production of value in their paid work for their contractors and the other 
agents further up the supply chain. I continue this argument in Chapter 5 by examining how 
women’s work (paid and unpaid) can be understood as embodied labor. Allen and Wolkowitz 
(1987) head in this direction with their compelling argument that contractors justify the low wages 
because women home-based workers’ are seen primarily as housewives who take on this work for 
spare money. I add that the temporal and spatial characteristic of this work also allows a capitalist 
production system to enter the home and restructure women’s domestic activities for its benefit. 
The ability for women to pause paid activity to address unpaid care needs seems to be a potential 
benefit, but it is also found in the inverse, work’s ability to interrupt women’s daily activities at 
any moment allows for a production system that is irregular and poorly paid.  
Lastly, an important contribution of social reproduction theory’s contemporary reworking 
is the inclusion of subjectivity in its analysis by accounting for the embodied nature of work. 
Ferguson’s (2008) review argues that current strands of social reproduction theory address past 
criticisms that this theory relies too heavily on structuralism and reduces explanations of social life 
to the economy. Her argument is a response to Bannerji’s (1995) critique that Marxist feminism 
does not account for cultural social formation and so “create[s] an unbridgeable gap between self, 
culture and experience, and the world in which they arise and have little to say about political 
subjectivity.” Ferguson thoroughly agrees that subjectivity, and especially race and racism, are 
absent from the earlier theory, but she argues that current feminist scholarship offers solutions. 
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The work/labor distinction, by centering human action despite much of it being in the form of 
estranged labor, is one example. Another is the socio-spatial historical aspect of labor. Social 
reproduction explains how the laboring subject becomes gendered through assumed biophysical 
traits, but Ferguson writes that the “location of our laboring bodies…[is] crucially important in 
determining how individuals and groups take part in the process of social reproduction” (p. 51, 
emphasis in original). Influenced by David Harvey’s emphasis on capitalism’s use of space, 
Ferguson argues that our social reproduction activities are organized in and through space, and 
that these locations are a “complex unity” of socio-historical determined spaces of geopolitics and 
systemic social relations; she writes, “it’s not just what we do to reproduce, but where we do it that 
matters in an imperialist capitalist world” (p. 51, emphasis in original). Today’s capitalist process 
of accumulation and the globalized production system that accompanies it reinforce these 
geopolitics and social relations of class, gender, and race. Contributors to Bakker and Silvey’s 
(2008) edited volume employ this socio-spatial analysis of social reproduction to explain the 
migration of women from poor countries to be domestic workers in rich countries (Herrera 2008), 
the use of microcredit in South Asia as a strategy to use women’s social reproduction for the market 
(Lingam 2008), and the reliance of assisted reproduction technologies by women who have had to 
postpone childbearing because of their careers (Chavkin 2008). 
A social reproduction framework locates the intersecting sites of subjectivity as socially 
mediated in a space that, today, is shaped by historical processes of colonial and capitalist 
constraints and resistance to it (Ferguson 2008). Past studies have examined how home-based 
workers’ multiple social locations of gender, caste, and religion shape their experiences with work 
(Abreu and Sorj 1996; Ghavamshahidi 1996; Khattak 2002; Weiss 1996). They also explain the 
role of capitalism in creating the conditions for this production system (Balakrishnan and Sayeed 
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2002; Carr and Chen 2002; Unni and Scaria 2009). Yet, they miss the ways that capitalist processes 
and social locations interact to form a shared social space of relations. Social reproduction provides 
agency to human beings as they actively participate in work (broadly defined as creative activities), 
though much of this work is exploited in the form of labor under capitalist conditions. But framing 
labor as embodied also accounts for an individual’s social location, both in terms of her 
geopolitical location and her location in a set of social relations.  
Social reproduction theory explains how the conditions of capitalism are inscribed on the 
different people because of their socio-spatial location. These social locations are in relation to 
capitalism, but experience and subjectivity are not reduced to an economic structure since 
capitalism, including the type of economic, family, state relations promoted within it, is understood 
to be a “set of practices by individuals and groups that act upon, reproduce and change over time” 
(Ferguson 2008:48). This theory helps illustrate “the ways that responsibilities for such [social 
reproductive] work are assigned to particular groups of people (women versus men, immigrants, 
low-income people, women of color) and institutions (state or non-state) and how these 
assignments and workloads are shifting in the contemporary period” (Bakker and Silvey 2008:4). 
This is why, as I argue in the following chapters, the entrepreneur in the gender and development 
paradigm is a construct of the gendered and racialized subject (see Chapter 5), unequal power in 
the family shapes women’s experiences within the institutions of the economy and civil society 
(see Chapter 6), and the constraints on women’s mobility because of their social identities, such 
as gender, caste, and religion, are exploited by the capitalist production system (see Chapter 7). 
Constructed Boundaries of Work: Moving beyond Public/Private 
Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus offers an additional analytical framework for this 
dissertation’s study of symbolic and material analyses of women’s experiences with informality 
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and development. Habitus is a system of dispositions that inform human aspirations and actions 
within a field, a socially structured space. This field reflects a social order (including power and 
domination) as unquestioned and is reproduced by human’s behavior. Yet, as human actions are a 
reflection of “strategies” to accumulate forms of capital (such as economic, social, and cultural), 
Bourdieu accounts for agency and social change in negotiation with structures of power. Here, I 
use the concept of habitus to examine women’s reproduction and resistance to power in the home. 
Habitus and the presence of social and symbolic boundaries helps explain how women are 
conscious of and participate in reproducing oppressive or unequal relations, but at the same time 
they also act out to change those circumstances, framing their participation in home-based work 
as an opportunity to support their children’s economic and social mobility. Feminist scholars have 
engaged with Bourdieu’s theories to help bring the significance of structural inequalities, such as 
class, back into feminist theory (Skeggs 1997).  
This scholarship complements a theoretical framework of social reproduction, not only 
from the obvious connection to the social reproduction of power (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977), 
but also because it provides a framework to understand the boundaries that inform, and at times 
are resisted by, women’s actions and experiences. In a review of the study of boundaries in the 
social sciences, Lamont and Molnár (2002) distinguish between symbolic and social boundaries. 
Symbolic boundaries are “conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, 
people, practices” and are “an essential medium through which people acquire status and 
monopolize resources,” while social boundaries are “objectified forms of social differences 
manifested in unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social 
opportunities” and are the result of socially agreed upon symbolic boundaries (Lamont and Molnár 
2002:168). These analytical tools are useful for this study because they help explain how symbolic 
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boundaries associated with “woman” and “home” are manifested in the social boundaries that 
shape women’s experiences, including mobility restrictions, work opportunities, and division of 
labor. This framework also allows for the possibility of women to use these symbolic boundaries 
to confront and reframe the meaning of social boundaries (2002:186). This helps explain how 
women reproduce relations of power, while contesting them at the same time.  
Examining the construction and use of symbolic and social boundaries allows us to 
critically question and move beyond assumed definitions of the public and private sphere, 
addressing a long-standing endeavor of feminist epistemology (Jaggar and Bordo 1989). A study 
of home-based work necessitates a reconceptualization of dichotomies such as public/private, 
work/family, and formal/informal because the material structures that support this production 
process do not themselves follow these rules. As I will argue in this dissertation, contract home-
based work exploits both women’s productive and social reproductive labor because of the 
reproduction of these boundaries.  
Plan of the Dissertation 
Chapter Two is an introduction to the city of Ahmedabad, located in the western state of 
Gujarat, and the organization with which I worked while in India, the Self-Employed Women’s 
Association. This chapter provides context for the historical and political-economic settings that 
have influenced present-day realities of informality for women workers in Ahmedabad and the 
civil society organizations that aim to support them in their livelihoods. While much of the content 
in the following chapters remain in the setting of the home, women’s experiences with the family, 
work, and civil society are shaped by the transformations I outline in this chapter.  
Chapter Three presents the methodology of this study. I discuss the importance of feminist 
methodology for international research on informal workers and the methods I used to collect data. 
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This chapter also reports on demographic data regarding the study’s participants. I end with a 
discussion of data analysis and the use of translators in this research. Methodology and methods 
were chosen for the ability to elucidate women’s experiences with the family, economy, and civil 
society, but also to acknowledge and address power relations inherent in the research process. 
Chapter Four is the first empirical chapter; it provides readers with an introduction to 
home-based workers, the factors that shape their experiences with work, and their strategies to 
address tensions that arise from it. The first part of the chapter explains how the economic contexts 
of Ahmedabad pushed women into the labor force in order to support households with few options 
for gainful employment. I discuss how women’s social positions constrained their work choices to 
employment in the informal economy. The second part focuses on the characteristics of home-
based work and the strategies that women employ to balance their work and care responsibilities 
when work takes place in the home. I examine the contradiction between the social forces that 
compel women to participate in home-based work and the actual practices of women’s productive 
and social reproductive labor. Using social reproduction theory, I argue that women’s participation 
in home-based work is a strategy to address their household’s precarious conditions within a 
limited set of possibilities. Women’s work possibilities are shaped by a range of economic, social, 
and cultural factors, including the division of labor in the home, women’s access to education and 
skill training, and the availability of work. I argue that these limits are advantageous for a capitalist 
system based on a flexible and fragmented production. Examining the strategies women employ 
to balance work and care helps uncover how aspects of social reproduction are incorporated as 
exploited labor for capitalism.  
Chapter Five examines the construction of the gendered entrepreneurial subject in 
development discourses—the poor woman of the Global South who employs her entrepreneurial 
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abilities to pull her family and community out of poverty. Studies critical of this construction often 
focus on micro-finance institutions; instead, in this dissertation, I investigate a common setting for 
entrepreneurial work—the home. I examine two characteristics of entrepreneurialism that are also 
found in home-based, covering costs of production and autonomy of work. I argue that these 
characteristics are not sources of empowerment, as often claimed by micro-finance institutions, 
but rather are sources of exploitation for the home-based worker. I find that in this setting where 
women have to invest in their work and have the potential to work (and earn) as much as they are 
willing to, work and care become a form of embodied labor in which their sense of providing for 
their family is impeded by these two roles. I apply the concept of embodied labor to explain the 
contradiction between the entrepreneurial women as imagined by gender and development 
institutions and the realities of the home-based worker. 
While Chapters Four and Five focus on relations of production, the sixth chapter centers 
on the relations of power in the family that shape women’s experiences with work and civil society. 
This chapter examines more closely women’s subjectivity as occurring within a set of socio-
cultural boundaries. Women’s position in the family determines how they participate in the public 
spheres—having to choose home-based work so that they could stay home or restricting their 
participation with SEWA if it took too much of their time. Rather than limiting women’s agency 
to institutional forces, I argue that participants employed strategic practices that allowed them to 
maintain these boundaries, while resisting the power embedded within these spaces in what James 
Scott (1985) calls “everyday forms of resistance.” This chapter employs theories of social 
reproduction and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to explain women’s agency and resistance within 
limited set of boundaries.  
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In Chapter 7, the final empirical chapter, I examine the concept of mobility for home-based 
workers. I begin by discussing the topic of mobility in the development field; I argue that 
restrictions on women’s mobility are often blamed on cultural factors, at the expense of social and 
structural forces. I briefly discuss the urban context of women and their mobility in the city before 
turning to my findings of how women maintain and contest symbolic boundaries. Among 
participants, women’s lack of mobility arises from their need to stay close to home to complete 
their care duties. However, I find that women’s preference for working at home contradicts their 
aspirations for their children, and notably their daughters, to leave the home for work. Women 
strive for upward mobility for their sons and daughters, but they emphasize the importance of 
outward mobility—leaving the home—for their daughters’ development and wellbeing. Their 
hopes for their daughters reveal their acknowledgement of and resistance to the injustices that they 
themselves have faced because of their intersecting social identities, including, gender, caste, class, 
and religion. While the previous chapters focused on the limitations that shape women’s 
experiences and everyday practices, Chapter Seven offers examples of how women address the 
inequality and injustices that they faced in their lives and their hopes for a better life for their 
daughters.  
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Chapter 2. Ahmedabad: Textiles, Gandhi, and Hindutva 
 
Though Ahmedabad, the largest city in the Indian state of Gujarat, is not well-known 
outside of India, the historian Howard Spodek has rightfully labeled it a “shock city” of the 
twentieth century, so called for the city’s contemporary history of dynamic and often violent 
changes. This chapter highlights some periods when the city found itself at the center of new social 
and economic problems and opportunities, including, as the chapter’s title suggests, the rapid 
industrialization and urbanization of Ahmedabad as a result of the textile industries, the arrival of 
Gandhi and the influence of his moral order for labor organizing, deindustrialization and rise of 
informalization, and the Hindutva politics that exploited inter-caste and communal tensions for 
political gains.  
Against this background, I discuss SEWA and its twin strategy of struggle and 
development for women in the informal economy. SEWA’s impressive growth in numbers and 
influence arrived in relation to a number of global social and economic transformations, most 
notably, the feminization and informalization of work that reified the importance of including 
women in economic analyses and the social turn in development practices (the inclusion of social 
factors in economic theory [Bergeron 2003]) that reflected many of SEWA’s multi-dimensional 
approaches to organizing and supporting its members.  
A City Divided 
The Sabarmati River divides the city of Ahmedabad in half. On the eastern bank is the 
“walled city,” founded in 1411 by the sultan Ahmed Shah and the city’s namesake. The wall has 
since been removed, but remnants of its twelve gates still remain. The walled city retains much of 
the city’s cultural heritage, with its historic mosques, markets, and pols relics of an illustrious past, 
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yet its debilitating infrastructure and high rate of poverty speak to its current use for the city.11 
Many of its residents are Scheduled Caste, Other Backwards Caste, or religious minorities. To the 
west of the Sabarmati is the new Ahmedabad. Its sprawling residential high-rises and air-
conditioned shopping malls attract those belonging to higher income groups.  
Two maps of Ahmedabad in the first pages of Spodek’s (2011) portrait of the city—one 
representing the city at the beginning of the 20th century and the other at the start of the new 
millennium—illustrate the shift of the city center from east to west, with the 1917 map dotted by 
the many mills within and surrounding the walled city, while villages made up most of the western 
bank. By 2000, prominent institutions, including universities and government buildings, had 
moved to the western bank, leaving behind the chaotic walled city and the now quiet textile mills. 
East Ahmedabad is the old city, a crumbling picture of heritage and poverty. West Ahmedabad, 
notwithstanding the pockets of slums that serve the upper classes, is the planned “Smart City,” 
representing the city’s modernity and global connectivity (Bhatkal, Avis, and Nicolai 2015). 
With 5.5 million people, Ahmedabad is the largest city in the western state of Gujarat, and 
one of the ten largest cities in India. As the economic and cultural center of Gujarat and the site of 
Mohandas K. Gandhi’s first ashram in India, Ahmedabad holds significant meaning for the state 
and nation.12 The city’s history in the struggle against colonialism laid the foundation for a strong 
civil society presence (Spodek 2011). One of these organizations, SEWA, has received 
international acclaim for its work with poor working women. With one of the fastest growing 
economies in India, Gujarat is often noted for its economic prowess. More recently, Gujarat gained 
national and international attention in 2002 for the communal riots that left over 2,000 dead 
                                                
11 Pols are housing clusters, often made up of one caste or religious community.  
12 The capital Gandhinagar is just over 14 miles north of Ahmedabad. 
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throughout the state, with over 1,000 of the victims in Ahmedabad, and again in 2015 when 
Narendra Modi, Chief Minister of Gujarat during the riots and later the head of the BJP party, 
became Prime Minister of India. The pogrom and the ensuing success of the BJP in the state leads 
to disturbing, though certainly not novel, questions of the link between ethno-nationalism, 
capitalist development, and violence (Bobbio 2015; Shani 2007; Sud 2012). Today, Ahmedabad, 
the urban center of Gujarat—an exemplary state of the neoliberal development model, complete 
with a biennial business summit to validate its investor-friendly environment—has become what 
the historian Howard Spodek has called “a capitalist city out of control” (2011). 
In the following sections, I present an overview of this city’s impressive and contradictory 
history in the 20th century as a site of the labor, women’s, and freedom movement, but also of a 
divisive form of nationalism and neoliberal economics.  “Industrialization and the Emergence of 
a Working Class” introduces the industrial city and the arrival of Gandhi that would shape the 
spirit of the labor movement of the city for decades and continues to influence SEWA’s organizing 
approach today. The second half of the century was marked with caste and communal strife that 
was worsened by growing informalization and de-industrialization, as well as the rise of Hindutva 
(Hindu nationalism). “A Changing Economy” documents the shift from centralized, inclusive 
development to free market economics. “The Rise of Hindu Nationalism” covers the same period 
and the change from multicultural secularism to religious nationalism; “Neoliberalism and 
Hindutva” explores the relationship between economic liberalization and Hindu nationalism. I then 
shift to the role of civil society, with a focus on SEWA, in addressing workers’ needs during these 
periods of great change, and, conversely, the impact of these economic, political and social changes 
for civil society itself.  
Industrialization and the Emergence of a Working Class Movement 
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Ahmedabad has historically been a center of trade and finance, with a strong and politically 
influential mercantile community. Reflective of Gujarati’s entrepreneurial spirit as well as the 
growing resistance to foreign rule over their economy, an early assertion of swadeshi (promoting 
indigenous manufacturing), Ahmedabad’s first textile mill opened in 1861 (Yagnik and Sheth 
2005). While the city’s rich merchant class viewed this endeavor cautiously at first, they slowly 
recognized the potential of investing capital in this modern industry, and less than a century later 
the city had 76 mills, employed over 70,000 workers daily, and earned the nickname the 
“Manchester of India” (Yagnik and Sheth 2005). Ahmedabad’s mills were all owned and financed 
indigenously, in contrast to Bombay’s mills that were owned by the British and Parsi (Mahadevia, 
Desai, and Vyas 2014), reflecting growing sentiment among the elites of the city for economic 
nationalism and swaraj, or self-rule (Yagnik and Sheth 2011). 
Migration to the city accompanied the growth of the industry, and the city grew 
correspondingly. Despite the rapid changes in Ahmedabad, the mills continued to reflect the caste 
hierarchy of the city, with Dalits occupying the most laborious yet poorly paid work (Patel 1988). 
Women made up a large percentage of the workforce, reaching 20 percent of the workforce in the 
1920s; most were Dalit women who, out of necessity, would work alongside their husbands 
(Yagnik and Sheth 2005). While the mills provided employment for the poor, the working 
conditions were harsh, despite legislation passed to regulate work conditions in factories (Yagnik 
and Sheth 2011). Labor unrest intensified as workers began to identify a common source of 
exploitation, but lacked a common venue for bargaining power. Mill owners formed the 
Ahmedabad Millowners Association in 1881 to protect their interests; workers would not have a 
union until the Textile Labour Association (TLA) was formed in 1920 (Yagnik and Sheth 2005). 
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In 1915, when Gandhi arrived in Ahmedabad to establish his first ashram in the country, 
the city had a vibrant social and political life from the citizenry’s involvement in social reform 
projects to the swadeshi and nationalist movement. Gandhi, whose exploits in South Africa were 
followed closely on the subcontinent, was given a hero’s homecoming, and, on deciding to set his 
base in Ahmedabad, his work was financially supported by the city’s elites, including the 
industrialists (Yagnik and Sheth 2011). This relationship with the capitalist class as well as his 
practice of satyagraha (passive resistance) would influence his view of the relationship between 
labor and capital as one of mutuality rather than conflict (Patel 1984; Yagnik and Sheth 2005). 
Gandhi’s influence in a major 1917 labor dispute between mill owners and workers helped lay the 
foundation for the TLA, but it would also shape the union’s future strategies and tactics of 
negotiation and avoidance of confrontation (Breman 2004). After the TLA’s first few years, the 
lack of a strong leadership base, the absence of leaders belonging to the rank and file, and mill 
owners becoming less enthusiastic about compromise with labor resulted in a weakened labor 
union unable or unwilling to use more militant tactics (Patel 1984). Notwithstanding critiques from 
the left, the TLA, with its leadership of city elites and its close relationship with the Congress 
Party, maintained significant power in the city and would influence labor legislation in both the 
state and the nation (Breman 2013). Collective bargaining offered workers a life of security, 
stability, and dignity, but the changes to come, most notably the collapse of the mills and the 
informalization of the economy, would undermine whatever advances the union had achieved 
(Breman 2004). 
A Changing Economy: From Post-Independence to the 1990s 
Following independence, Gujarat welcomed Nehru’s emphasis on nation building through 
capital-intensive development and domestic production. Industrialization, coupled with land 
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reforms and natural and manmade disasters, led to rapid urbanization across the state as migrants 
moved to cities in search of work (Yagnik and Sheth 2005). Ahmedabad, the major industrial city 
in the state, absorbed much of this migration, growing from under a million people in 1951 to over 
2 million three decades later (Yagnik and Sheth 2011). The city expanded in area as well, absorbing 
surrounding villages (Bhatkal et al. 2015). With infrastructure under pressure from its growing 
population, chawls (tenement-style housing) and slums proliferated (Bhatt and Chawda 1976).  
Social and cultural changes accompanied the city’s growth. Gujarat’s mercantile ethos 
propelled a new entrepreneurial middle class, facilitated by government policies that supported 
development of small-scale industries and expansion in new industries, such as chemicals (Yagnik 
and Sheth 2005). The reservation system, a positive discrimination system of reserved spots for 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in higher education institutions and public sector jobs, 
also provided a route for these historically oppressed groups to enter the middle class (Yagnik and 
Sheth 2005). As the city and its economy expanded, Ahmedabad became what Yagnik and Sheth 
call the three Ahmedabads: the walled city with its historic, though dilapidated, pols and markets, 
the surrounding textile mills with chawls housing the city’s working class and migrants, and to the 
west of the city, the cosmopolitan Ahmedabad, with its middle- and upper-class residents.  
Gujarat became one of the most industrialized states in India, but that did not translate into 
social prosperity. Environmental degradation and state development projects displaced many of 
the landless poor to work in cities under extremely exploitative conditions (Breman 1996), and 
relations between capital and labor in the latter half of the 20th century became defined by its 
informalization (Breman 2004). The economic changes in the coming decades would redefine the 
nation and state’s approach to development, and, in Ahmedabad, this was epitomized by the 
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closure of its famous textile mills and the lack of support provided to its now unemployed workers 
(Breman 2004).  
The economic dominance of the textile mills began to falter in the 1970s. The industry 
faced multiple crises, including domestic competition, state policies in favor of small-scale, 
decentralized production, changing consumer preference for synthetic materials, and the mill 
owners divesting from their own factories (Spodek 2011). This occurred at the same time as India’s 
economy was shifting from India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s socialist model to one 
of liberalization in response to the 1970s economic crisis. Economic reforms in 1985, supported 
by Rajiv Gandhi’s government, allowed for greater “flexibility” in the labor system. Following 
another economic crisis in the late 1980s, the IMF advised a structural adjustment program (SAP) 
that followed the tenets of neoliberalism—privatization, deregulation, and trade liberalization. The 
program, known as the New Economic Policy (NEP), was implemented in 1991 by the Congress-
led government, and placed India’s economy under a neoliberal doctrine. The policies associated 
with the NEP relied on a one-sided reading of the complex issues affecting India’s economy, and 
the strategies chosen were political choices that placed an uneven burden on certain groups in 
society (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002) and fostered a stratified and fractured workforce 
(Harriss-White 2003).  
When the last of the textile mills had shuttered at the start of the 1990s, its former workers 
joined an expanding informal economy with few, if any, labor regulations to protect them. Many 
of the jobs were in service, such as driving rickshaws, street vending, and construction, but others 
included casual work tied to industrial work in the form of outsourcing (Breman 2004). Women 
in poor households, whose workforce participation in the formal sector had fallen after 
independence (Banerjee 1978), joined the informal economy to make up the loss of income from 
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male household members (Mahadevia et al. 2014). The mills and their related industries and 
commerce had been a principal means of livelihood for many of the working poor in the city, with 
up to a third of its residents dependent on the industry (Varshney 2002). It had also offered a source 
of social cohesion, as members of different castes and religions shared a common working class 
interest, fostered over decades of social struggle. Thus when the mills collapsed, so did the social 
infrastructure that could help tame inter-caste and communal riots (Breman 2002; Varshney 2002).  
The Rise of Hindu Nationalism 
By the 1990s, the Gandhian moral order of unity was displaced by an ethos of growth 
(Yagnik and Sheth 2005) and communal division (Mahadevia 2002). Gujarat became a model state 
of free-market development in the 1990s. During this period of tremendous economic growth, 
workers faced a downgrading of work as new jobs were not unionized, lower paid, and more 
precarious (Spodek 2011), and the state lagged on several human development indicators and 
exhibited high environmental degradation (Hirway 2000).  
The urban sprawl and displacement further deepened divisions in Ahmedabad (Spodek 
2011). While inter-caste and communal riots were frequent in postcolonial and post-partition India, 
these divisions increasingly became part of a planned political articulation of Hindutva. Hindutva 
emerged as an upper-caste ideology of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which calls itself 
a cultural organization in support of a Hindu nation, a nation that excludes Muslims and Christians. 
Its political arm, which would later become the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), gained ground in 
Gujarat in the 1970s and 1980s through mobilization against the reservation system and other 
policies that were perceived as displacing the upper caste elites from power. The party’s idiom of 
Hindu communalism began to define its political strategy more definitely in the 1980s, as it 
broadened its base by including Dalits and Adivasi in its cultural-awakening program (Nandy et 
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al. 1995 from Ghaseem-Fachandi 2012). This form of social assimilation included the 
“Hinduizing” of groups that were formerly excluded from and discriminated against in the Hindu 
caste hierarchy (Hansen 1999). While conventional political analyses view the BJP strategy from 
the 1980s onward as one of Hindu-Muslim antagonism, Shani (2007) suggests an alternative 
perspective of deepening caste tensions displaced onto Muslims that supported the party’s rise to 
power in Gujarat and then the nation. This reworking of caste points to the fluidity of the system 
in relation to social factors, which in the 20th century were namely urban modernity, changing 
labor markets, and electoral mobilization, rather than the often interpreted rigidity of caste 
hierarchy (Hansen 1999:146; Vaid 2014).13 
Ingenious dissemination of Hindutva through mass mobilization by the Sangh Parivar (the 
term used to signify the RSS and its family of organizations) provided a means to unify formerly 
divided groups under the common goal of a Hindu nation. The most famous was the nation-wide 
movement to install a Hindu temple in Ayodhya on land that was at the time occupied by a 
mosque.14 In 1992, the mosque was successfully destroyed by an organized mob of Hindu 
nationalists, and the country exploded in riots. This political and cultural strategy was extremely 
successful. In 1995, the BJP emerged as the main political party in Gujarat, and in 1998 it gained 
national power for six years. In developing a strategy of mobilization through divisive politics, 
Gujarat became a laboratory for Hindutva.15 Political and communal riots made Ahmedabad one 
                                                
13 In fact, post-colonial scholars have attributed modern definitions of caste groups and religious 
communities to colonial constructions by the British Empire for the purpose of classification and 
categorization (Appadurai 1993). 
14 Ayodhya is a city in Uttar Pradesh. The Sangh Parivar’s argument for destroying the mosque 
was that it was built on the site of an important Hindu deity.  
15 The BJP employed similar communal politics in Uttar Pradesh before the 2014 election, with 
riots followed by a strong showing for the party (Pai 2014). 
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of the most violent cities in the latter half of the 20th century (Varshney 2002), and at the start of 
the new century the city would once again be defined by violence . 
Gujarat was known as a volatile place with numerous incidents of inter-caste and religious 
violence over the years; however, the communal riots of 2002 were especially horrific for their 
magnitude, violence, and complicity of the state. The 2002 riots were sparked in a town not far 
from Ahmedabad on February 27th. A train car of Hindu pilgrims caught fire during a clash 
between the passengers and Muslim kiosk owners on the platform. Fifty-nine passengers trapped 
in the car died. The next day, after a procession of the burned bodies through the city and 
incendiary local news coverage of the events (Ghaseem-Fachandi 2012), Hindus in Ahmedabad 
and other urban and rural areas in Gujarat broke out in violent retaliation against Muslims. 
Government officials estimated 850 people were killed over the eight weeks of carnage, though 
other reports estimated a death toll of 2,000 and over 100,000 displaced (Human Rights Watch 
2002). Almost half of the deaths were in Ahmedabad, and the overwhelming majority of victims 
were Muslim (Human Rights Watch 2002). The role of the state, through its failure to contain the 
riots from the start and accusations of state machinery orchestrating and inciting the violence, have 
compelled some to label the riots as a pogrom (Ghassem-Fachandi 2012; Spodek 2011). Civil 
society was complicit too, either explicitly (such as the Sangh Parivar) or through its absence, 
including organizations that maintained a Gandhian ideology; especially disconcerting was the 
silence of SEWA, an organization with a wealth of social capital and resources, as well as a large 
percentage of Muslims within its membership (Spodek 2011).16 The Sangh Parivar, however, 
benefits from divisive politics, as evidenced by the BJP’s gains in the state after the pogrom, 
                                                
16 When I asked one of the SEWA Directors about SEWA’s silence during these times, her 
response was, “We tried but the atmosphere was such that our voices were not heard…it was a 
very difficult time.” 
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especially in areas that witnessed the most violence (Spodek 2011). With each ensuing riot, greater 
social and geographic isolation between Muslims and Hindus have grown (Yagnik and Sheth 
2005). 
Neoliberalism and Hindutva 
The two defining features of India in the 21st century—the arrival of economic liberalism 
and the rise of Hindu nationalism as a political force—are not as contradictory as they would seem. 
The failure of basic social reform (Frankel 2005) and the exclusion of the masses by the elite in 
post-colonial India left a vacuum that would be filled by the ideology of Sangh Parivar family 
(Corbridge and Harriss 2000). The rise of Hindutva in the 1980s occurred during a time of 
economic transformation and uncertainty (Jaffrelot 1996), and, in the 1990s, the threat of 
globalization to national culture and identity added fuel to the movement (Oza 2006). Through a 
convergence of economic progress and Hindu nationalism (Bobbio 2012), the BJP successfully 
produced a political construction of a new Hindu middle-class that would represent modern India 
(Fernandes 2006). This was especially successful in Gujarat, which came to be known as a 
laboratory for Hindutva politics.  
Modi, in his tour of the state before the 2002 elections, used imagery of the Muslim enemy 
to rally supporters, but he also exalted the economic and social development of the state (Spodek 
2011). The violence of BJP politics was quieted by the economic success of Gujarat (Jaffrelot 
2008). The political ideology of economic liberalization, labeled as Gujarat-style development, 
and ethno-nationalism would later be adopted at a national level (Patel 2002).17 Remarkably, 
despite its overt religious ideologies, the BJP managed to envelop secularism within an economic 
                                                
17 Once again, the approach proved favorable for the BJP. During the national elections of 2014, 
the BJP won a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha. As party leader, Modi was sworn in as Prime 
Minister. 
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discourse, with claims that only a privatized and liberalized economy will bring equality of 
opportunity, irrespective of one’s social status, and insisting on solely economic indicators to 
measure progress (Bobbio 2012). This conceals the still present role of the state in creating a 
business-friendly environment (Sud 2012), while excluding marginalized groups from state 
resources, namely backward castes, Adivasi, and religious minorities (Hirway 2014). 
During Modi’s tenure as Chief Minister of Gujarat from 2001 to 2014, “ease of business” 
became the mantra. The period ushered in an era of regional competition to attract foreign and 
domestic investment to the state (Bobbio 2012). Free-market supporters have fallen 
wholeheartedly for Modi’s business-friendly gimmicks, including a biennial business summit, 
Vibrant Gujarat, and offering Tata Motors a factory-ready plot for its Nano plant after land disputes 
with the state government in West Bengal (The Economist 2015). Ahmedabad, as the state’s 
largest city, underwent extensive urban redevelopment. Beautification and infrastructure projects, 
including the Sabarmati River Front Development (SRFD) and Bus Rapid Transit System (BRTS), 
reimagined the cityscape to that of a world-class city, reflecting the urban renewal mission of other 
post-colonial cities (Chatterjee 2014). An aspect of the city in global capitalism has been the shift 
in urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989). Chatterjee (2014) 
adds to the literature on urban entrepreneurialism by noting that, in Ahmedabad, urban governance 
combines neoliberal urbanism with ethno-religiosity. Ahmedabad’s municipal authority, headed 
by the BJP, presents formal scientific planning in its urban policies, but actually performs Hindutva 
ideology to hide the exclusion of minorities and the poor in urban planning; for example, political 
support of a Hindu procession with overt anti-Muslim provocations. In this urge to transform the 
industrial city to a global city (Bobbio 2012), urban politics emphasized middle-class aesthetics 
 55 
and lifestyles, while overlooking the needs of the urban poor (Mahadevia, Joshi, and Datey 2013; 
Mahadevia 2002a).  
SEWA: A Union for Women Workers 
Over this period of deindustrialization and informalization of the labor market, along with 
rising neoliberal practices and communalism, SEWA grew from a department within the TLA to 
an internationally renowned organization. During this period, its organizing strategy for women in 
the informal economy developed significantly. This evolution reveals SEWA’s response as an 
organization to changing political and economic contexts, but it also hints at changes that women 
faced at home, in the labor market, and in civil society over the decades. This section presents a 
brief history of SEWA, and highlights how the organization modified, resisted, and reproduced 
changes in the city and country. 
In We Are Poor but So Many, Ela Bhatt (2006), the founder of SEWA, recounts how she 
came to realize the need for a labor union for women informal workers. Bhatt was the head of the 
TLA’s Women’s Wing at the time, and she had recently conducted a survey to assess the impact 
of the mill closures on former mill workers’ families. In the field, Bhatt saw that, since men had 
lost their work at the mills, women had taken on the responsibility of providing for their 
households. While the TLA saw these women as “enterprising housewives stepping in to work at 
a time of crisis,” they did not believe that there was a need to organize them as workers (Bhatt 
2006:9). Bhatt, on the other hand, recognized the possibility of organizing these women as 
workers, and so SEWA was established in 1972 as part of the Women’s Wing of the TLA. 
Over time, the relationship between SEWA and the TLA started to deteriorate. SEWA was 
growing rapidly, and, because of the unique position of its members in the labor process, it had to 
expand its services and experiment with new methods of organizing; the TLA, on the other hand, 
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remained a top-down organization, and was unable to adequately change its approach to organizing 
in response to the changing economic conditions. After a disagreement over SEWA’s outspoken 
support of Dalits during a caste riot in 1981, the TLA asked SEWA to leave. According to Bhatt, 
the break was fortuitous. As an autonomous organization, SEWA was able to move in a direction 
that traditional labor unions would never have, such as combining organizing with cooperatives 
and developing a grassroots leadership structure.  
In establishing SEWA, Bhatt sought to bring recognition to the significant economic 
contribution of women informal workers and to show that these workers could be organized. 
SEWA has been very successful in achieving this, and has grown significantly in size and scope. 
From a membership of 4,900 members when it left the TLA (Bhatt 2006), in 2013, SEWA had 
nearly 2 million members across fourteen states in India (SEWA 2013). Its members participate in 
four main types of trades and occupations: street vendors, home-based producers, manual laborers 
and service providers, and rural producers. It has grown to include 20 sister organizations that 
provide various services, including banking and microloans, health services, and capacity building. 
SEWA has gained national and international stature for its expertise on informal workers. It 
coordinates international networks for informal workers and has helped establish similar 
organizations in different countries.18 It is often asked to contribute expert advice to government 
                                                
18 Some of the international networks include HomeNet, StreetNet, and WIEGO (Women in 
Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing), and it has also provided assistance in 
developing similar organizations in other countries, including Afghanistan, Nepal, and South 
Africa (SEWA 2013).  
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and multilateral institutions,19 and has partnered with foreign state agencies and the private 
sector.20  
SEWA, guided by the extraordinary vision of Ela Bhatt, has succeeded in removing 
conceptual barriers regarding who counts as a worker and what counts as work (Bhatt and Jhabvala 
2004). There is a wealth of scholarly work examining this first and largest union for women 
informal workers. SEWA’s success is attributed to its leadership, flexibility, and organizing 
strategy (Blaxall 2004), its emphasis on developing grassroots leaders (Datta 2003; Rose 1992), 
its dual strategy of struggle through organizing and development through cooperatives (Chen et 
al. 2005), and fostering a shared identity as workers for its members (Hill 2010; Ichharam 2006). 
Scholars and policy makers have documented how SEWA organizes informal and contingent 
workers (Hill 2010; Hotch 2000; Jhabvala 1994), addresses the negative impact of globalization 
on workers (Unni 2004), achieves women’s empowerment (Datta 2003; Rao 1996; Rose 1992), 
increases women’s wealth and assets (Baruah 2010; Unni 1999), and supports work-life balance 
(Chatterjee 2006; Hill 2010), among other accomplishments. Learning from the organization’s 
success is of particular relevance in the current contexts of growing informality (UNDP 2015; 
WTO and ILO 2009) and interest in women’s role in economic development (UN Women 2015; 
                                                
19 In 1987, when the government established the first National Commission on Self-employed 
Women and Women in the Informal Sector, Ela Bhatt was asked to be the chairperson on the 
committee and to contribute to its report Shramshakti (see SEWA 1989). SEWA was also a critical 
voice during discussions to pass legislation for informal workers at the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) (Spodek 2011).  
20 Examples of these partnerships include the ILO and WHO (SEWA 2013), Mastercard (Pandit 
2014), and Vodafone (Chukkath 2016). SEWA has also been called an example of India’s regional 
power to promote development in the South Asia region by the Council of Foreign Affairs (Council 
of Foreign Affairs 2015); recently, it has partnered with USAID on a $1.5 million, three-year award 
to train women’s vocational skills in Afghanistan as part of a strategic partnership with the US, 
India, and Afghanistan (USAID 2015). 
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World Bank 2012). In fact, SEWA is often noted as an exemplary organization for women informal 
workers (ILO 2013; UNDP 2015). 
Among these accolades, there are few studies that have assessed SEWA’s organizational 
transformations in response to changing political and economic contexts. Other than Bhatt’s (2006) 
book, there is no systematic study of the institutional and political challenges that SEWA 
confronted, such as the significant changes in the political economy and in international 
development, since it was first established. SEWA admits to having had to professionalize in order 
to sustain its far-reaching goals (Bhatt 2006:16; SEWA 2013), but there are no studies of how this 
professionalization and institutionalization has affected SEWA’s mission and its members. In the 
following section, I discuss SEWA’s organizational strategy, its leadership and membership 
structure, and the role of SEWA Academy. I locate these organizational decisions and practices in 
relation to societal changes, including, deindustrialization and informalization in Ahmedabad, the 
growing presence of NGOs for development, and rising communalism in the city. While this is not 
a complete picture of the organizational transformation of SEWA over four volatile decades, it 
does provide an introduction to understanding the contexts in which SEWA works, offering both 
opportunities and limitations for organizing informal workers.  
Organizing Informal Workers: Twin Strategy of Struggle and Development  
SEWA is committed to achieving what Gandhi called the “Second Freedom,” freedom 
from hunger and want (Chen et al. 2005; SEWA 2013). SEWA interprets this economic freedom 
as achieving two goals: full employment, with security of work, income, food, and social security 
(defined as health care, child care, and shelter) and self-reliance, allowing for economic self-
sufficiency and autonomy, both collectively and individually (Chen et al. 2005:78). It employs an 
integrative approach in addressing these goals, guided by eleven points as described in Table 1. 
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SEWA addresses numerous aspects of workers’ lives, not just issues traditionally 
associated with the economy. Through this more comprehensive and holistic approach to 
organizing workers, SEWA offers an alternative perspective that includes both the social and 
economic factors that shape workers’ experiences. To achieve these eleven points, the SEWA 
movement incorporates a twin strategy of struggle and development in its organizing—a strategy 
that sets it apart from traditional trade union work.  
From its experience organizing women informal workers, SEWA learned that to achieve 
full-employment and self-reliance for its members it must include both struggle and development 
in its strategy (SEWA 2013). Struggle, the building of collective strength and bargaining power 
through solidarity among workers, is an essential part of social change (SEWA 2013). 
Development is also necessary to help sustain the poor during their struggle and to aid them in 
developing their own vision for a just society (SEWA 2013). After it broke with TLA, SEWA 
began its development work in earnest in the form of cooperatives, beginning with Mahila SEWA 
Table 1. SEWA Goals and Eleven Points 
FULL EMPLOYMENT requires that each woman has: 
•   Employment. Have more members obtained more employment? 
•   Income. Has their income increased? 
•   Nutrition. Have they obtained food and nutrition? 
•   Health care. Has their health been safeguarded?  
•   Childcare. Have they obtained child-care?  
•   Housing. Have they obtained or improved their housing? 
•   Assets. Have their assets increased? 
 
SELF-RELIANCE of each woman is achieved through: 
•   Organized strength. Have the workers’ organizational strength increased?  
•   Leadership. Has worker’s leadership increased?  
•   Self-reliance. Have they become self-reliant both collectively and individually?  
•   Education. Has the education of our members (and their children) improved?  
 
Adapted from Chen et al. (2005:3) and SEWA (2009). 
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Sahakari Bank in 1981 and following with trade cooperatives, social security, and healthcare 
cooperatives, along with many others that would offer social and economic support for its 
members. The long-term goal of the trade union and cooperatives remains the same, but the 
strategies employed to achieve short-term goals differ, providing SEWA and its members with a 
balance of radical and conservative tactics (Jhabvala 1994).  
SEWA sees this dual approach as necessary for the sustainability of the organization and 
its members. Jhabvala (1994:133) writes that the positive image of cooperatives softens the “hard” 
image of the union, often portrayed by employers, the government, and police as “unreasonable, 
destructive, violent.” The cooperatives provide the union with potential allies that would normally 
be opposed to the confrontational image of unions, such as the press and middle-class. For 
members, the cooperatives embody the spirit of cooperation, build self-reliance through alternative 
employment, and provide workers with control of the economic system; the cooperatives can also 
set standards for work and help raise wages for other workers. Similarly, the trade union is vital in 
its support for cooperatives and for the success of the movement. The union has the capacity for 
“mass mobilization, pressuring tactics, fighting strategies, legal know-how and effective 
bargaining,” and it offers resources and knowledges that are difficult to foster among poor 
women’s cooperatives with “the weight of the economic system against them” (1994:134). In 
pursuit of SEWA’s two goals of full employment and self-reliance, it employs a range of activities 
that are grouped as organizing or development strategies, listed in Table 2. 
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Table 2. SEWA Organizing and Development Strategies 
ORGANIZING: 
•   Organization:  trade groups or cooperatives or producer groups 
•   Leadership development: opportunities and training to become local leaders 
•   Collective bargaining: trade-wise or issue-based 
•   Policy advocacy: trade-wise or issue-based 
 
DEVELOPMENT: 
•   Financial services: savings, loans, and insurance  
•   Social services: health, child care, and education (adult literacy) 
•   Infrastructure services: housing plus water, sanitation, electricity 
•   Capacity-building services: training in technical skills, leadership, and other skills 
•   Enterprise development services: skills training, product development, and 
marketing 
 
Adapted from Chen et al. (2005:5). 
 
This twin strategy can weaken a union as SEWA enters into dependent relationships with 
the government (through funding projects) and private industries (through contracts for SEWA’s 
cooperatives),  and its development activities mimic those of an NGO,21 but the industrial relations 
structure of unions is ill-equipped to address the needs and demands of an expansive and 
heterogeneous informal workforce (ILO 1997). Munck (2002:116) writes that unions’ ability to 
organize informal workers will determine the “relevance of trade unions to the world’s workers of 
today.” Informality will not disappear; rather, informalization is an integral component of global 
capitalism (Castells and Portes 1989). How does a union organize workers when there is no 
common employer? How does a union, organized around trade, organize a worker who might be 
an agricultural laborer during harvest time, but embroiders quilts to sell year-round? How does a 
union organize a worker who does not identify herself as such? SEWA aims to develop an 
individual and communal sense of worker identity, but it is not bound solely by economic 
definitions of work and labor. Rather, because of the unclear divisions of when and where one is 
                                                
21 See following section for a discussion of SEWA’s NGOization. 
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working in informal work, such as working out of one’s home or a vegetable vendor looking after 
her child while working, SEWA integrates a holistic organizational structure, supporting women’s 
economic conditions, but also building her capacities as outlined in SEWA’s Eleven Points. This 
provides SEWA with a means to address the intersecting inequalities that affect workers, not just 
their class identity, an aspect that unions have traditionally ignored (Cobble 1993). In its innovative 
and boundary-breaking approach to organizing workers, SEWA has proved that labor solidarity is 
still possible despite the exploitative and isolating nature of informal work, and labor scholars 
identify it as an exemplary organization for informal workers (Breman 2013:130; Munck 
2002:125).  
The NGOization of SEWA 
In many ways, SEWA is an example of the NGOization of social action. But the SEWA 
Directors I spoke with rejected the NGO label, pointing to the twin strategy of union and 
cooperatives and its membership-based structure to distinguish SEWA from project-based NGOs 
(Interviews, April 2, April 30, May 27, 2014). Many grassroots and community-based 
organizations, including SEWA, however, fall under the category of NGO as civil society 
organizations. The transformation of SEWA from a trade union to a family of organizations that 
provide development projects, including microfinance, childcare, and health services, is, for better 
or worse, an example of NGOization, defined as the professionalization, institutionalization, 
depoliticization, and demobilization of social movements (Alvarez 1998; INCITE! Women of 
Color Against Violence 2009; Miraftab 1997). I do not use the terms NGO and NGOization to 
criticize SEWA’s work, but rather to situate the role of SEWA within a neoliberal model of civil 
society (Kamat 2004). I am interested in examining how SEWA responds, resists and even 
concedes to neoliberal capitalism, with the aim of moving beyond the binary generalization of “co-
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opted NGO” versus “radical social movements” (Choudry and Kapoor 2013). 
Being a trade union and a development organization, SEWA had to institutionalize and 
professionalize to sustain itself and to expand its dual strategy. Ela Bhatt started the union 
alongside informal workers, but as it grew she began recruiting professionals to help with 
organizing and leadership (Bhatt 2006:16). She writes that there was a need for “educated 
professionals who could speak on behalf of women when they themselves could not” (Bhatt 
2006:8). In this statement, Bhatt is acknowledging the difficulty of grassroots organizations of the 
poor in translating their needs to those in decision-making positions. It is not because the poor are 
unable to articulate their demands, on the contrary, Bhatt (2006) and Jhabvala (1994) provide many 
examples of poor illiterate women who become leaders in their community through their activism, 
but, nevertheless, they do face barriers imposed by structural powers. Mobilizing workers provided 
strength in numbers, but to support policy change, the movement had to adopt the language of the 
state. 
All of the SEWA directors that I met with belong to the middle and upper class and castes 
and hold university degrees, some from institutions in the United States and England. As educated, 
politically skilled, and economically privileged women, they provided social and cultural capital 
to the movement. Another driver of professionalization was the need for paraprofessionals when 
SEWA began to expand its scope into development activities. 22 For example, with the 
establishment of SEWA Bank, staff with financial education and licenses had to be hired 
                                                
22 While SEWA publishes its membership numbers in its annual reports, it does not provide 
consistent and publicly available information for its staff. At the end of a manuscript on SEWA’s 
membership, Chen and colleagues (2006) provides some information on staff numbers. According 
to the report, in the state of Gujarat, there are 953 paraprofessionals for the 469,306 members. It 
does not state how many of its paraprofessionals reflect the communities that SEWA serves, 
though, in its definition of SEWA paraprofessionals, Chen and colleagues note that they are SEWA 
members and some are trained from the SEWA’s membership. 
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(Interview, May 21, 2014). A number of professionals arrived only to leave shortly afterwards, 
unable to adjust their preconceptions with the ideals and practices of the organization, namely, 
where poor workers are leaders (Interview, April 2, 2014). There were some professionals who 
arrived with open minds, and, recognizing the importance of SEWA’s work, spent the rest of their 
careers with the organization. In an interview with Lalita Krishnaswami, who has been with the 
organization since 1977 and is the director of SEWA Cooperative Federation, she describes the 
different generations of professionals that arrived to contribute their skills, but who also learned 
from the members and grassroots leaders (Interview, April 2, 2014). 
Despite its professionalization, SEWA manages to remain committed to a grassroots 
process, with many of its organizers and leaders (though not directors) belonging to the 
communities in which SEWA works. It achieves this through a strategy of recruiting members, 
organizing them in local primary groups (e.g., trade group, savings-and-credit group), and 
promoting and building their leaderships skills out of these local organizations (Chen et al. 2006). 
SEWA’s membership, and the many roles among its members, is best understood as a concentric 
circle. Figure 1 illustrates how leaders and representatives (and paraprofessionals, though they are 
not represented in the figure) come from its pool of members. In their report, Chen and colleagues 
(2006) explain that of its 2 million general members there is a smaller group of members who are 
more active, having participated in more than one service and being with SEWA for two or more 
years. 23 Active members can attend training sessions offered by SEWA to take on leadership roles 
in the organization and their community (the “leaders” represented in Figure 1); representatives 
are elected members who form the Trade Council of SEWA’s governance structure.  
                                                
23 Recipients of any of SEWA’s services are automatically considered members, since they are 
required to pay a nominal membership fee. 
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Figure 1. SEWA Membership 
 
 
 
Adapted from Chen et al. (2006:96). 
 
 
The governing structure is designed to support leadership and representation from working 
women (see Figure 2). The membership body is made up of members of various trade occupations, 
such as vendors, construction workers, and agricultural workers, from both rural and urban areas. 
Each trade has a Trade Committee made up of elected local leaders. This committee elects trade 
representatives to the Trade Council; in 2002, there were 1,421 representatives on the council 
(Chen et al. 2006:101). The council elects twenty-five representatives for the Executive 
Committee, which is the decision-making body of SEWA. Its ability to foster and support 
grassroots leaders is impressive, and SEWA Directors pointed to this aspect to differentiate the 
organization from top-down and project-based NGOs (Interviews, April 2, April 30, 2014). 
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Figure 2. SEWA Governing Structure 
 
 
 
 
SEWA Academy: Building Capacities, Building Leaders 
To build members’ capacity as leaders, SEWA Academy, a university for the poor, was 
established in 1991. As a sister organization of SEWA, its goal is to take “the SEWA movement 
forward” through “training and capacity building, action-oriented research of its members, and by 
building strong communication channels, within the organization as well as with the outside 
world” (SEWA Academy 2016). Services for members include literacy classes, vocational 
training, and leadership training. SEWA Academy is also responsible for communication and 
offers research capacity for the family of organizations. 
SEWA Academy’s capacity-building programs are for the “self-development of the worker 
in order that her talents may be encouraged and developed, and she develops self-confidence and 
leadership skills” (SEWA 2009a), and involves “a slow but steady progression of women to a state 
where they develop a critical consciousness towards the world in and around her” (SEWA 
Academy 2011:5). Programs, like skill training and literacy, are aimed at immediate results in 
improving women’s employment opportunities, while building women’s capacities. The programs 
developed women’s sense of worth as a worker and that her contributions, both paid and unpaid, 
are valuable to society. Community organizing also provided space for women to share their 
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experiences and learn from each other, developing individual and collective identities. This 
building of respect and recognition is necessary for women to develop a worker identity as well as 
agency to confront exploitative economic institutions (Hill 2010). Worker agency sustains the 
organization’s grassroots membership and its leadership base. 
The Politics of Identity 
SEWA’s success depends on creating and supporting a shared worker identity among its 
members (Hill 2010). Since the beginning of the organization, SEWA fought hard to show that 
these women, as waste collectors, home-based workers, and street vendors, among others, are 
workers providing significant economic contributions and that they could be organized across 
these different occupations (Bhatt 2006). In a society divided by caste and community, it is also a 
strategic decision to organize women on the commonality of their working class identity, despite 
their diverse backgrounds. In an interview, Mirai Chatterjee, director of the health and social 
insurance cooperative Vimo SEWA, explained that:  
[SEWA] strategically and ideologically chose to focus on their identity as workers. And in 
a country that is so divided by caste and community, if you want to build a workers’ 
movement, and it’s not just SEWA, it’s all the unions and other labor organizations, we 
focus more on their common worker identity…If you provide work security, income 
security, food security, and social security as SEWA is trying to do, then all will benefit. 
These [caste and communal] divisions are likely to go down because there will be less 
inter-caste and inter-religious rivalry. (Interview, May 21, 2014) 
Mirai went on to argue that focusing on the shared socio-economic relations among the 
working class is a potential avenue for overcoming communal tensions. Economic relations had a 
significant role in public violence of 20th century Ahmedabad. Deindustrialization, rapid 
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urbanization and modernization all contributed to the divisive social fabric of a city that had 
previously seen Dalits, higher caste Hindus and Muslims living and working side-by-side in the 
walled city (Yagnik and Sheth 2011). Mirai notes that today the working class still shares “deeply 
enmeshed social-economic relations”: 
The contractor of a home-based worker may be a Hindu or the big merchant may be a 
Hindu but the Muslim women are the home-based workers. And even though they are from 
different communities they have a long social connection. So this binds not only them 
together, it binds the entire society together. Because in a way her perception—she has an 
identity as a Muslim woman, as a wife, as a mother, as a worker—but she also has an 
identity linked to that particular merchant or contractor who may be from another 
community. (Interview, May 21, 2014) 
Keshab Das, a professor and researcher at the Gujarat Institute of Development Research 
agreed that the working class shared economic relations, but he was of a different mind regarding 
the nature of these relations. For him, the relationship was hypocritical, as the foundation was one 
of conflict: 
Communalism helps a certain religious group to oust the other group out so as to capture a 
certain spaces or opportunities of work and life. By displacing you as a Muslim, I gain that 
space for myself. (Interview, April 19, 2014) 
He went on to explain that after Muslims were displaced,24 Hindu-owned businesses still 
needed their skills: 
                                                
24 After the riots, many Muslims fled from the city center to the outskirts of Ahmedabad. 
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While I will not allow you to take a house on rent (no Muslim is allowed to take a house 
on rent in this area25), but in my garage or in my restaurant, I want a Muslim worker to 
come and work for me. And there are fairly good relations between me and the worker. 
(Interview, April 19, 2014) 
Mirai admitted that, despite SEWA’s work in fostering a common worker identity among 
members, this approach “gets severely tested from time to time,” such as during the 2002 riots, 
because “we don’t live in a vacuum…We live in a society which was getting polarized and also 
our sisters are influenced by their communities, by their husband’s families.” However, she 
emphasized that, as SEWA members, women had a shared history that helped maintain ties, and 
she gave examples of Hindu and Muslim members helping each other during the riots and in the 
aftermath.  
The organization was criticized for its lack of action during the 2002 riots (Bunsha 2005; 
Spodek 2011). SEWA did not speak out publicly against the state government, which was a 
questionable decision, made all the worse considering its membership consists of Muslims, Dalits, 
and other backward castes, its vast political network (one NGO representative noted that Ela Bhatt 
could have called Bill Clinton to intervene [Bunsha 2005]), and its headquarters located in the 
center of the riots. To the criticism, SEWA responded “we thought it wise to keep away from the 
mass media in such a turbulent, vitiated, and complex atmosphere” (SEWA 2002:34). The 
                                                
25 Segregated housing in Ahmedabad is rampant, for example, many housing cooperatives in 
western Ahmedabad are comprised of homeowners who belong to the same caste or religious 
group. Segregation is also disguised under religious dietary restrictions (Ghaseem-Fachandi 2012). 
For example, during my search for an apartment in Ahmedabad many of the listings noted that 
only strict vegetarian cooking (no meat or eggs) was allowed in the building. During a tour of one 
potential rental, the owner explained that absolutely no meat or eggs could be cooked. His mother, 
a Brahmin who followed a strict diet and lived downstairs, would smell the cooking and become 
sick.  
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organization was active in providing relief in the camps during and after the riots (Spodek 2011), 
and its continuing work across castes and religion is noted as a “bulwark against the Hindutva 
brigade” (Yagnik and Sheth 2011). 
However, this passivity during the riots also points to the importance of presenting an 
appropriate image when an organization receives funding from outside sources. As Jhabvala’s 
(1994:136) admitted, SEWA’s endeavor in cooperative work helps the union win “allies, 
sometimes even with the ‘enemy’,” such as partnerships with the State and private companies. For 
example, the director of SEWA Bharat in Delhi explained to me that they received contracts from 
corporations, such as the UK retailer Monsoon, hiring homeworkers to complete the work. 
SEWA chose not to speak against the state government publicly, but it still became the 
target of the Gujarat BJP party. In 2005, the State of Gujarat accused SEWA of mishandling funds 
in a redevelopment project, known as “Jeevika,” and began a “special audit” of the organization, 
withholding funds related to the multi-year project and asking for reimbursement for its other 
projects with the state (The Hindu 2005). In response, SEWA pulled out of all its Government of 
Gujarat projects. In an interview, Ela Bhatt admitted that, “The space for voluntary agencies, 
especially those with Gandhian values, has shrunk in Gujarat and it has become difficult to work 
freely. There is no positive atmosphere in the State for our organisation to work” (Sharma 2005).26 
Conclusion 
                                                
26 As Prime Minister, Narendra Modi continues to politicize civil society organizations (Frontline 
2014). Soon after coming to power, the BJP froze foreign funds for a number of NGOs, accusing 
them of violating foreign contribution regulations (The Hindu 2015). One of the NGOs is 
Greenpeace India, which has been campaigning against power plants, air pollution, and the 
country’s unsustainable use of natural resources, leading some to question this ruling as an attack 
on civil society organizations that disagreed with the government’s style of development (The 
Hindu 2015). 
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In 2011, the Times of India voted Ahmedabad as the “Best City to Live” in India; yet, over 
half of its inhabitants still live in slums, more than 75 per cent of the workforce are in the informal 
sector, and there are scars of past inter-caste and communal riots on the collective memory of the 
city (Yagnik and Sheth 2011). The shift towards a market-oriented, liberalized political economy, 
which include a withdrawal of the state and entrance of an unregulated job market, have had a 
detrimental impact on the lives of poor women in India (Ghosh 2009). While organizations like 
SEWA have helped highlight the needs of women informal workers, the majority of workers are 
still excluded from current development practices.  
If economic changes presented a new source of income, social and cultural constraints on 
women’s mobility pushed them towards home-based work (Sudarshan and Sinha 2011). The riots 
of 2002 further constrained women’s mobility. For the first time rioters targeted women and 
children, with disturbing accounts of mutilation and sexual assault (Hameed et al. 2002; Sarkar 
2002). Women became even more restricted in their travel as Ahmedabad became mapped into 
“dangerous” Muslim or Hindu neighborhoods (Yagnik and Sheth 2011). The two Muslim 
neighborhoods that I visited for this research, Fatehwadi and Vasna, are examples of the ghettos 
that sprung up after the riots as Muslims moved out of the inter-caste and inter-religious 
neighborhoods of the walled city to live with others like them seeking safety in numbers (Yagnik 
and Sheth 2011). The Hindu women I spoke with explained their choice to stay home to work 
because of fears of safety and the need to protect their children. The increasing geographical and 
social isolation for both of these communities hampers the possibilities for them to practice and 
envision a place for themselves in this society.  
In India, where the political has veered towards an unlikely partnership between 
neoliberalism and ethno-nationalism, SEWA, with its support for inclusive development and 
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communal harmony, offers an alternative roadmap for the country. However, its links with the 
State and the private sector through funding and collaborations bring up questions of its ability to 
adequately address the free-market and xenophobic forces it is up against. SEWA’s strategic 
choices on how to address the social injustices faced by women workers points to the political, 
economic, and social influences on an organization’s approach. Kamat argues that civil society is 
“coalescing with global capitalists interests” during this “restructuring of public good and private 
interests” (2004:156), and as the Gujarati research Keshab Das noted, SEWA and the trade union 
movement in Ahmedabad in general had always taken a more collaborative approach in the labor-
capital relationship because of its Gandhian ideology.  
In the following chapters, I examine women’s experiences with work, family, and civil 
society in relation to these significant challenges to the economic and social structures of the city. 
These spheres cannot be examined separately as neoliberal technologies have redefined the role of 
capitalist production in public and private life (Mitchell, Marston, and Katz 2004). A mapping of 
women’s subjectivities in relation to these spheres, through their struggles to secure their and their 
families’ life necessities, exposes the consequences of global capitalism. 
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Chapter 3. Methodology: Researching Women in the Informal Economy 
 
A study of women in the informal economy and the organization that supports them brings 
up a number of methodological questions. How did I gain access to a particularly hidden 
population? Do I risk assimilating to SEWA and its perspectives since I relied on the organization 
for access and institutional backing? How does the use of a translator alter the data in a qualitative 
study? How do I, as a white woman from a rich country, interpret and represent stories of Indian 
women in the informal sector? Though it is impossible to avoid all possible problems that arise 
when conducting social science research, the methods that I chose and my approach to data 
analysis seeks to reduce issues regarding power and representation in research, with the aim to 
minimize the impact of my privilege as a researcher. 
As I discuss below, I employed a range of methods in this study, including a survey, 
interviews, spatial data, qualitative observations, and secondary data analysis. While the survey 
provides background information (demographics, socioeconomic status, work characteristics), 
most of the findings presented in this dissertation are based on qualitative data. While there are 
limits to “generalizability” in qualitative research, this study aims to understand women’s multiple 
subjectivities in relation to ideological and material forces, a goal that requires an exploratory 
focus, flexible methods, and cultural insights (Charmaz 2005).  
My research approach is further informed by feminist methodology. Feminist methodology 
is sensitive to the potential exploitative practices of research, and facilitates research that seeks to 
transform oppressive social systems (Harding 1987). It provides the tools to critique power 
relations inherent in research by disputing the notion of the researcher as sole bearer of knowledge 
and the participant as the Subject/Other; rather, it recognizes that there is a multiplicity of 
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knowledges in the field. Importantly, it grounds the research to the material consequences of a 
social justice project and forces the researcher to continually question knowledge claims (Haraway 
1988; Katz 2001). 
In the following sections, I discuss my research approach to data collection, analysis, and 
writing. The aim is to provide an overview of my methods, but also to acknowledge the politics of 
the research process. 
Research Methods 
My first visit to Ahmedabad, India was in 2012 when I spent the summer working at SEWA 
as a research intern. After an unanswered request the previous fall to conduct research at SEWA 
(as one of the most well-known organizations for informal workers, they receive many such 
requests), happenstance provided me with a contact in the organization, the director of one of 
SEWA’s sister organizations. I contacted her and, after some discussion about my research 
interests, I was offered a position as an intern in the Research Department of SEWA Academy. 
That summer in Ahmedabad was an introduction to what would become the field site for my 
dissertation. While I had originally wanted to conduct research with SEWA Union, as I was 
primarily interested in the activities of the labor union, my position at this sister organization turned 
out to be fortuitous for my dissertation. My affiliation with the Research Department and working 
alongside its staff provided me with a wealth of knowledge and access to the practical aspects of 
how to conduct research on informal workers. SEWA Academy, as the organization aimed at 
women’s capacity-building and SEWA’s communication arm, turned out to be an ideal site to 
examine how gender and development discourses of “women” and “worker” are constructed and 
practiced in the field. 
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I returned in September 2013 as a visiting researcher to conduct my dissertation on home-
based workers over the course of nine months. Because of the difficulty in accessing these workers 
(Sudarshan and Sinha 2011) and my limited knowledge of the city and language, I decided that 
collaborating with SEWA would be the best approach for completing this research. Asking women 
about their experiences with SEWA with a member of the organization present during the 
interview brings up questions of reliability in participants’ answers, but conducting this research 
without SEWA would have been difficult for a number of reasons. First, SEWA Academy’s staff 
has worked in these communities for years, with some staff members even coming from those 
same neighborhoods. The network that SEWA has established across the city provided me with 
access to a group of women who would have otherwise been very difficult to approach as an 
outsider. Second, the research staff had many years of experience conducting research on women 
in the informal economy. Their input proved to be a valuable resource during fieldwork and 
preliminary data analysis. Lastly, as a white woman from a wealthy Western country, conducting 
this research alongside a Gujarati woman who had an understanding of participants’ social milieu 
was invaluable, which brings me to my research colleague, Jayshreeben. 
Jayshree volunteered to be the staff member that would support me in this research. My 
cubicle was next to hers during my first summer in Ahmedabad, and we got along very well. I was 
happy to hear that she was assigned to accompany me in the field. She had been with SEWA since 
she was a teenager, having been trained as a “grassroots researcher” and subsequently joining the 
staff.27 Her English skills were also impressive considering her socio-economic background; as a 
city off the tourist track, not many people in Ahmedabad spoke English unless they belonged to 
                                                
27 Grassroots researchers are research staff recruited from the neighborhoods in which SEWA 
works. They are trained by SEWA in research skills, providing them with skills that are often 
acquired only by attending college, a luxury that many of these women could not afford. 
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the upper-middle and upper class. While her official role was that of a translator, Jayshree offered 
much more to this research. Rather, she was a “cultural broker” who offered cultural translations 
of what we saw and heard in the field (Hennink 2008; Temple 2002). I relied on her to explain the 
nuances and meaning behind participants’ responses and what we witnessed in the field. At times, 
she would also expand on a participant’s response, relying on knowledge from her research 
experience in this field, but also from her own life experience. During our rides to and from field 
sites, she would often talk to me of her experiences as a woman, mother, and worker, sharing 
stories that followed the themes of this research, such as working seven days a week to pay for her 
children’s school tuition, her relationship with her in-laws, and marriage rituals of her caste. 
Jayshree and I also had opportunities to discuss and reflect on the research process and findings 
throughout my time in Ahmedabad, a necessary practice when conducting cross-cultural and multi-
lingual research (Temple 2002). Jayshree’s insights during field collection and preliminary data 
analysis provided a valuable perspective on what it meant to be a working mother in India. Because 
of her role in this research, I use the first person plural pronoun in the empirical chapters to indicate 
the presence and contribution of a translator and cultural broker (Hennink 2008). 
Jayshree and I found participants for this research with the assistance of the literacy 
department at SEWA Academy. The literacy department organizes literacy classes in the low-
income neighborhoods where many of their members live, including the neighborhoods where I 
conducted research. Their presence and work in the neighborhoods over the years, which included 
setting up a center, hiring literacy teachers from the community, and providing information about 
other SEWA services, helped to build a trusted relationship between the literacy staff and many of 
the women in those areas. In fact, the literacy staff member who would accompany us to the day’s 
chosen neighborhood was always the one who worked in that same neighborhood. Literacy staff 
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would contact the SEWA community leader in the neighborhood to arrange a day for us to collect 
data. Jayshree, a literacy staff member, and I would visit the home of the community organizer 
who would then invite home-based workers to her house who were interested in participating in 
the research. Many of the women would know the literacy staff member since she would have 
helped organize literacy classes in that neighborhood. Jayshree and I introduced ourselves to 
research participants by first conducting a survey of home-based workers. Following the approach 
of Cindy Katz’s (1991) ethnography of a Sudanese village, conducting surveys introduced me to 
the field and allowed home-based workers to familiarize themselves with the project and 
researchers. The survey also provided demographic background for the research, as well as work 
characteristics, care responsibilities, and experience with SEWA. We conducted the survey from 
October to November 2013 with a convenience sample of 100 home-based workers in ten 
neighborhoods. After receiving verbal consent, we would start the questionnaire. I would ask 
questions in English, Jayshree would then ask the participants in Gujarati or Hindi, and she would 
translate participants’ responses back to me in English. I recorded answers on a paper copy of the 
survey.  
However, most of the findings I discuss in the following pages are based on the qualitative 
data. Jayshree and I returned to the field sites in January 2014 to conduct interviews. Thirty home-
based workers were chosen from a purposive sample of survey participants for interviews and 
spatial analysis. Interview participants reflect the demographics and work characteristics as that of 
the survey participants. Interviews continued the discussion of work and care responsibilities, and 
further explored tensions or conflicts between these two roles, as well as their participation in 
SEWA. Interviews also focused on their daily routine, paying attention to both relations with other 
family members, especially male members, and relations with space and the material. Because of 
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time constraints, women were unable to participate in lengthy interviews, and most interviews 
were 20 to 40 minutes.  After the interviews, Jayshree and I would visit the worker’s home, if we 
were not there already, to photograph her home and workplace. Often, we would be invited to stay 
longer for a cup of chai or to be introduced to family members. In the end, we would often spend 
between 30 and 60 minutes with participants, including the interview. The translation process in 
the field was similar to that during the survey data collection. However, for data analysis, I 
recorded the interviews and transcribed the English dialogue. In addition, I hired a research 
assistant to translate the Gujarati and Hindi dialogue into English. I included these transcripts, 
what I call “second translation,” as part of the interview data to analyze. Though interviewees gave 
permission for me to use their first name and their images in published material, I have changed 
the names of participants to preserve anonymity and in accordance with human subject regulations. 
To capture the spatial aspects of home-based work, I took photographs of the homes, 
workspace, and participants at work. I complemented photographs with hand-drawn maps of the 
homes. I also took portraits of all survey and interview participants; as I discuss in the data analysis 
section, having these portraits turned out to be helpful during the analysis and while writing. As 
other qualitative researchers have noted (Low 2000), the camera proved to be an aid in the field in 
ways other than for data collection. Interviewing can be awkward because it diverges from natural 
speech patterns and because of the presence of apparatuses that are not often present in everyday 
conversations, such as notepads, questionnaire sheets, and recording devices. Most data collected 
in interviews are captured on paper and machine, but it then disappears from the participants, 
viewed again after researchers’ interpretations. The camera, however, was a device that women 
were more comfortable with during the data collection process (maybe because of the increased 
access to cameras due to camera phones), and a digital camera allowed participants to immediately 
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see the data that I was collecting. It also helped create a more congenial relationship between 
researchers and participants. Posing for the camera was often accompanied by laughter and jokes 
of how to stand or fix one’s sari. Some would call their children over to be included in the picture; 
other times, women would show off the intricate embroidery work that they had added to dresses. 
Furthermore, photographs of the homes captured features of women’s work and daily life that 
would have been difficult to do with interviews. Throughout this dissertation, I rely on these 
photographs to provide additional evidence to my findings. Through the act of photographing, 
participants also witnessed which aspects of their lives I was interested in recording, even the most 
mundane. For example, I would take a photo of their stored work under a cot or request that women 
leave the workspace as it was rather than cleaning up for the photograph (See Figure 3). I believe 
that the use of a camera contributed to creating a more open and participatory environment during 
data collection. 
Figure 3. Cloth scraps left on the floor for the camera 
 
 Photograph by author. 
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Primary data, survey, interviews, and visual data were complemented by secondary data, 
including analysis of SEWA documentation, analysis of media reports on SEWA and informal 
workers, and interviews with SEWA Directors, academics, and activists. Utilizing the resources 
of SEWA Academy’s documentation center, I reviewed books, reports, and informational 
pamphlets. I also had access to the short documentaries produced by Video SEWA, a cooperative 
under SEWA Academy’s communication arm. Video SEWA began producing these films in 1984 
to document issues affecting women working in the informal economy. Applying an “ethnographic 
reading” of these films spanning over three decades, I documented the changing institutional 
representation of the informal worker. I conducted interviews with directors of five SEWA sister 
organizations, including SEWA Academy, SEWA Bank, SEWA Bharat, Gujarat State Mahila 
SEWA Cooperative Federation, and Vimo SEWA.28 I conducted four additional interviews with 
local academics and activists. All interviews lasted an hour and were conducted in English. 
Interviews with SEWA directors focused on the history of the organization, how it has changed 
over the years, how SEWA supports informal workers, and current issues affecting workers. In my 
interviews with academics and activists, I asked about social, political, and economic changes in 
the city and what they believed to be SEWA’s role in the city and for informal workers. This 
secondary data helped contextualize research findings in the current discourse of development and 
the informal sector as internalized by SEWA, SEWA directors, and experts.  
Description of Participants 
                                                
28 SEWA Bharat is the all-India federation of SEWA member organizations. Vimo SEWA is health 
and social insurance cooperative. SEWA Bharat is located in Delhi, and the interview was 
conducted there. The remaining interviews were conducted in Ahmedabad. I attempted to conduct 
an interview with the director of SEWA Union, but she was unable to meet with me 
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All participants were women and over 18 years of age.29 Most were married (over three-
quarters). A third lived in joint families, and the remaining lived in a nuclear family household. 
The average household income was close to Rs. 12,000 a month (US $19430), with most working 
household members employed in the informal economy. Three-quarters of the participants were 
Hindu, and one-quarter were Muslim. Among participants who are Hindu, the majority, 79 percent, 
belonged to Scheduled Castes (SC), seven percent were Other Backward Castes (OBC), and 15 
percent were general castes.31 Scheduled Castes, comprised of the lowest castes including the 
former untouchables or Dalits, constitute 29 percent of India’s population and still face frequent 
discrimination (Shah 2010). Despite proclamations of the end of caste (Srinivas 2003), caste 
remains a powerful social force that shapes many aspects of society, including ideologies of work 
(Harriss-White 2003; Vaid 2014), with caste hierarchies being prevalent in the Indian Muslim 
community as well (Bhatty 1996). Making up 11 percent of the Indian population, Muslims are a 
minority community in India, and are increasingly targeted in communal tension and the Hindu 
Right propaganda. In Ahmedabad, the percentage of Muslims is around 13 percent, but they are 
overrepresented in this study to capture the high rate of Muslim women from low-income 
households who participate in home-based work.  
I limited this research to garment workers. Over three-quarters of survey participants 
received their work from contractors, two participants received orders directly from retailers, and 
the remaining were own-account workers, receiving orders from neighbors. The type of garment 
                                                
29 See Appendix I and II for list of interview participants and list of fieldsites. 
30 The exchange rate here and throughout this dissertation is based on Rs. 61.76 to US $1. This 
was the average rate when I conducted the survey in October/November of 2013. 
31 Scheduled Castes include the former untouchable castes; other terms commonly used are 
Harijans (children of god) and Dalits (the oppressed). Other Backward Castes are other 
historically discriminated castes. Both SC and OBC are constitutional categories that receive 
positive discrimination by the government.   
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work varied, as did the skills required for the work. Work ranged from producing the whole 
garment (though this was almost always own-account workers), to sewing borders to garments, to 
finishing work, such as closing buttonholes, ironing, and packing. I use the term “own-account 
worker” to refer to workers who have direct contact with the market and buy their own materials, 
while “homeworker” are workers who have an employment relationship and receive orders from 
retailers, subcontractors, and other intermediaries (Sudarshan and Sinha 2011). “Home-based 
work” is used to refer to both types of work or when distinguishing between the two is unnecessary.  
To capture the impact of SEWA for home-based workers, only half of survey and interview 
participants were SEWA members, though the extent of their participation ranged from being a 
SEWA community organizer to having attended just one skill-training or literacy class. Of the 
participants who were SEWA members, the two most common services used from SEWA 
Academy were literacy classes (40 percent) and skill training (32 percent). The most prevalent 
services used were those offered by SEWA Bank (64 percent). These three services—financial, 
literacy, and skill training—exemplify the multi-dimensional development work of SEWA. 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis began while I was still in Ahmedabad so that I could discuss interpretations 
of data and preliminary findings with Jayshree and other staff members of SEWA Academy. At 
the end of my time in Ahmedabad, we invited community organizers of the neighborhoods where 
I conducted research to SEWA Academy for a presentation of my work. After discussing my 
findings, they offered their perspectives on the meaning and implications of the research findings. 
All of these discussions were considered as I wrote this dissertation. This process was essential for 
an experiential understanding of the organization’s approach to supporting informal workers. 
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Interviews and fieldnotes were coded thematically according to topics derived from my 
research questions and those that arose during fieldwork and analysis. I used qualitative data 
analysis software to label and organize quotes. Coming from an interpretive perspective, my aim 
was not to present findings that could be generalized for all home-based workers; rather, I chose 
stories that illustrate the unique locations of each of these women and their experiences with work 
and caregiving. 
The photographs and maps I collected proved to be useful during analysis and writing. 
Since I met with most of the women only once or twice, as I was writing, months later and from 
thousands of miles away, I came to rely on their photographs to remind myself of the setting and 
the participant—their personality, behavior, and even way of speaking. A quick look at a 
photograph of a participant or her home would stimulate memories of the field—how hot it was 
that day, the long rickshaw ride to the area, what was my mood, what was her mood—that I did 
not feel as strongly by reading through my fieldnotes. Having these memories was very helpful as 
I constructed ethnographic stories of these women’s lives.  
Interviews, surveys, and observations were possible because of Jayshree’s work as a 
translator. Her skills, attentiveness, and patience during what can be a cumbersome process of on-
the-spot translation were commendable. However, because of specificity that qualitative analysis 
requires, I also hired Bushan, a researcher from a local university who was fluent in English, to 
conduct a second translation of the Gujarati and Hindi dialogue. This second translation offered 
word-by-word translation of the recorded interviews that was difficult to achieve in the field during 
the data collection. Furthermore, the use of a second translator addressed a critique I received from 
a reviewer of my dissertation proposal—using a SEWA staff member as translator could distort 
responses in favor of the organization’s point of view. Having the two transcripts for each 
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interview allowed me to locate when Jayshree’s translations diverged from women’s responses. 
However, I did not always see these differences as diversions; rather, Jayshree’s immersion in this 
particular social setting, both from her socio-economic background and her history at SEWA, 
offered valuable interpretation of the meaning behind women’s responses. While he might have 
offered more accurate translations, Bushan, as a middle-class and highly educated Indian man, 
would have found it difficult to immerse himself in the women’s stories and their situations. I use 
both translations for my analysis and include quotes from both in the findings. Qualitative data 
analysis software was used to link quotes translated by Jayshree to those translated by Bushan. 
Because the interviews have already been interpreted through the translation process, reflecting 
the grammar and diction choices of Jayshree and Bushan, I have edited many of the quotes, with 
the aim of readability rather than changing meaning. Both interpretations, as well as my own, 
cannot be seen as value-free; all three of us come from a position of power and privilege in 
determining what gets said and how. However, I found that the two versions offered a fuller picture 
of what transgressed during the interview, and helped to mitigate some of the inherent problems 
found in the translation process.  
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Chapter 4. Women’s Work and Informality 
 
“In this dupatta work I am sitting and it seems like rest, but the back stiffens, the shoulders 
ache…one gets tired while sitting all day long.”32 Nikila, a homeworker, is describing the irony of 
her work. She is at home, sitting on the floor while looking after her toddler asleep in a small 
hammock nearby. Someone peering through the grate door would not immediately recognize her 
as part of a hidden assembly line of workers scattered across the city, all working towards the 
completion of a product to be sold on the market; rather, it would seem to be a domestic scene of 
a young mother taking advantage of her daughter’s nap to finish some household work. As this 
visitor continues down the narrow lane, she passes more women sitting in the doorway or on cots 
pushed against the pale blue walls of their homes, chatting with each other, and all with a scarf, 
needle, and thread in hand. These women are also part of that assembly line, having learned from 
one another of this work that can be completed at home, and asking a neighbor or family members 
to introduce them to a contractor.  
Nikila, whose main job is an office cleaner at SEWA Academy, was explaining why she 
prefers working at SEWA to her home-based work.33 She explains that at the office she meets 
other women, but she also prefers it because there are moments when she can sit and rest. Once at 
home, whenever she finds a spare moment, she picks up the dupatta orders. It might seem like 
rest, but it is not. Her comment above speaks to the misconception of home-based work as 
                                                
32 Dupatta is a long scarf worn with a women’s salwar kameez outfit (trouser and tunic). The 
dupatta work Nikila mentioned is sewing a beaded border to the scarf. 
33 Nikila was one of two home-based workers we interviewed who had a main job outside of the 
home (both lived in Jamalpur). Jamalpur was one of two field sites that did not have a literacy 
center. Jayshree learned that Nikila received homework from a contractor, and asked her if she 
could introduce us to other homeworkers in her neighborhood.  
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“something to do” during a woman’s spare time at home, but she is also questioning the definition 
of work. 
For decades, national statistics maintained a narrow definition of what was counted as 
“productive” and “of value” to the national economy, resulting in economic policies and practices 
that overlooked the diversity of work and the people who participated in those activities (Folbre 
2001; Waring 1999). Of particular significance in these conventional economic measures was the 
exclusion of women (Benería 1981; Waring 1999). Through activism and research, progress was 
made in broadening the definition of work and gaining a more accurate account of women’s 
activities, with two of the most consequential outcomes being the recognition of informal work 
and unpaid work in the home and community (Benería 1992; Himmelweit 1995). Development 
economists began to highlight the contributions of the informal economy to countries’ GDP 
(Charmes 2012) and its link to the formal economy (Chen 2007). Feminist economists sought ways 
to incorporate unpaid work in economic analyses, measuring the time spent on this work or giving 
it a monetary value, to measure the economic value of these non-market activities (Folbre 2006; 
Ironmonger 1996). This “feminizing the economy” agenda relies on mainstream economic 
concepts to explain non-capitalist economic activities, and so it does not allow for the possibility 
of an alternative or non-capitalist economies (Cameron and Gibson-Graham 2003); yet, these 
feminist interventions have challenged us to reconceptualize how we examine and understand the 
diversity of economies. 
This chapter contributes to these discussions by focusing on a setting that holds both 
conventional paid productive work and unpaid care and household work. To offer a more complete 
picture of how these activities intersect, I employ feminist social reproduction theory’s definitions 
of “work” and “labor.” I define work to include the many activities of individuals that mediate and 
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transform social and natural orders, and I define labor to be those aspects of work that are 
appropriated by capital (Bakker and Gill 2003), not just those activities that are in the wage-labor 
system. This broader understanding of labor provides me with an analytical tool to reconsider 
which activities are part of capitalist accumulation strategies and what this process looks like. 
Bakker (2007) writes that the work/labor distinction frames social reproduction as not entirely 
mediated by capitalism, while also explaining social reproduction as being on a continuum from 
non-commodified work to commodified labor, such as domestic work, reproductive technologies, 
and sex work (Radin 1996). I agree that not all of social reproduction is appropriated by capitalism, 
in fact, as Bakker notes, this conceptualization allows for the possibility of alternative systems of 
social reproduction. As the geographers Gibson-Graham (2006) have argued, it is important to 
acknowledge the diverse forms of economies in order to offer possibilities for transformative 
feminist political projects. I also acknowledge the increasing commodification of care, especially 
in these neoliberal times. However, in this dissertation I want to examine how those tasks of social 
reproduction that are not immediately connected to wage-labor or commodity production are 
appropriated by capitalism in the pursuit profit. In a wage-labor system, it is workers’ unpaid labor-
time in producing a commodity that creates the surplus value for capitalism. I argue that in home-
based work women’s unpaid social reproduction activities are also exploited as surplus labor in a 
capitalism production system that profits from a flexible and fragmented labor force.  
I begin the chapter by discussing the economic and social contexts that shaped women’s 
decision to choose home-based work. The informalization and feminization of work pushed 
women to join the workforce, and the feminization of work (characterized by low wages, 
insecurity, and irregularity) helped maintain social and cultural constructs of women’s role in the 
public and private sphere (Elson and Pearson 1981; Enloe 1990; Fernandez-Kelly 1984). Though 
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poorly paid and irregular, home-based work is a strategy for women to provide monetary 
contribution to their households while upholding their primary role to be that of mothers, wives, 
and daughters. However, despite paid work taking place in the home, women were still confronted 
with having to balance their work and family activities, especially when considering the 
irregularity of both home-based work and caregiving activities. In the following sections, I outline 
the various techniques women employed to address this tension, and I discuss how these practices 
contribute to the exploitation of their social reproduction work into labor. This chapter is an 
introduction to the home-based workers who participated in this study and their daily experiences 
with work and family, but it also sets the tone for this dissertation by questioning our conceptions 
of the relationship between work, family, and development.   
Women, Work, and Informality 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Ahmedabad experienced a significant shift in its economic 
foundations as the closure of its many textile mills signaled an end to the city’s history as an 
industrial center. A source of work for many of the city’s low-caste and Muslim male inhabitants 
(Patel 1988), the mill closures resulted in over 100,000 workers being laid off between 1980 and 
1990 (Kundu and Mahadevia 2002), and it added to the growing informalization of work in the 
city. With the loss of a male breadwinner income, more and more women joined the informal 
economy out of necessity, but also because of the increasing feminization of the labor market 
(Mahadevia 2002).  
What was this workforce that women were joining? While some women were already 
contributing to home-based family enterprises, this was a new form of informal employment that 
had substantial, while not always obvious, links to the formal economy (Hahn 1996). What is 
considered informal employment can vary greatly, from piece-rate home-based work to street 
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vending to daily wage construction work. A similarity across all these sectors of work is that its 
workers are “informally employed, without secure contracts, worker benefits, or social protection” 
(ILO 2002a). More recently, these very characteristics have encouraged free-market capitalism to 
approach the informal economy in a favorable light, framing the informal worker as a safety net 
for workers who apply their entrepreneurial skills in times of economic recession and slow job 
growth in the formal sector. The Dutch sociologist Jan Breman challenges this rosy picture of 
informal work, noting that the reality for these workers is a constant state of insecurity that “saps 
the energy to cope and erodes the strength to endure” (2009:32). Many of these supposed 
entrepreneurs are disguised wage workers, though they lack the protection that formal workers 
would have received (Breman 1996). In a similar vein, Pillai (2010) argues that the recent increase 
of self-employment in India is not a sign of new productive opportunities following high economic 
growth, but rather the lack of employment opportunities, especially for women. She writes, “the 
growing social and economic crisis is locking vast sections of women workers into a downward 
spiral of more labour for less income and an enhancement of gender based inequality in the world 
of work as a whole” (p. 154).  
Women’s participation in the informal economy in relation to the past decades of economic 
restructuring is especially important to examine when considering the contemporary emphasis on 
women’s economic potential in the development field (see World Bank 2012). Yet, India’s 
economic growth of the past decade has not led to better jobs for women (Klasen and Pieters 2012). 
The women who join the informal workforce are neither examples of economic emancipation nor 
are they consciously destabilizing their gender roles; rather, women start work not as individuals 
but as part of “a collective effort to better the conditions of existence” for a network of kin 
(Chatterjee 2012:801).  
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In general, India has a low female workforce participation rate, especially in urban areas, 
with urban employment among women measured at 20 percent (Das et al. 2015). Despite Gujarat 
reporting the fastest gross domestic product (GDP) growth in India, its largest city, Ahmedabad, 
has the second lowest rate of female labor force participation among the major Indian cities at 11.7 
percent (Shrinivasan 2013).34 To explain the low numbers of working urban women, Indrani 
Mazumdar, a senior fellow and associate professor at the Delhi-based Centre for Women's 
Development Studies, explains in an interview that "women are moving off the land and out of 
agriculture in large numbers but are not finding the jobs in other sectors of the economy that this 
transition was supposed to create…In mega cities, the demands on a woman's time—from care 
work, to time spent collecting rations—are even greater, making leaving home for work that much 
harder” (Shrinivasan 2013). With less time to spend on paid work, it is not surprising that home-
based work is one of the largest types of work in the urban informal economy in India and that it 
is disproportionately female. Forty percent of urban women informal workers are home-based 
workers, compared to 12 percent among urban male informal workers, and the female rate has 
been rising steadily over the past two decades (Chen and Raveendran 2011).  
Ahmedabad’s recent history is of course not unique. Similar processes can be found 
throughout the world as the decline of formal and state-sponsored jobs seen in post-Fordism 
(Harvey 1989) gave way to the intensification of informalization and the feminization of the global 
political economy (Castells and Portes 1989; Elson and Pearson 1981; Enloe 1990; Fernandez-
                                                
34 Women’s labor market participation is often underestimated because of their propensity to be 
working in the informal economy or working as unpaid family members. Labor market surveys 
and census data are increasingly including variables for informal work, but the nature of informal 
employment means that it is not easily captured by surveys (Chen 2007), and the two sectors in 
which women are concentrated, home-based work and street vending, are especially elusive (Carr 
and Chen 2002). 
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Kelly 1984). The differential effects of economic globalization for women and men are now well 
documented (Benería and Feldman 1992; Moghadam 1999; Sen and Grown 1987). Much of the 
literature has focused on sites that have more obvious ties to globalization, such as women working 
in maquiladora assembly lines (Alarcón-González and McKinley 1999; Fernandez-Kelly 1984), 
the migration of women from poor to rich countries (Parreñas 2001), or sex tourism (Hoang 2015; 
Kempadoo and Doezema 1998). These studies have highlighted how the consequences of 
globalization vary by gender, as well as along lines of class, race, ethnicity, religion, and nation, 
and they add to our understanding of a gendered political economy that moves beyond mainstream 
narratives of neoliberalism (Sassen 1996).  
Yet, as Osirim (2003) argues in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, globalization has had 
an impact on most women within their countries, whether they participate in activities more 
evidently connected with globalization, as those listed above, or they hold roles in less obvious 
ones, such as subsistence farmers, agricultural workers and participants in the microenterprise 
sector. Here, too, I focus on these less obvious sites in which global economic processes have 
shaped daily practices but have also been transformed in conjuncture with the local milieu (Ong 
1991). In this section, I examine women’s reasons for beginning home-based work. Starting paid 
work often stemmed from economic need, and the current economic climate offered few viable 
work options. But women also employed gendered notions of women’s duty to their family and 
the household to explain their decision and job choice, pointing to the agential aspect of why they 
work. 
The Need to Work 
While women’s earnings are often dismissed as “supplemental,” in a labor market of 
irregular, low-wage work, women’s labor force participation can help keep a household out of 
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poverty (Chen et al. 2005). In our survey, the vast majority of home-based workers (95 percent) 
began working because of economic need, and on average they contributed a third of the household 
income, around Rs. 4,130 a month (US $67) to the average monthly household income of Rs. 
12,096 (US $195). Fifteen women contributed half or more of the household income; among them, 
six were the sole earners either because of widowhood or their husband’s disability.  Regardless 
of how much they contribute, nearly half of participants believed their household and care work 
to be their most important role in the household, but they were grateful for the work because of 
the additional earnings it brought to the household. As one woman explained to us, “household 
work is my responsibility so that’s very important, but I like home-based work the most because 
it brings money.”  
Allen and Wolkowitz (1986) point out that, because women’s domestic work is assumed 
to be their full-time job, the entrance of paid work in the home is seen as woman’s use of her free 
time rather than a job, reproducing the notion that home-based work is a “leisure” activity. Thus, 
when a woman begins home-based work, it has a two-fold effect of devaluing her paid work and 
unpaid work, reinforcing gendered divisions of labor and constructs of care. The location of home-
based work in the domestic sphere, concealing its role in the production process, and women’s 
continual participation in the bulk of household and care duties, even after beginning paid work, 
diminish the significance of their productive activity and the potential for work to improve 
women’s position in the household (Kantor 2003; Pant 2000). This conception of women’s work 
departs from studies that argue home-based workers contribute significantly to household earnings 
(Sudarshan, Venkataraman, and Bhandari 2007) and that home-based work can be instrumental in 
alleviating household poverty (Tipple 2005) by questioning the interaction of material and 
ideological forces that devalue women’s paid and unpaid work.  
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The main earners in most of these households were also employed in the informal 
economy, working as construction workers, rickshaw drivers, and even contract homeworkers. 
With the only constant being the irregularity of work, all members of the family had to contribute 
in some way. It was common for most working-age adults to participate in work either as paid 
workers or unpaid family members, and no less common for children to be helping as well. Family 
members often had more than one source of income to make up for the low wages and insecurity 
of work. Over half of the women we surveyed had more than one type of home-based work. For 
example, Naseem in Vatva receives orders from two different contractors; from one she receives 
salwar and churidar orders and from the other she sews borders on dupatta.35 In Danimilda, 
Manjila does finishing work on jeans for a subcontractor, but she also takes orders from her 
neighbors to make blouses and sew sari fall.36  
This was a strategy that provided women with more frequent periods of work due to the 
irregularity and seasonality of garment work. Informants’ explanations of their work 
characteristics point to the various survival strategies that poor and tenuous lower-middle class 
households employ in these economic times. This was the case in the homes of Keshavnagar, a 
neighborhood in the northern limits of the city, bordered by a highway overpass to the west and 
the Sabarmati River to the east. We were in the living room of a relatively spacious three-story 
home. The home belonged to a family whose adult women, the mother and her two daughters-in-
law, were involved with SEWA. Being a SEWA literacy teacher, our hostess knew many of the 
women in the neighborhood and had invited some of them to her home to take part in the survey. 
                                                
35 Salwar and churidar are two types of cloth trousers. 
36 The finishing work consisted of cutting hanging threads from the jean’s seams. Sari is an Indian 
dress worn by women, composed of a long piece of material (also called a sari) wrapped around a 
blouse and underskirt. Sari fall is sewing a border to the edge of the material to add weight and a 
better drape when the sari is worn.  
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We did not survey all of the women present in the room that day, but many remained while 
Jayshree and I conducted the questionnaires. They were vocal in their concerns of their families’ 
current economic situation, telling us of the lack of regular work for men and the increasing cost 
of living. While these women were working and contributing to their households, they were doing 
this out of necessity. Though many had been working for years, they framed their work as a 
temporary strategy until better work was found for their husbands and sons. 
Most of the women in Keshavnagar who participated in the survey were thirty years old or 
younger. They worked because it was needed, even expected. As part of a joint family, their 
mothers-in-law had asked them to start work so that they could contribute to the household. They 
themselves recognized the need for more income in their homes. They told us of the high 
educational expenses for their children and the cost of food, but the main reason is the lack of a 
fixed income in their households since their husbands do not have regular work. Reflecting a trend 
among many households in developing countries following economic restructuring, the gap 
between household needs and household income resulted in the reallocation of household 
resources, often in the form of women’s labor (Floro 1995). 
The older women in the room listening to us agreed—what was needed was stable work 
for the men in the neighborhood. In their explanations, they brought up memories of better days 
when men could find work that would provide for the whole family in the city’s large mills and so 
women could stay at home. Yet, similar to the family-wage ideal in western countries that obscured 
and ignored actual class and race power relations (Barker and Feiner 2004), these were likely 
idealized memories of the past since many Dalit women would work alongside their husbands in 
the mills because of economic need (Yagnik and Sheth 2005). Furthermore, by the time this 
generation of women had moved to Keshavnagar to join their marital households in the 1980s, 
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there were few jobs left at the textile mills, with many of the mills having already been shuttered 
and the rest following suit by the end of the decade (Breman 2004).  
Today, the work available for their husbands and sons is casual labor, despite Gujarat’s 
rapid economic growth rate over the past two decades. These men do not have the required skills 
to be employed in the state’s new sectors of work, such as petrochemical, pharmaceuticals, and 
telecommunications. The cost of living is rising as well, especially food. Keshavnagar is too far 
from the city center for women to travel daily to the large market in the old city, where produce 
could be bought for less. This was especially on their minds since in the last year the price of staple 
foods had become more expensive because of inflation. Onions, which could be found for Rs. 10 
a kilo a year before, had doubled in price to Rs. 20 a kilo. One woman worried that the cost of 
living would rise as Ahmedabad continued to grow, pointing to the high-tech corridor being 
developed just north of the city as proof.37  
The laurels surrounding Gujarat’s economic growth during Narendra Modi’s tenure as the 
state’s Chief Minister focused only on its success in economic measures, such as GDP growth and 
rate of foreign investment (see The Economist 2015). Under Modi, development of infrastructure 
and other projects that support the growth of business and international investment were 
emphasized rather than inclusive policies that addressed the needs of the poor and working class 
(Hirway 2014). For the families in Keshavnagar, this form of economic development had not 
benefited them. Development meant higher prices; it did not bring the type of jobs that their 
families needed. “What we need is reliable jobs for our men,” they repeated, “we need good jobs 
for them. Write that in your report.” 
                                                
37 She was speaking of the Gujarat International Finance Tec-city (GIFT City), a financial Central 
Business District currently under development. GIFT City is conceptualized to be the future global 
financial and IT center for Gujarat and India (see GIFT Gujarat 2011).   
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Good jobs were difficult to find however. This was why, they explained, everyone in the 
household had to work if they were able to. The same sentiments were expressed in the other 
neighborhoods we visited, such as in Rajivnagar. Kajal, a 46-year-old homeworker with three 
grown children, also compares the current economic situation to the past. Repeating the older 
women’s reasoning in Keshavnagar, Kajal explains that before she did not have to work as her 
husband’s earnings were enough to support a family, but now everyone has to help. 
 “Choosing” Home-Based Work 
Choosing homework is not simply an economic decision but one that is guided by multiple 
and sometimes conflicting perceptions of one’s duties and roles. How do women grapple with 
internal and external factors in deciding to start home-based work? If home-based work is a telling 
example of how social and material conditions shape women’s experiences with work (Benería 
and Roldan 1987) and reveals the interdependence of production and social reproduction 
(Agarwala 2014), then an examination is needed of how they internalize the meaning of this work 
when it stems from these constraints. This reveals a more complete picture of women’s 
understanding of their role in production in tandem with their social reproductive labor and how it 
shapes their notions of gender, class, caste, and community, in which the “boundaries of a 
particular category are both constructed through and challenged by other social identities” 
(Fernandes 1997:5). 
Women’s contributions are necessary and, when they decide to work, there are socio-
spatial and cultural determinants that shape women’s choice. The women we spoke with were 
limited to home-based work because of domestic responsibilities (51 percent) and/or not being 
allowed to work outside the home (44 percent).38 Their network also determined their access to 
                                                
38 Informants could choose more than one response to why they work at home and not outside. 
 97 
work, with many of the women having found work through family and neighborhood contacts. 
Many informants had low education levels, with the average grade passed being the 8th grade.39 
All of these factors limited women’s options to low-income informal jobs (Mitra 2005).  
While for some women, especially those who were part of the Muslim community or lived 
on the outskirts of the city, working outside was never an option,40 it was not always the case that 
women never had an opportunity to work outside. We spoke with a handful of women who had 
previously worked outside of the home, but had to leave those jobs once they had children.  Asha, 
a 31-year-old homeworker in Keshavnagar, who used to work at a jute factory in Usmanpura (a 
neighborhood south of Keshavnagar) and then at a small enterprise sewing decorations to sari and 
sari blouses in Mithakali (a well-off neighborhood closer to the city center). Despite living in a 
joint household, her in-laws did not provide her growing family with much financial assistance. It 
was expected that she and her husband would cover the financial needs of their immediate family 
members. With her husband’s meager earnings as a casual day laborer, it was necessary for Asha 
to work as well. Asha searched unsuccessfully for work in the neighborhood, and she eventually 
decided to look in the surrounding areas where there would be more opportunities.  
At the factories, Asha earned between Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 3,000 a month (US $32 and US 
$49 respectively), working eight hours a day six days a week, two to three times more than what 
her husband earned from his irregular work. When she had her first child, Asha stopped work to 
care for her daughter and did not return to work outside until her daughter was two years old, this 
time at the factory in Mithakali. A year later, Asha became pregnant with her second child, again 
                                                
39 This is much higher than the country average of 3.6 years of schooling for women (UNDP 2015), 
though this number does not differentiate educational attainments by urban and rural areas. Urban 
areas are more likely to report higher educational attainment. 
40 I discuss women’s mobility in further detail in Chapter 6. 
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a daughter; she took another leave from work. After her third pregnancy, this time a son who died 
in infancy, she stopped working outside the home permanently. 
When we met her, Asha was receiving orders from a retailer decorating blouses and sari—
similar to the work she was doing in Mithakali (see Figure 4). She earns less as a homeworker, 
around Rs. 1,200 a month (US $19), working six hours a day and seven days a week, though it is 
seasonal work so her earnings fluctuate. Despite the lower earnings, she prefers working at home. 
When working at the factories, her days were more rushed. She would wake up early in the 
morning so that she could finish the household work, make chai, sweep the floors, and prepare 
lunch for her husband and father-in-law before heading to work. After her daughters were born, 
Asha was even more anxious when she was at work. She would worry whether her mother- or 
sisters-in-law were properly caring for her daughters, if they had been fed and clothed, if they had 
reached school in time. She tells us that the “tension of home” was with her at work. In addition, 
when she would return from a full day of work, she had the domestic chores to complete, helping 
her daughters with their schoolwork, cooking, cleaning, and washing. She tells us, “It is better at 
home than at the factories because I can complete my household duties, I can look after my 
daughters, and I can still do that decorating work.” 
Before having children, Asha was allowed, even required, to work outside of the home in 
order to contribute to the household. However, after having children, her main responsibility was 
that of being a mother. Asha returned to work after her first two children, but in the end, she 
decided that home-based work was best, even if it meant lower earnings.  
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Figure 4. Asha's embroidery work 
 
     Photograph by author. 
 
Asha was not the only home-based worker in Keshavnagar that saw working at home as a 
better opportunity to care for family and home. Her neighbor Usha had also worked in a small 
enterprise and stopped once she had children. After her first pregnancy, Usha did not return to her 
work at the factory because her mother-in-law was ill and was unable to look after the child. Usha 
earned less as a homeworker, but she also did not mind, telling us, “Now my house can be looked 
after, I can look after my children and my mother-in-law. And I can take care of the house. All of 
this is, and I still earn income. I can earn money by myself.”  
Across the river, in Danilimda, a neighborhood in south Ahmedabad, Alka brought up 
similar notions of care to explain the benefits of home-based work in contrast to her experience 
working outside the home, “Every time I have to work in the factory from 10 to 6, but working in 
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the house is better. I can look after my children. I can sit, I can take rest, I can do work. And there 
is no fixed time for work.” In these responses, the desirability of home-based work arose from 
women’s perceived roles. By participating in home-based work, they could continue contributing 
to household earnings, an economic necessity, but they also believed that they could better 
complete their familial responsibilities. These responsibilities, such as childcare, cooking, caring 
for the elderly, were always present, even if the women would work outside. As one homeworker 
explained to us, “First we have to look after the children. Even if I go outside for work, I would 
still have to look after them.” Taking care of the house and family was their responsibility, and 
they did not easily admit to needing help, even if it was difficult to complete everything. As Shilpa, 
an especially busy homeworker, told us, “I need nothing, because this is my responsibility. All 
Indian women have this responsibility.” Scholars have remarked on the resilience of gender norms 
in the family, noting that, while “gender division of paid work is more flexible than used to be 
thought, the division of domestic labour has proved extraordinarily rigid” (Harriss-White 
2003:28). Home-based work especially does little to challenge the divisions of labor in the home 
because of the work setting (Abreu and Sorj 1996:106). 
Women had to work, but with limited resources, informal work was often the only option 
available to them. Their domestic responsibilities encouraged them to stay home, and home-based 
work provided an opportunity to address the economic and social needs of their households. Yet, 
women’s access to work is not determined by their human capital and cost and benefits rationality 
(Becker 1981), but by policies and practices that support the informalization of work for the 
accumulation and appropriation of surplus capital (Harriss-White 2003). Women’s domestic labor 
is key to this. In this time when productive work and social reproductive work are uncoupled and 
social institutions of support are under attack, the unpaid work in the home and community 
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provides much of the material and emotional support to sustain households. The stories presented 
above are examples of the strategies women employ to address the tension between providing 
monetary support and domestic support. By framing them as strategies, I acknowledge their 
participation in home-based work as partly an expression of agency to address what they believe 
is their contribution to their family and household, while also recognizing that these actions occur 
within a limited set of possibilities.  
Later, I will discuss two other aspects that encouraged women to stay home, women’s 
notions of domestic femininity and socio-spatial and cultural restrictions on mobility; in this 
chapter, though, my aim is to examine how women’s work in the social reproductive domain are 
appropriated by capitalism in the form of labor. This is not to argue that women’s oppression can 
be explained solely by material dynamics, but to show how ideological constructs support 
dominating economic relations. Next, I examine how the spatial and temporal characteristics of 
home-based work provide capitalism with a source to accumulate surplus value. 
The Space of Work and Care 
The space and temporality of home-based work construct this work as appropriate for 
women. The lack of a rigid schedule and the ability to work from home are seen as more 
compatible for women than factory work. It maintains gendered constructs of women’s role in the 
private and public domain (Allen and Wolkowitz 1987), providing, as I discuss in Chapter 6, a 
means to appease supposed threats to a nation’s cultural orders (Ong 1991). The idea that home-
based work provides ease and comfort because of its flexibility contradicts the fact that the 
irregularity of work orders and the urgency to complete those orders creates stress and uncertainty 
(Allen and Wolkowitz 1987). In addition, care work is often irregular and not easily scheduled into 
neat time frames, such as caring for a sick parent or helping a child study for exams. In the next 
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sections, I discuss the tensions that arise when paid work occurs in the same setting and at the same 
time as women’s domestic and caregiving responsibilities, and I present the ways that women 
attempt to ease these tension. Past scholars have noted that capitalism exploits the spatial and 
temporal characteristics to its advantage, and I add to this argument by employing the conceptual 
framework of a work/labor distinction to analyze how women’s social reproduction work is 
exploited as labor. While women employ strategies to ease tensions caused by precarious work 
conditions, their unpaid social reproduction activities become enveloped within an exploited 
production system.  
Irregularity and the Expendable Worker 
The insecurity of home-based work was apparent for the women who participated in this 
research. A quarter of workers surveyed answered that their primary home-based work was 
irregular. When Jayshree and I returned to their neighborhoods for the interviews, we found that 
five of the thirty women we spoke with were no longer working. For three, it was because their 
subcontractor had permanently stopped providing them with orders. The two other women had 
decided to stop their home-based work because the wages were too low to justify the expenses, 
such as traveling to pick up orders or paying for materials. Even for the women who maintained 
their home-based work, they were dependent on their subcontractors to provide an adequate 
amount of orders, and this could fluctuate drastically from one season to another. A third of the 
one hundred women we surveyed had seasonal work and reported a 60 percent decrease from peak 
season earnings to lean season earnings.  
It was for the earnings that Nita looked forward to Navrati, the Hindu holiday just a couple 
of weeks away that was especially famous in Gujarat for its weeklong dance festival. For Nita and 
many homeworkers in Ahmedabad, in the weeks before holidays or wedding seasons, they were  
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Figure 5. Shanta adding embellishments to chaniya choli 
 
          Photograph by author. 
 
confident they would receive large work orders, some of which would be orders of chaniya choli. 
Working on chaniya choli brought a sense of pride; these were traditional Gujarati dresses—
dresses for which customers would pay over Rs. 3,000 (more than a homeworkers’ weekly 
earnings) at Law Garden’s street market. Shanta, a young worker of Rajivnagar, saw this 
traditional work as one of the differences between her work and that of other homeworkers who 
sewed ready-made garments (see Figure 5). The elaborate dresses would be embellished with 
intricate hand embroidery and weighed down by small mirrors. Working on these dresses reminded 
her of the dance festivals to come, the event that many young Hindu women looked forward to the 
most in the year. Shanta admired the skills needed to work on chaniya choli, even if she only did 
the sewing work (the pieces were already embroidered when they were given to her to sew 
together). Her neighbors noted the extra care that was needed when working on these orders. If 
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they made a mistake they would have to pay for the cost of the material that was ruined, but also 
the cost of labor that went into hand-embroidering the dress. Shanta had not made a mistake yet, 
and she was confident that she would not. 
Back in Sarkhej, Nita did not look forward to the season for these reasons. For her, Navrati 
brought large and regular work orders, meaning more money, but there were other reasons to 
appreciate the work that arrived before the holidays. For one, surprisingly, the contractor had 
decided to increase the piece-rate wages, and he had begun delivering the materials to her and 
picking up the completed products, saving her Rs. 30 for each trip in addition to the time spent 
commuting. This was peak season, and the contractor was in a hurry to produce as many orders as 
possible. He did not have time to haggle over wages or wait for the homeworkers to pick up the 
materials.  
The large orders, however, meant that Nita would spend all day at her machine. Nita told 
us this in a rush as she was in a hurry to get back home to finish her orders. After completing the 
other interviews, Jayshree and I visited her home to see the work. She lives on the second floor of 
a building with her husband and two children; her parents-in-law live on the ground floor. To reach 
her apartment, we climbed up a steep ladder that led to a patio used for drying beans and rice, 
sleeping during hot nights, and storage space for any belongings that did not fit in the cramped 
two-room home. In the front room, Nita was sitting at her machine near the window facing the 
patio (see Figure 6). Not able to be interrupted from her work again, she welcomed us without 
stopping, her feet peddling rapidly against the treadle of the sewing machine. She lost her electric 
sewing machine, along with all of her family’s belongings, to a fire last year; with limited savings, 
she could only afford a manual machine. Before the fire, she would receive better-paid orders, but 
with a manual machine she can only do simple garment work. Now, her orders consist of sewing  
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Figure 6. Nita working at her machine 
 
    Photograph by author. 
 
borders on cloth to be used as a decorative cover for skirts, earning Rs. 8 per piece (US $0.13). 
When there are enough orders to work seven days a week, Nita can earn just under Rs. 1,000 a 
week (US $15.50). She has little time for rest in order to complete enough pieces to make up for 
the paltry wage rate. For Nita, festival season means long days hunched over a sewing machine, 
made additionally tiresome because of the manual machine, but it brought much-needed earnings. 
As we left, she continued her work, perspiration dripping from her brow as she bent over the 
machine and green gauze cloth. 
Since home-based work is often determined by seasons, there would be periods of 
continuous orders, but it was often followed by lean periods. Lacking a permanent contract, 
homeworkers were dependent on their suppliers for work, and it was common for women to lose 
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work unexpectedly. In Danilimda, two of the women we spoke with were no longer receiving work 
from their contractors when we returned to conduct their interviews.  Jyoti had been sewing borders 
on handkerchiefs, but now it was the end of January; the cold season was almost over and there 
was less need for handkerchiefs until mid-spring when temperatures would rise to above a hundred 
degrees Fahrenheit. Jyoti made do by sewing quilts from the scraps of cloth her husband would 
bring back from his job at a tailor shop. She would sell the quilts to neighbors for Rs. 75 apiece, 
more than what she earned with the handkerchiefs (at Rs. 2.5 per dozen, the most she earned with 
the handkerchief work was Rs. 175 a week), but there are only so many quilts to sell in one 
neighborhood. 
Across the lane, her neighbor, Manjila, was no longer receiving orders as well. She had 
been working on the colorful jeans that were currently in style among Bollywood actors, and there 
was a large demand for cheap versions of these jeans at the city’s markets. While the jeans were 
constructed elsewhere, the women in Danilimda completed a finishing task of removing any 
hanging threads. The jeans would be returned to the subcontractors to then be given to another 
homeworker to iron, fold, and pack. But there were often many actors involved in the supply chain. 
Manjila did not receive the orders directly from a subcontractor; rather, she knew a woman in the 
neighborhood who had the contact with a subcontractor provided Majula with these orders. The 
neighbor began working at a hospital and stopped her home-based work; as Manjila did not know 
the original subcontractor, she lost this work. 
Time and Schedules 
 Home-based work does not follow a defined schedule, but neither does the domestic 
responsibilities expected of women. Planned and unplanned needs would interrupt the ability to 
complete a work order, while an urgent work order would disrupt women’s domestic tasks, 
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resulting in a sporadic schedule where women are expected to be present and available for both 
forms of work. 
Women did not often openly admit to difficulties with balancing their paid work and unpaid 
work. They would dismiss any possible conflicts, reasoning that they were working from home, 
so it was possible to do all. But they did employ techniques to cope with the added responsibilities. 
One of the most common was to lengthen and intensify their daily schedules by waking up earlier 
or completing their household tasks faster. Kaia plainly explained that since she began home-based 
work she just has to finish her household tasks more quickly. Asha wakes up earlier in the morning 
so that she has more time in the day. With a laugh, she tells us, “If we wake up early to do the 
[household work] then there isn’t much difficulty.” In Nobelnagar, Hansha explained, “I adjust. 
As such, I don’t face many difficulties as I have my routine. If I have to get up at 5 a.m. then I 
have to get up by 5 a.m. I do face some small difficulties, but I adjust.” 
Women attempted to have some semblance of a working day by setting a schedule for their 
work. Kaia gave a typical response to our question of how they managed, “There is no difficulty. 
The children go to school, and by the time they return in the evening the work is done.” Kaia has 
three young children, between the ages of six and ten, but she lives in a home with three other 
couples who also have children. She has a few hours during the day when the children are out of 
the house to complete her work orders. Asha and Biliksha schedule their day similar to Kaia, 
waiting for the children to leave for school to start paid work. When the children are at home, it is 
impossible to work. If the orders are not completed by then, Asha waits until her children are 
asleep to finish.  
The scheduling techniques described by Kaia, Biliksha, and Asha create space to allow for 
the completion of their work without interruption; yet, the boundaries of this workspace were often 
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framed around their caregiving roles. They would work in the middle of the day when their young 
children are at school as this is the only time that they are able to concentrate on their work. Other 
women we spoke with also worked in the middle of the day, when the needs of their household 
was less and they were less likely to be disrupted. For example, Lajvanti and her mother would 
wait until her father and brothers left for work before starting their home-based work. Vali would 
stop her work at midday to prepare lunch for her husband, who would have returned home from 
his job as a sweeper at the Gujarat High Court. They strove to schedule work around these tasks, 
and so emphasized the salience of their domestic roles. 
Despite efforts to separate their paid work and unpaid care work, collisions occurred. When 
Jayshree and I visited Kaia’s home, her children along with those of her two brothers-in-law and 
their wives were home because of a school holiday. The younger kids boisterously followed us 
around, while the older boys sat in front of a television set feigning boredom. Kaia tells us that 
today, even if the children were at school, she would not have been able to work because her 
machine is broken and in the shop for repairs.  
Other participants reflected on the need to accommodate their time depending on the tasks 
of the day. Hansha, a mother of three who wants to support her daughter’s education, explained to 
us that she prioritizes tasks depending on where she is needed, “If home-based work is urgent I do 
that, but if my daughter needs tutoring, I help her.” Women would also stop work whenever guests 
arrived at home or if they had to attend community or religious events. These events could take up 
a significant amount of time away from their work. And, as a sociologist at Gujarat University 
remarked, women have twice the number of events to attend as their husbands because of their 
attachment to two families, their natal and their conjugal.41  
                                                
41 See Chapter 6 for more on women’s experiences in the family. 
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These stories show that, despite women’s attempts to have a planned schedule, it was often 
difficult because of the continuous and sporadic nature of both care work and home-based work. 
Social reproductive roles are not well defined, and the irregularity of home-based work means that 
from day-to-day they would either have more or less time to complete their other tasks. With this 
constant shifting and presence of tasks, their multiple identities of worker and woman were always 
present, regardless of which task they were conducting. The young woman in Figure 7 illustrates 
this conflation of roles. She is adding beads to rakhi—a bracelet associated with the Hindu holiday 
Raksha Bandhan. While the young woman is working, she is caring for her infant who we see 
cradled in the nook of her legs. 
 
Figure 7. A working mother and her child 
 
      Photograph by author. 
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Work like this, where a machine was not required, was easy to define as “leisure” activity. 
In Jamalpur, the women I spoke with all had contract work that involved adding beads to the ends 
of dupatta, the scarves women would wear over their shoulders. This was a second job for Bharti. 
A widow living with an older mother-in-law and two young sons, she shouldered most of the 
financial responsibilities for the household. Her main job was working the nightshift as a hospital 
peon.42 Bharti frames her home-based work as “restful,” it is work that she can complete at home 
whenever she has a free moment in the day from her other household responsibilities. (Nikila, the 
homeworker quoted at the beginning of this chapter and Bharti’s neighbor, notes otherwise.) 
Because beading does not require a designated workplace, like sewing a garment does, women 
would work on orders anytime their hands were free. This obscured even more the line between 
when one was working and not working, as seen in Figure 7. The categorization of women’s home-
based work as secondary, completed during her free time, is found throughout industrial use of 
home-based work; it justifies the low wage rate and devalues women’s participation in the 
economic sphere (Boris 1994; Prügl 1999). 
Home-based workers’ day, more than other types of work, reflects how the division of 
production and social reproduction are becoming difficult to define (Mitchell, Marston, and Katz 
2004). In a capitalist system that divides these forms of work, a home-based worker attempts to 
create similar spatial and temporal boundaries to differentiate work and nonwork. Not dissimilar 
to when a worker leaves her house to work outside, by scheduling her work time when her care 
needs are less, such as when her children are at school, a home-based worker attempts to remove 
her care duties from a working space. Though, of course, a home-based worker (like many 
                                                
42 Though it holds a negative connotation in the West, the term “peon” is still used in India to 
signify a low-ranked office attendant performing unskilled work, such as cleaning or running small 
errands. 
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workers) is never able to completely detach from her care duties when she enters her workspace. 
Care and work are never so constant, and this is clear when work occurs in the home where the 
boundaries between the two are even more difficult to keep.  
Unpaid Family Workers 
A common technique to address insecurity of work was the use of unpaid family workers. 
When paid work takes place in the home, it is easy for family members to become unpaid workers, 
most often women and children (ILO 2013; Sudarshan and Sinha 2011). Family help also allows 
women to take on more than one type of home-based work. While this provided a somewhat more 
constant income, it was not uncommon for multiple orders to arrive at the same time. The help of 
family members was particularly necessary at these moments. These unpaid family workers are 
often overlooked in labor market data, but Sudarshan and Sinha (2011) argue that they should be 
included in the definition of home-based workers because of its prevalence. 
Jaya, a young mother living in a nuclear household in Amraiwadi, works long hours sewing 
the gloves that upper-middle and upper class women wear while driving their mopeds in the city. 
Jaya reported one of the higher monetary contributions to her household among survey 
participants, nearly half of the household income. She was also one of the few women who 
mentioned receiving help from a male family member with her paid work. When there are large 
orders, “There are difficulties, but my husband helps in straightening the gloves. Gloves are inside 
out, so he helps to make them straight.” If the work needs to be completed urgently, Jaya would 
buy food from a canteen instead of cooking, “We have to bring meal from outside and eat. The 
most important is to deliver the work.”43 
                                                
43 While most studies, including this dissertation, focus on domestic responsibilities such as 
cleaning, cooking, and caregiving, Jaya’s comment points to women’s responsibility of having to 
schedule and manage time for herself and her family members. 
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Daxa, who had two types of home-based work, would have her sons iron the ready-made 
garments while she worked on the sewing machine. While most of the informants’ children helped 
after school, some children would stop their schooling in order to contribute to the household. 
Girls, especially eldest daughters, are more like to be pulled out of school early to help with paid 
work and the unpaid work in the household (Burra 2001). Shanta, the young homeworker in 
Rajivnagar, dropped out of school to start working when she was 12 years old, while her sister 
remained in school and is now attending college. 
This use of unpaid family labor as a survival strategy is another source of exploitation of 
workers in capitalist production. It sustains inequality as children spend time working instead 
studying, even dropping out of school to work fulltime. The process of learning where one stands 
in the class structure starts much earlier than when one enters the labor market, and the family is 
recognized as a first site of this process (Crompton 2006; Lareau 2003). In home-based work, 
however, children also form their sense of identity as a worker through the actual participation in 
home-based work.  
This process became apparent during our visits to Jamalpur, a neighborhood located on the 
eastern bank of the Sabarmati River. We were conducting interviews at Nikila’s two-story pucca 
house.44 Her family had been in Jamalpur for a while, and they lived in the older section of the 
slum. Most of the homes in this area of the slum were permanent and on secluded and quiet alleys, 
a welcomed moment of calm in stark contrast to the busy atmosphere of the market road just 
                                                
44 Pucca denotes a home made of concrete with a permanent roof. Other types of dwelling include 
semi-pucca, usually made of concrete walls and a tin roof, and kuccha, traditional dwellings made 
of mud and a straw roof, but also used to denote temporary homes of found material, such as plastic 
and plywood. Jamalpur, like many slums that have existed for some time, had all three types of 
housing types. The homes on the outer edge were kuccha and belonged to more recent migrants to 
the city, while families who lived in the area longer and had more resources, such as Nikila’s 
family, had built pucca and semi-pucca houses.  
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outside Jamalpur and the dirt lane enclosed by the cramped and slanting kuccha homes that led us 
here. Nikila’s home was at the end of the road, close to the river. It even had a backyard of sorts, 
as their home was at the edge of the neighborhood, against the overgrown land of a former textile 
mill (see Figure 8). Her family had constructed a small seating area in the back, a place to sit 
outside in the shade. We began our interviews in the back room with the door open to the backyard 
to let in light. As was often the case when we conducted interviews, in the room were Nikila’s 
family (her daughter, mother-in-law, and younger sister-in-law) and her neighbors (some waiting 
to participate in the study). Every other woman had a bowl on their lap, threading needles through 
the beads in the bowl and sewing them to the borders of a scarf. Even Nikila’s husband, who came 
home from work halfway through our visit, took a bowl and started working. Unlike sewing a 
 
Figure 8. Shilpa's backyard with a former textile mill chimney stack in the background 
 
Photograph by author. 
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garment, this work could be completed anywhere, picked up and placed aside easily. Both times 
that I visited their homes, this was what they were doing, threading and sewing beads to scarves 
whenever they had a free moment, sitting on the floor waiting for dinner or in the backyard to 
catch a breeze—any moment their hands were free. 
While I was interviewing Nikila, I noticed that her daughter, a toddler, sitting nearby with 
a neighbor, was playing with the beads in the bowl. Later, when I starting taking photographs of 
the girl, Jayshree explained to me that the daughter was helping with the work, and in fact, her 
small hands were threading beads onto a string. Her mother nudged her to continue for me, smiling 
proudly at her daughter’s ability. Nikila and her family laughed as they told me that she is only 
three years old. This little girl, along with the others in the room, even during a time of leisure or 
rest, made use of their free hands to labor. When I returned a couple months later, the family was 
taking advantage of the cool weather by sitting in their backyard, with the old textile mill in the 
background. They were at “leisure,” with bowls, beads, and thread in hand. Even at the age of 
three years old, Nikila’s daughter was learning that play or leisure should be work.  
Women’s Labor  
Home-based work is a telling illustration of how material and ideological forces work in 
tandem in the reproduction of relations of power. With the informalization of work and the lack of 
social support from employers or the state, households are in a state of insecurity and often face 
cycles of poverty. Participants of this study began work because their economic contribution was 
needed. However, their job choice was limited because of economic and social conditions, and 
home-based work offered an opportunity to work while maintaining their primary role as 
caregivers. However, home-based work, with its fragmented and flexible production system, is a 
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global strategy to minimize costs of production for employers and capitalists (Carr, Chen, and Tate 
2000). This hierarchical production structure takes advantage of gendered constructs to offer low 
paid and irregular work to “housewives” (Allen and Wolkowitz 1987; Benería and Roldan 1987), 
with little threat to existing class relations through collective action (Sudarshan and Sinha 2011) 
or to power relations in the home (Kantor 2005; Khattak 2002). In their study of homeworkers in 
Mexico, Benería and Roldan (1987:166-167) argue against analytical dualism that considers class 
and gender relations as semiautonomous systems; rather, class and gender are integral and 
integrated dimensions, ideology plays a role in economic relations as much as the material basis 
of society does for ideological processes. 
My contribution here is the application of a social reproduction framework that 
distinguishes work/labor, and so does not separate the paid work and unpaid work activities of 
women if both are exploited as labor. The process of disconnecting production from social 
reproduction resulted in a tendency to analyze the relations in these domains as related yet separate, 
a practice that Benería and Roldan criticized. Adopting their perspective, I approach material and 
ideological relations to be integrated and seek analytical frameworks that allow us to overcome 
this dualism. In this chapter, I argue that one way to achieve this is to define activities by their 
relationship to the alienation process of capitalist production, rather than relying on capitalist 
definitions of productive work being those activities that result in the production of commodities. 
Women’s strategies to address their time and space constraints as home-based workers reveal how 
activities in the social reproduction domain are appropriated as labor. The irregularity of 
subcontracted work is an effective method for this process. Unpredictable work orders, seasonal 
work, prevalence of urgent orders, and lack of job security all contribute to a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding one’s daily work schedule. While women would attempt to create space and 
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stability for their home-based work, for example, through scheduling or taking on more than one 
type of home-based work, the irregularity of both their paid work and their caregiving 
responsibilities made it difficult to maintain boundaries between the two.  
There are two ways that capitalism exploits the labor of social reproduction. One is by 
taking advantage of cultural and social norms that keep women in the home, providing a ready and 
cheap labor force. Social reproduction’s role in the appropriation of labor is not always apparent, 
but because women are compelled to stay home to complete these domestic tasks a production 
system is able to enter the home, justifying the work’s irregularity and low payment rate. The 
image of the young mother working on bracelets while cradling her infant is a clear example of 
how her caregiving work is being appropriated as a cheap labor supply by allowing her to 
participate in both roles concurrently. The possibility for women to interrupt their daily activities 
to complete work orders offers capitalism an attractive and profitable production system, while it 
is presented as a work option for women to better address household care needs, reproducing 
gender ideologies. 
A second method, and related to first, is the use of unpaid family labor. When women have 
urgent orders or receiving more than one at a time, they would rely on other family members to 
help complete the work as unpaid workers. While some might argue that the piece-rate system 
resolves this issue, since the orders that family members complete result in higher earnings, this 
ignores the exploitative system that compels families to employ survival strategies to address their 
precarious condition (in part due to the very low wages of piece-rate work). In addition, this 
practice of relying on family members, and often children, encourages employers to continue the 
practice of irregularity of work. Because of this unpaid work, contractors are reassured that the 
orders will be completed. The use of child labor is another troubling factor. Not only is their labor 
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being exploited, but it also reproduces class relations, materially (in that children are denied 
schooling) and symbolically (as they learn their position in the class structure at a very early stage 
of life). 
This does not mean that women are stuck in a system of exploitation in which they are 
powerless against larger economic and ideological forces. Rather, because work is conceived to 
include those creative activities with the purpose of transforming material and symbolic life 
(Bakker and Gill 2003), women’s participation in home-based work, while it invokes exploitation, 
is also an example of their agency. Women’s comments of working in order to contribute to their 
households are an example of the strategies that they employ to address difficult situations. While 
the “empowering” potential of these strategies is limited because they occur within an exploitative 
system, they still signify active participation by women to affect and, in some cases, transform 
their environment. Before moving on to this discussion of how women reproduce and contest 
power at work, in the home, and in civil society, the next chapter continues to examine the use of 
women’s labor in capitalist production against the construction of the gendered entrepreneurial 
subject.   
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Chapter 5. The Gendered Entrepreneurial Subject  
 
Like many large Indian cities, Ahmedabad experienced significant changes in its economic, 
political, and social fabric as a result of economic liberalization, including the growth of a 
feminized workforce in the export industry (Elson and Pearson 1981) and the informalization of 
work (Breman 1996; Castells and Portes 1989). In the previous chapter, I discussed women’s 
experiences with informality and the strategies employed by women to address conflicting roles 
when work takes place in the home. In Chapter 6 I will discuss how these spatial and temporal 
strategies maintain the symbolic boundaries of family and work for women, but first I turn to a 
symbolic construction of the mainstream development paradigm, the gendered entrepreneurial 
subject. This construction reflects the social turn in the development field—the inclusion of social 
dimensions in economic development—that remains grounded in neoliberal thinking. Scholars 
have noted the use of feminism to achieve neoliberal goals (Eisenstein 2005; Fraser 2009), and, in 
the gender and development field, how the construction of the entrepreneurial woman has served 
the interests of the market in the name of development and empowerment (Keating, Rassmussen, 
and Rishi 2010; Rankin 2001). Similarly, in this chapter, I question the conviction that micro-
entrepreneurialism is the answer to poverty and inequality, and ask how this discourse perpetuates 
social and economic injustices. Using the case of home-based workers, I argue that there is a 
contradiction between the gendered entrepreneurial subject as typified in the development field 
and the realities of informality as it exists in capitalism. 
Civil society is active in the construction of this subject. The proliferation of civil society 
organizations involved in social and economic development, with the NGO as its most well-known 
form, fosters an idea that development has become more grass-roots and democratic than the past 
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monopoly by the state and market (Kamat 2003, 2004). However, this sector cannot be considered 
as autonomous from the dominant political economy, and NGOs are in fact involved and 
influenced by the “systematic reorganization of the political culture” (Kamat 2003:93). I find that 
SEWA, as a membership-based organization that is involved in substantial program-based 
development, including microfinance and capacity building, contributes to this construction of the 
entrepreneurial subject. After discussing the construction of the gendered entrepreneurial subject, 
I examine two films produced by SEWA to document how the organization employs strategic 
representations of women’s empowerment that are linked to hegemonic discourses of 
neoliberalism.  
The second half of this chapter examines women’s actual everyday experiences with this 
entrepreneurial subject. Critical gender and development scholarship has been helpful in 
examining the intersection of capitalism, development, and gender; yet, most empirical studies 
have focused on the micro-finance industry and the women who use micro-finance services (see 
Karim 2012; Keating, Rassmussen, and Rishi 2010; Radhakrishnan 2015; Rankin 2001). I expand 
the discussion of the gendered entrepreneurial subject to include women who participate in home-
based work and focus on the setting of work for the analysis. Many women who participate in 
micro-enterprises complete their work from their own home, and the characteristics of home-based 
work blur the line between the independent entrepreneurial worker and the dependent contract 
worker (Chen 2014; Prügl and Tinker 1997).  
I find that two characteristics of entrepreneurialism, capital and autonomy, are present in 
home-based work not as sources for empowerment, as depicted by micro-finance institutions, but 
as sources of exploitation. I discuss the homeworker’s subjective experiences of her work in 
relation to the construction of a gendered entrepreneurial subject in development discourses, and 
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I show how characteristics of informal work can be misconceived as entrepreneurialism, 
specifically, owning the means of production and flexibility of work time. I ask how, through these 
practices, the gendered entrepreneurial subject is present in home-based work and what are 
workers’ experiences with this “entrepreneurialism.” Examining women’s experiences with 
informality in the home reveals the contradictions of the gendered entrepreneurial subject.  
The Gendered Entrepreneurial Subject in Development  
In the past three decades, there has been a surge of interest in women’s entrepreneurship 
in the Global South. Policy makers and development practitioners promote and encourage 
women’s entrepreneurial abilities from the conviction that increasing women’s market-based 
opportunities is key to lifting women, their families, and communities out of poverty (World Bank 
2012). In a shift from earlier practices, the post-Washington consensus is that social and economic 
dimensions must be addressed to ensure inclusive and sustainable development (Stiglitz 1999), 
and increasing capabilities, especially women’s, is essential (Sen 1999). This new focus remains 
grounded in economic thinking, as empowering women is not only held to be the right thing to do 
but to be good business as well (Revenga and Shetty 2012).  
In this environment, micro-finance projects, which uphold the self-help and individual 
entrepreneurship of mainstream development, have flourished with support from governments, 
NGOs, and social business enterprises. The beneficiary of this movement is specifically gendered 
female; the majority of borrowers of micro-loans are women (Reed 2011), and micro-finance 
institutions are often explicit about their gendered preferences in customers. Women, most often 
poor women in developing countries, are targeted as they are seen as more reliable in repaying 
loans and, presumed to be more altruistic than men, will use earnings to support their household 
(Prügl 1999). Providing women with access to credit is believed to have more positive effects on 
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household welfare than when men have access to credit (Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright 2006). 
The entrepreneurial woman is seen as a driver for economic growth and development in her 
community, and her participation in work brings potential for societal transformations, including 
helping her household escape poverty and transform gender roles (De Vita, Mari, and Poggesi 
2014).  
The emphasis on women’s entrepreneurialism is in line with the construction of a gendered 
neoliberal subject. This process is reminiscent of the global market’s use of young women of the 
global South in production factories, reproducing gender constructs that define young women as 
docile, nimble, and cheap labor power (Elson and Pearson 1981). Supporting women’s 
entrepreneurialism reflects a shift towards including women as agents of development; yet, there 
remains a need to critically examine the use of women’s labor in these practices and discourses. 
Despite the inclusion of social factors in development, multilateral agencies, such as the World 
Bank, a prominent proponent of women’s empowerment through entrepreneurialism, retain 
economic-centric and colonialist discourses of neoliberalism; a prime example of this being the 
marketization of empowerment through microfinance while continuing to ascribe gender inequity 
to “traditional culture” (Bergeron 2003). The construction of the Third World Woman into the 
“rational economic woman” has been described as a tool to open financial markets in areas that 
are closed to global capital (Rankin 2001). Furthermore, in the enthusiasm for developing women’s 
entrepreneurial skills, a “universalized entrepreneurial womanhood” emerges from the conviction 
that there are basic principles of entrepreneurship and education that are universally shared by 
women in developing countries (Radhakrishnan 2015:267).  
The rise of the entrepreneurial woman came at a time when the meaning of home-based 
work underwent a transformation. Rather than being seeing as a form of traditional craft production 
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or a hobby for idle housewives, home-based work began to be seen as an opportunity for women 
to develop and foster their entrepreneurial abilities (Prügl 1999). The focus on women as agents 
of development and the microenterprise movement created a reversal of values associated with 
womanhood and the home; womanhood is no longer limited to nurturance but now includes 
breadwinning as well, while the home became a site of nurturance and microentrepreneurial 
activities (Prügl 1999). In a study on microenterprise support groups in Nepal, Rankin (2001:29) 
argues that these women-only groups have a “functional role in anchoring the subjectivity of 
rational economic woman in a national civil society,” as they mitigate the threat to cultural 
ideologies that entrepreneurial (and public) activities might bring. Similarly, the appropriation of 
motherhood for capitalist production, under the guise that home-based work does not impede 
women’s ability to attend to their domestic responsibilities, resembles “nationalist rhetoric in 
constructing women as the antidote to capitalism” (Prügl 1999:98). The entrepreneurial woman is 
another example of how women “bear the burden of being cultural repositories, subjectively 
[resolving] the balance between the old and the new” (Oza 2006:7). Home-based work allows for 
the integration of women in the economy without disrupting imagined notions of gender and 
nation. 
SEWA’s Development Strategies 
SEWA’s development programs participate in this reproduction of the gendered 
entrepreneurial subject. While it began as a labor union, its dual strategy of struggle and 
development allows the organization to venture into new forms of support for its members, 
including movement-oriented approaches, but also cooperatives, microfinance, and capacity 
building. SEWA (2013) explains this detour into development as necessary to support women’s 
ongoing livelihood needs while also building collective strength and bargaining power. Building 
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women’s capacities, through literacy, access to capital, and leadership training, provides them with 
tools to develop their own vision of a just society. However, its overemphasis on socio-economic 
development (it has nearly twenty sister organizations just in Gujarat offering a range of services, 
from health to trade facilities to banking) and the ensuing professionalization and 
institutionalization required to support these programs is an example of the NGOization of social 
movements found among other community-based NGOs (Alvarez 1998; Kamat 2003a; Miraftab 
1997). This is a move from consciousness raising and demanding transformative social change to 
“technical managerial solution to social issues of poverty and oppression,” such as developing 
skills for economic livelihood projects rather than addressing the structures that foster economic 
inequality (Kamat 2003:90). This process is linked to the neoliberal project of state disinvestment 
in social reproduction needs as NGOs have come to replace state actors in development projects 
(Eisenstein 2009). NGOs are presented as a grassroots and community-led alternative to the “top-
down” approach of 20th century development; yet, scholars have questioned the ways in which 
NGOs are being incorporated into a neoliberal privatized model of civil society (Kamat 2004). 
SEWA, with its substantial ties, through funding and collaboration, to the state, global policy 
actors (such as the World Bank and the UN), foreign states (USAID 2015), and private 
corporations, including Mastercard (Pandit 2014), Vodafone (Chukkath 2016), and Primark 
(Primark 2016), are examples of its cooperation with the state and capital and part of the 
“development hegemony” (Kamat 2003a; Sahoo 2013). 
Video SEWA and Representing Workers 
 SEWA’s approach to organizing women workers today reflects the ideological shift in the 
neoliberal development agenda, namely, through the construction of women’s empowerment to 
mean her entrepreneurial abilities. A look at SEWA’s multi-media productions demonstrates this 
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move. Two films produced by SEWA Video, one produced in 1984 and the other in 1995, are a 
telling representation of this change and the organization’s representation of the “woman informal 
worker” from activist to entrepreneur.45 
Manek Chowk is SEWA’s first production, filmed in 1984. The film’s subjects are the 
city’s street vendors, and the title comes from the film’s location, Manek Chowk, a neighborhood 
located in the old city of Ahmedabad that is famous for its large street market. The film focuses 
on one vendor, Rajniben, a vegetable vendor at Manek Chowk and a SEWA member. In her 
protests of unfair treatment that vegetable vendors face from the authorities, Manek Chowk is overt 
about the class dynamics at play. In a particularly shrewd comment, Rajniben accuses city officials 
of ignoring street vendors and only listening to “those in multistoried buildings” (the middle and 
upper class). SEWA does not change the presentation of Rajniben; she is presented as she is. She 
sits on the floor surrounded by her produce; she is wearing old and tattered clothes (only wearing 
the blouse and skirt usually worn under a sari and considered undergarments). Throughout the 
film, Rajniben is visibly angry. She shouts at the camera and waves her hands in exasperation, at 
times so forcefully that the baby in her lap starts to cry. SEWA, the organization, is absent. It is 
neither a subject in the film, nor is it visible through the production of the film. 
A decade after this first film, SEWA produced I Am Shakti in 1995.46 It has been screened 
at multiple international film festivals and has received numerous awards. This film was made a 
                                                
45 Video SEWA was established as a cooperative in 1984. It has produced 200 documentaries to 
document issues affecting women informal workers. SEWA staff produces the films, and topics 
are decided in collaboration with SEWA members. The cooperative also offers production 
services; clients have included Women’s World Banking, the United Nations, and Star Plus, a 
private television channel in India. The films are used both as development tools for women 
informal workers as well as for international audiences, with screenings at international film 
festivals. See more at www.videosewa.org. 
46 Shakti translates to “power,” and is a Hindu female deity representing power and strength. 
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few years after the liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991, and during a time when the gender 
and development field began to be defined by entrepreneurialism and women’s empowerment. 
Rather than focusing on the class identity of informal workers, it follows one woman, Hiraben, 
and the economic and social impact that she experiences since becoming involved with SEWA. 
The theme addresses the multiple inequalities that poor women face in India, and shows how 
Hiraben becomes empowered through SEWA’s capacity-building programs. The decision to 
incorporate the multidimensional and intersecting identities of women is significant and needed; 
however, it comes at the cost of ignoring structural inequalities. In place of the angry vegetable 
vendor, fed up with the class inequalities that she sees every day, we are presented with Hiraben 
who, with some help from SEWA, has been able to succeed within the structural limitations of her 
society. She empowers herself by building her capabilities, and thus becomes a contributing 
citizen. SEWA plays a central role in these films. The organization, its goals, and its successes, 
becomes a focal point in the story and is the propeller of change. SEWA is also more present in 
the production of the film, as the aesthetics and behavior of Hiraben in I Am Shakti are more 
fashioned. She is well behaved, dressed nicely, smiles often, and speaks clearly. She portrays the 
acceptable image of a working woman. Rather than being angry at the class dynamics in society, 
she gives advice to viewers on how they too can succeed. Her demands are less threatening than 
the first. She is not angry; she just wants the opportunity to succeed in this society.  
 Of course, these two films are not a complete representation of SEWA as an organization. 
But as cultural objects of the institution, produced by SEWA itself and viewed by informal workers 
and development practitioners, they offer insight into how SEWA represents itself in relation to 
changing development discourses and SEWA’s growing role in the development field. Its first film 
is an example of a participatory film production in which cameras were placed in the hands of 
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women workers, many of them illiterate, to capture their daily life and the issues they face 
(Interview, May 14, 2014).47 It was an experiment with film’s potential for the organization and 
its members. By 1995, when I Am Shakti was produced, SEWA employed conscious and deliberate 
strategies to present a particular message and to advertise its programming and services. In this 
later film, the organization had a much more visible presence in the film and Hiraben’s growth is 
tied to the SEWA programs in which she participated, with an emphasis on the productive potential 
of women if they are given the opportunity. 
The Entrepreneur and the Home-Based Worker 
Current development discourses rely heavily on the neoliberal notion of “empowerment” 
with its focus on individual responsibility and capabilities to address poverty. The construction of 
an entrepreneurial subject derives from this project to develop women’s economic skills and so to 
support their integration in the economy. This analysis considers the construction of the 
entrepreneurial subject in the homeworker. By centering the analysis in the domestic space, the 
space in which much of the enterprising woman’s labor is often located, I address the multiple 
institutions and settings in which expressions of neoliberal technologies occur, including in the 
family and home, and not just in the economic sphere (Ong 2006).  
Because of the workplace setting and ambiguous employee-employer relationship, contract 
home-based work is often refashioned as self-employment, though it actually exhibits 
characteristics of both independent and dependent work (Chen 2014; Prügl and Tinker 1997).48 I 
examine two characteristics of home-based work, costs of production and indeterminate schedules, 
                                                
47 Other early videos captured this participatory process, such as Parde Ke Pichee (Behind the 
Veil), which consists of a single scene of a group of Muslim women discussing why they do or do 
not wear a veil. 
48 In fact, India’s census data does not distinguish between self-employed home-based work and 
contract homework (GOI 2007).  
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that are misconstrued as those of entrepreneurship, investing in one’s work and autonomy. First, 
it is common for homeworkers to bear a number of costs related to production. As the work does 
not occur in a designated workspace by the manufacturer, it is the responsibility of the worker to 
provide her own tools, materials, and, of course, workspace to complete the job. Second, because 
of the “autonomy” of home-based work, often discussed as the “flexibility” of deciding when to 
work, workers have to employ a form of self-management that differs from similar work conducted 
in a factory. Both of these processes gain particular significance because they occur in the setting 
of home where women’s other roles are performed. I argue that these are examples of embodied 
labor, in which the spatialization of labor constructs gender relations but also inscribes social 
differences such as race and caste (Ferguson 2008; Rioux 2015) that contribute to the appropriation 
of social reproduction for capitalist production.  
I focus on the subjective dimension of home-based work, specifically in terms of balancing 
work and care. The production process, of course, has a significant influence on women’s 
experiences with work; here, however, I am interested in outlining how women interpret the 
experience of working in the home and internalize the meaning of their paid work and their 
caregiving. I juxtapose this subjective experience to the mainstream emphasis on the 
entrepreneurial woman in gender and development practice, critiqued from the left as the 
construction of a neoliberal subject (Rankin 2001; Wilson 2011). How does the subjective 
dimension of women’s participation in home-based work reflect this constructed subject and how 
does it diverge from it? 
Owning the Means of Production or Exploitation? 
As garment workers, most women used sewing machines and related tools, including 
machine oil, scissors, and needles, to complete their paid work. Homeworkers were expected to 
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purchase these tools themselves, since contractors did not provide them. If a machine broke (or 
was even lost permanently, such as Nita’s sewing machine after the fire) it was the homeworker 
who paid the costs of fixing or replacing the machine. And as the machine was her means for 
earning, it was essential to pay for these expenses so that she could continue working; though, a 
broken machine often results in a predicament since women depended on the money earned to pay 
for the repairs or replacement. Money would have to be found from somewhere, such as 
moneylenders (Bhatt 2006). For some women, who had a more secure situation and had been able 
to accumulate savings, they used this to cover unexpected costs. Kaia relied on her savings when 
her machine stopped working. She always placed a portion of her earnings in a savings account—
it is meant to pay for her children’s private school tuition49—but when her machine broke, she 
used some of it to pay for the repairs. She was renting the machine, like the rest of the homeworkers 
we spoke with in Vatva, but the cost of repairs was her responsibility.  
Depending on the work, homeworkers were also required to purchase some of the 
materials. Contractors would provide a partially finished product and any embellishments, such as 
lace or beads, but other materials were the homeworkers’ responsibility. Just as homeworkers were 
expected to provide for and maintain upkeep of the machines and tools necessary for the work, 
they also had to provide the threads, needles, and machine oil. Depending on the woman’s degree 
of mobility, some workers would buy thread and other materials directly from contractors.  
Manisha’s contractor provides thread with his orders, but he deducts the price from her 
wages. She has few options to purchase threads elsewhere as she does not live near markets. As a 
young wife and daughter-in-law with a toddler to care for, it is difficult for Manisha to travel to 
                                                
49 As discussed in Chapter 7, because of the poor state of India’s education system along with other 
factors, such as school’s distance from home, some families would send their children to private 
schools. 
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those markets where she could find thread for lower prices. The area where she lives, Sarkhej, is 
in the western outskirts of Ahmedabad and off a secluded road; it costs around Rs. 10 in a shared 
rickshaw to arrive at the end of the road where it intersects with the busier Jawaharlal Nehru Road. 
From there, she would have to pay for an additional shared rickshaw or bus to arrive at a market 
along Jawaharlal Nehru Road. To reach the city center, it could cost up to Rs. 50. The costs, along 
with the time required in this pieced-together transportation did not justify traveling to buy thread. 
This is a similar situation for Biliksha who lives in Fatehwadi, a neighborhood not far from 
Sarkhej. She is a young mother of two, living with her in-laws, and with limited opportunities to 
go outside her neighborhood. Biliksha buys threads directly from the same neighbor who supplies 
her with orders for school uniforms. She reasoned that if she bought threads at the neighborhood 
shop, she would spend Rs. 6 per spool, so she chooses to pay the Rs. 5 to the contractor for each 
spool. Her neighbor, Zarina, at 42 years old and with two grown sons, has greater independence 
to travel to the markets for better prices. There she buys the larger spools in bulk to save a few 
rupees. 
Homeworkers are also responsible for providing a site for production and overhead costs. 
Women often do not devote a section of the house for work; rather, their work areas are within the 
domestic space of the house.50 She would also have to pay for the electricity used for the machine 
and for light when working at night.  Women’s production practices were an outcome of trying to 
keep these costs down. They would place their sewing machine by a window to use natural light 
instead of overhead light (see Figure 9), but in these cramped homes the daylight that entered was  
                                                
50 In her research on male and female homeworkers in Mexico, Miraftab’s (1994) found that there 
was a gendered allocation of workspace. While male homeworkers would construct a separate 
space for work, female homeworkers were more likely to complete the work in the living area, and 
so were not separated from their domestic responsibilities. 
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Figure 9. Working by the window for light 
 
Photograph by author. 
 
often weak. If they could avoid it, few women worked after sunset since they would have to use 
electricity, though, the urgency of orders would at times require them to work through the night. 
Having to pay for production costs was often mentioned as a negative aspect of their work. 
For the other characteristics of the production system, namely, low wages and irregularity, women 
were mostly compliant. They reported their piece-rate wages without complaint and noted that 
work was regular. After we asked if they believed their wages to be fair or if they ever asked for 
higher wages, women would answer that their contractor paid good wages and they were satisfied 
with it. The lack of dissatisfaction with their work arrangement is not surprising. Being isolated 
from other workers, they had limited knowledge of the market, market prices, and value of their 
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products (Chen 2014). Protest against unfair wages was risky as women depended on these 
earnings and contractors could easily find more compliant workers in another area.51 In this 
environment, workers were grateful for the work that they could find.  
However, when asked to describe their work materials, women were quick to note that they 
had to pay for the threads, needles, and other costs. In fact, it was on this aspect of their situation 
that a handful of women were compelled to confront their contractors. Two women, Nita and 
Mohsina, stopped their work for this reason. When we met Nita for the first time in October, she 
had recently stopped accepting work from her contractor. Originally, her task was to topstitch 
material that would be used for chaniya choli (festive dresses), but then her contractor asked Nita 
to add an understitch as well. Nita refused because she would have to use more thread, and the 
cost for a spool of thread, for which she was already paying, would be too high of an expense to 
justify the low piece-rate wages. So Nita would not pick up any new orders until he agreed to offer 
more money to compensate for the cost of thread. When we saw Nita again a few months later, 
she had started working again with the same contractor. He had agreed to pay a higher piece-rage 
wage, Rs. 8 per piece rather than Rs. 5.5, and he was even dropping off the materials and picking 
up completed orders. Nita tells us, however, that it was a wedding season, so the contractor was in 
need of workers. After the peak season, he could easily return to the lower pay rate or even stop 
providing work. 
Between our first visit with Mohsina and our second for the interview, Mohsina had 
stopped her paid work. When we returned, she told us that she was no longer receiving orders from 
the contractor. Similar to Nita, the costs of traveling and materials had been too high to justify the 
                                                
51 SEWA Union has worked to address the vulnerability of home-based workers by negotiating for 
higher piece-rates and fairer working conditions with private enterprises and the State (Chen et al. 
2005). 
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low pay. Mohsina had additional difficulties because of her disability. She told us that she was 
born with a weak leg, but it became worse after an operation when she was a teenager. Now, 
Mohsina relies on a crutch and it is difficult to walk long distances. Since she cannot travel easily 
and her husband is bed ridden, her eldest daughter would go by rickshaw to the contractor for 
picking up and dropping off orders. The rickshaw trip would cost Rs. 30. Mohsina also used her 
own thread on the orders, and she used an electric machine because she was unable to work with 
a manual machine. After accounting for these costs, the remaining earnings made the work 
unviable, and so she stopped taking orders.  
Why would women object to the system of contract home-based work only in these cases? 
They do not object to the low wages or irregularity of work, but they do when they have to use 
their earnings to cover costs of production. The machines, material, workspace, all the costs that 
would usually be borne by the employer are instead placed on the worker. While their exploitation 
from the unpaid, surplus labor remained hidden, workers are aware of their exploitation by 
contractors and manufacturers to cover the cost of production with their own earnings. The few 
instances when women made the decision to stop work (rather than the contractor stopping work), 
they pointed to these unfair costs as a reason. Because of the tenuous employer-employee 
relationship, lack of work contracts, and isolation from other workers, it is very difficult for 
homeworkers to fight for better wage and working conditions on their own (Prügl 1999; Sudarshan 
and Sinha 2011), and participants’ acquiescence to their work conditions corroborates this. But 
there was something about having to spend their already limited earnings to cover costs of 
production that women recognized to be unfair in the work exchange. 
Home-based workers are often categorized as either fully self-employed or fully dependent 
workers, but work arrangements are not so clearly delineated, and sub-contracted home-based 
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workers are an example of this as workers bore many of the costs and risks of production despite 
being dependent on work from contractors and manufacturers (Chen 2014). Proponents of micro-
entrepreneurialism highlight the opportunity for poor women who have limited access to the 
formal labor market to build their entrepreneurial capabilities by investing in their work. Yet, it is 
this aspect of their work that women acknowledged as an exploitative work process. The 
frustration they have towards needing to “invest” in their work goes against the development 
literature that presents the Third World Woman as only wanting a chance to develop her 
entrepreneurialism. Instead of women benefiting from this investment, they were compelled to pay 
for costs of production using the limited earnings that could have been spent for their household. 
It was this economic exchange that women deemed unfair. A similar subjective experience with 
home-based work is also seen in the autonomy of work and women’s managing of their time to 
complete work. In this case though, rather than the expenditure of earnings, it is the expenditure 
of women’s time that causes conflict and contradiction for women, their work, and their family’s 
wellbeing. 
Autonomy of Work or Disciplining the Self? 
In a study on business practices of women in Asia, the desire of greater autonomy was a 
significant reason why women left formal employment to start a business (Xavier et al. 2012). 
Neoliberal principles of profit, competition, and entrepreneurialism are most often associated with 
formal markets and jobs; yet similar economic subjectivities are emerging among poor women of 
the Global South as a result of NGO and government interventions (Karim 2011). While the 
women portrayed in case studies of microenterprise ventures are often described as entrepreneurs, 
the line between the independent self-employed worker and the dependent contract worker is often 
unclear. Is a woman who runs a small enterprise out of her home, whose products are sold to 
 134 
manufacturers, a business owner or is she selling her labor? For example, Daxa owns three 
machines for garment work (one of which was paid by a loan) and receives various orders from 
different contractors. When too many arrive at once, she asks her sister and her teenage sons to 
help. Is Daxa enjoying the autonomy that comes with running an enterprise or is the flexibility and 
irregularity of this work taking advantage of her and her family?  
The autonomy that entrepreneurialism provides is in line with the homo economicus 
subject, in which neoliberalism is not just a form of governing states and economies, but a form of 
governance over individuals as well (Foucault 2008). So what are the economic subjectivities of 
homeworkers, such as Daxa, in these neoliberal times? How does home-based workers’ status of 
being both dependent and independent workers affect their experiences of entrepreneurialism? As 
home-based workers, women experience a higher degree of autonomy than if they worked in a 
factory. They do not have to go to a designated place of work, they do not have to follow a strict 
working schedule, and there is no oversight during the time of production.52 These characteristics 
define homeworkers as more independent than factory workers, and, in fact, autonomy is a 
deciding factor as the flexibility of work allows women to complete their domestic responsibilities. 
Home-based work provides workers with a flexible working day and limited oversight; yet, 
in the absence of scheduled work hours and managers, homeworkers would create and enforce 
these parameters themselves. Allen and Wolkowitz (1987) provide a compelling argument of how 
homeworkers are in fact very constrained in their daily work decisions. Despite employers’ 
minimal interactions with workers in the production process, manufacturers and contractors exert 
a high degree of control over labor through the segmentation of labor process, piece-rate pay 
                                                
52 While there is no oversight during the time of production, contractors inspect the products and 
withhold payment if they judge the quality to be low. 
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system, and lack of formal work contract (Allen and Wolkowitz 1987). It was in the interest of 
workers to finish their current orders as soon as possible since they would not receive their pay or 
more orders until then. To complete the desired production output, workers enforced self-
management in the absence of a manager’s direct supervision.   
However, in contrast to workers on the shop floor, home-based work occurs in the home 
where women’s participation in the production process is juxtaposed with their duties in the 
domestic arena. This characteristic of home-based work creates frequent situations in which 
women have to choose between work and care—instances when their two seemingly different 
roles, as worker and as mother (or wife, daughter, etc.), collide. Of course, many workers are 
confronted with this challenge, but examining the constraints placed on homeworkers against the 
ideological construction of a gendered entrepreneurial subject provides insight on how a particular 
work situation—flexibility of work and limited oversight—exploits workers under the guise of 
autonomy. The self-management required by a homeworker becomes part of a “technology of the 
self” to maximize the entrepreneurial subject. How this process plays out for a homeworker is 
especially important to examine in a time when the worker is defined by her potential human 
capital and labor is no longer limited to the workplace (Balibar 1994). Employing the concept of 
embodied labor, I connect this process to the ways that gender and other subjectivities are inscribed 
on the body under capitalism conditions.  
Shilpa’s comments on the negative and positive aspects of working at home provides clues 
to how actual experiences with entrepreneurialism becomes a burden as her desire to earn more 
and to provide care to her family come into conflict. After marrying, Shilpa started working in a 
factory in order to contribute to a joint family household income. However, when her husband’s 
younger brother married, the older couple had to move out with their two toddlers. Without her 
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mother-in-law to look after the children while she was at work, Shilpa began working at home. 
She prefers home-based work since she could properly care for her two daughters, now 14 and 12 
years old. She is proud that they are both still in school, and herself having briefly attended post-
secondary school (one of the few in this study to have reached that far), Shilpa was glad to be 
working at home so that she could be around to support her daughters in their studies.  
There were aspects of home-based work, though, that made it more difficult, even if the 
work was similar to what she had been doing at the factory. When she worked outside, Shilpa 
knew that at five o’clock in the afternoon, her work would be finished. She could go home and 
focus on her domestic duties, help her daughters with homework, prepare dinner, and any other 
household tasks that she did not finish in the morning. With home-based work however, work was 
always present. When a contractor gives her an order, there are various methods of control that 
push Shilpa to finish the order quickly. A direct form of control is instructions from the contractor 
to finish the order in a specified amount of time, and, if needed, Shilpa would have to stay up until 
midnight or later to finish the order. Less direct, but just as persuasive, is that she will not get paid 
or receive additional orders until the current order is completed and returned. “This responsibility 
is not there when you work in a factory,” she explained to us, “at five, I am free to go. But here in 
the home, we have the constant tension of this paid work and of taking care of the home.” Working 
at home has not made it more difficult for Shilpa to complete her domestic duties. She and others 
noted that home-based work always made balancing the two easier, but, in reflecting on the 
differences, Shilpa adds how the entrance of paid work in the home alters her approach to care and 
household work. When she would leave the factory at the end of the day, she would not have to 
think about the garments until she returned to work the next morning. At home, however, she has  
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Figure 10. Orders to be completed 
 
    Photograph by author. 
 
pressure to complete her domestic work, which is always present, as well as the orders that are 
also waiting, stacked in a corner of the house. 
Later in the interview, however, Shilpa points to this characteristic of home-based work as 
also being a benefit. Because she works at home, she has the possibility to make more pieces and 
earn more. With time, Shilpa told us, she has gained experience; she works faster and is better at 
gauging how long each piece will take, “at [the factory] I have to sit from ten to five, but there is 
limited income, Rs. 2,5000. Here I am doing the whole day work, whenever I get free, I can do 
this work. So the income is more.”  
Her explanation differs from most of the other homeworkers who noted that they earn less 
now than when they had worked in a factory. Shilpa was one of the few workers able to maintain 
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a minimum of an eight-hour workday at home. She starts work at ten in the morning, after 
completing her household duties and bringing her daughters to school, and works continuously 
until six in the evening. She will stop for lunch, but today, she tells us, “I have so much work, so 
I cannot rest.” She would work in the evening, but her husband does not allow it, “In the evening, 
I only do routine work, preparing food, chores, and so on. I definitely do not do this work in the 
night. My husband clearly says ‘no’ to this work at night.” She explains that her husband wants 
her to spend time with the family since she is working all day. 
Her work commitment and confidence in her skills was evident, and she was willing to 
invest in her work. Shilpa owned an industrial sewing machine, which, at Rs. 15,000 (US $242), 
was more expensive than most of the sewing machines. When Shilpa began working at home, 
receiving orders from the same employer she had worked for at the factory, she had to make this 
investment because it was the type of machine required to complete the work. 
Shilpa would seem to be an example of the entrepreneurial woman highlighted in 
development literature. She made a substantial investment so that she could continue her work at 
home. With more flexibility in working hours and her increasing skills, she is able to produce at a 
higher output and so earn more, than when she worked at the factory. An additional benefit is that 
it is easier to support her daughters, which, with a strict factory schedule was more difficult to 
achieve. Yet, at the same time, Shilpa told us that she experiences “tension” from working at home. 
In her study on women’s health and wellbeing in a New Delhi slum, Snell-Rood (2015:54–
55) discusses women’s use of the word “tension” to describe the stress from having to provide for 
and manage family troubles in an environment that returns little support for the women themselves. 
Snell-Rood finds that this tension is an “embodied burden,” by which women’s health is affected 
not only by material deprivations but also by the “fears and brooding over how to provide for their 
 139 
families” (2015:154). Connecting this to social reproduction theory and the experiences of the 
homeworker, Shilpa’s comment about tension points to the embodied burden of caring for her 
family while working from home, but it is an example of embodied labor that exists in a capitalist 
production system. Her body and its physical potential to work within the set hours of a day 
becomes both a source of opportunity and limitation in caring and providing for her family. 
Shilpa’s appreciation of the opportunity to work more while, at the same time, having the tension 
of paid work in the home points to a reframing of responsibility that is placed on Shilpa when the 
amount of work she will complete appears to be her decision. Her family’s wellbeing becomes 
defined by her effort to work and her willingness to work “whenever I am free,” as she puts it—
and as other women we spoke with also noted. Contributing to over forty percent of the household 
income, her work was more than merely pocket change; rather, it was a considerable means of 
income for her household.  
In this same space, her domestic responsibilities remain present. She would rather work 
more, even in the evening, but her husband does not allow this, saying she should spend time with 
family—fulfilling her emotional duties to the family. Instead, she occupies herself by completing 
some household tasks, such as preparing food for the next day so that in the morning there is more 
time to work. With no set schedule, it is up to Shilpa to determine when she works and the length 
of her working day, knowing that the more she works the more she will earn. Her desire to work, 
as one of two earners in a tenuous economic condition, conflicts with the need to also provide care 
for her family. This tension, believing that she can earn more but prevented from it because of her 
other duties, becomes her embodied burden as she reflects on how her physical and emotional 
provisions to her family constrains the amount of monetary help she can provide to the household 
(and how her work, in turn, impedes her care). 
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Conclusion: Women’s Labor and Informality  
In a period of economic crisis and retreating state support in public goods, changes that 
have affected poor women of the Global South the most; the remedy prescribed by international 
agencies is the poor woman of the Global South refashioned as an entrepreneur. However, the 
initiatives that development organizations support to foster the entrepreneurial woman cannot 
address the unequal balance of power that influence women’s experiences with work. Programs, 
such as microfinance, rely on the notion that women will benefit from engaging in these 
entrepreneurial activities. A popular image of a micro-entrepreneur would be the woman who, 
with some grit, sweat, and help from a loan, capitalizes on her sewing hobby, starts selling clothes 
out of her house, and expands to a large enterprise that employs and thus empowers other women 
in her community. Yet, behind the façade of microenterprises is the reality of possibilities for 
women. Scholars have already pointed out the complex social and cultural hierarchies that impede 
women’s success (Karim 2011) and the tendency to use loans for survival rather than 
entrepreneurial activities (Radhakrishnan 2015), let alone the profit-making aspect of microloans. 
This vision of the female entrepreneur has been unmasked, but what of the homeworker? Many of 
these entrepreneurial activities take place in the home, and in fact, it is often difficult to distinguish 
when a home-based worker is self-employed and when she works for an employer (Prügl and 
Tinker 1997).  
How production processes play out in the home in interaction with women’s relation with 
this space is important to untangle when considering the development field’s use of the gendered 
entrepreneurial subject as the means to combat poverty, inequality, and cultural practices deemed 
oppressive. I argue that the two aspects of entrepreneurialism—capital and autonomy—are found 
in home-based work, but women experience these characteristics differently than how they are 
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illustrated in the microenterprise literature. Rather than profiting from their investments, 
homeworkers are required to pay for costs of production for the benefit of those further up the 
supply chain. In fact, in addition to manufacturer’s profiting from the homeworker’s unpaid 
surplus labor, they benefit from lower costs of production, as homeworkers would also have to use 
their earnings to pay for the tools and materials (Allen and Wolkowitz 1987). On this aspect of 
work, when women had to spend earnings on production rather than using the money for household 
needs, women confronted their contractors. For the second aspect, the flexibility of their work— 
deciding their work hours, place of work, and even type of work—is not the autonomy described 
by microenterprise supporters. Rather, as seen in Shilpa’s case, the homeworker is faced with an 
embodied burden of choosing between work and care. 
Examining women’s experiences with home-based labor as an example of embodied labor 
acknowledges the connection between capitalist production systems and marginalized 
subjectivities. The construction of the gendered entrepreneurial subject conceals the exclusionary 
and unequal labor market for poor women in the Global South. The development literature 
emphasizes the importance of encouraging women’s entrepreneurial activities, yet, as I have 
discussed in this dissertation, women’s work options are limited. Rather, women choose home-
based work because it allows them to be economically active while maintaining their gender roles. 
The setting of home is significant here because the temporal and spatial characteristics of their 
work become intertwined with their care tasks. In this setting where women have to invest in their 
work and have the potential to work (and earn) as much as they are willing to, work and care 
conflict with each other, by which women’s ability to provide for their families is impeded by 
these two roles. Whether it is having to pay for the costs of production, earnings which she could 
use for the household, or the ability to work yet another hour in the day, women are confronted 
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Figure 11. Working and caring in the same space 
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with the choice of which of her roles is more needed—a subtlety of the informal worker’s 
experiences that is lacking in the development literature. Paying for costs of production and 
perceived self-determination of labor is a common characteristic of home-based work, and it 
creates an illusion that workers seem to have invested and practice autonomy in the production of 
these garments and other products, obscuring the exploitation of the worker’s labor. Women’s 
actual experiences with informality in the home reveal the contradictions of the entrepreneurial 
subject constructed in the development literature as the characteristics that are used to define the 
entrepreneurial woman are also examples of her exploitation as a worker. 
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However, as I noted earlier, women are not powerless in these processes. In the following 
chapter, I examine the ways that women reproduce and resist power in the economy, the family, 
and civil society. I rely on Bourdieu’s theory of habitus to explain how women express agency 
within a limited set of boundaries. This approach helps address critiques from feminist scholars 
that critical studies of gender, work, and globalization overlook women’s agency (Kabeer 2000; 
Lim 1990). Including this analysis within a social reproduction framework that critically examines 
the ways “through which the social relations and material bases of capitalism are renewed” (Katz 
2001a:709) maintains a commitment to exposing power relations that exploit women’s labor. 
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Chapter 6. Boundaries of Family, Work, and Development 
 
“What should I do if I am sitting idle at home? So I started this work.” Alka’s answer points 
to the devaluation of the many forms of women’s work, even by the women themselves. It follows 
the common perception that women participate in home-based work as something to do during 
one’s spare time, between washing clothes and preparing the evening’s dinner. In her comment, 
Alka is dismissing the value of her paid work and its contributions to the household, as well as the 
many other tasks that fill her day. Yet, the need for her to participate in home-based work is much 
more than just “something to do,” and her household and care responsibilities make it the case that 
there is, in fact, little time to be idle. Her comment is not a simple evaluation of why she works; 
rather, it points to the convoluted process in which women come to start home-based work and 
their experiences with informality. 
In an earlier chapter, I wrote about my conversation with a group of older women in 
Keshavnagar and their concern of the lack of quality jobs for men. Repeatedly, in explaining why 
women were working, they said, “We need good jobs for the men.” The younger generation of 
women in Keshavnagar, in their twenties and thirties, acknowledged the need for women to 
contribute to the household because of lack of good work for the men in their community, but they 
also framed their participation in home-based work as something to do so they would not be idle. 
This concern of being idle seemed peculiar since these women were unlikely to have little idle or 
leisure time in their day. With increasing economic insecurity in poor households and retreating 
state support, women carry much of the burden to make up for deficiencies, and their time is 
increasingly strained (Floro 1995). Describing their paid work as a side job to do once they have 
completed their domestic responsibility diminishes the importance of their productive labor for 
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their family’s wellbeing. I found that this sentiment was not limited to Keshavnagar, as other 
younger participants shared similar explanations of working to pass the time.  
These generational differences in women’s explanations of their need to work point to how 
the institution of the family shapes women’s everyday experiences with the material and social 
consequences of global processes of capitalism. Participants’ gender, class, caste, and religious 
identities have a significant impact on their experiences in the economic, family, and civic spheres. 
Yet, a more visible source of constraint and, at times, oppression, for women is their status in the 
family and community. This status is determined by a number of factors, including their age, 
marital status, motherhood, and presence of other women in the household (Dube 1997; Lamb 
2000). Young women avoiding the perception of idleness is one example of how women frame 
their experience with work in a way that maintains social and cultural boundaries of women’s 
appropriate activities. Women’s position in the family influences the rules and expectations that 
shape their everyday experiences. These rules and expectations have an impact on their lives in 
the home, but also with work and civic participation. In the following pages, I examine women’s 
experiences in these three spheres in relation to their family status, and I ask how their daily 
practices reproduce relations of power.  
Examining these boundaries helps explain how women’s actions occur within a limited set 
of possibilities, but at the same time offers opportunities to contest those boundaries and their 
limitations. Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus offers a helpful framework in understanding how 
social and economic forces interact to shape women’s choices. Habitus, as a socialization process 
acquired by practice, is the ability to enact a role within a given social field. That much of this 
action is “unknown” reflects how social norms and power in a given field are embodied in a person 
and expressed through their behavior, feelings, aspirations, demeanor, and the like. The symbolic 
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boundaries through which people acquire status and resources frame the social boundaries that 
limit or provide material and symbolic resources (Lamont and Molnár 2002).  
In this chapter, I examine how these symbolic boundaries are reproduced in the family, 
including by women themselves, but I also consider the ways in which these symbolic boundaries 
provide women with opportunities for contestation. James Scott (1985) called attention to those 
“everyday forms of resistance” that signify a silent ideological struggle of the subaltern against 
dominant groups. Cindi Katz (2001) distinguishes between the types of political responses that 
individual employ against power, including reworking, resilience, and resistance. In this chapter, 
I bring attention to women’s everyday practices and ask how they might be political responses to 
the relations of power that are embedded in their homes, work, and even civic opportunities. 
Following Harcourt and Escobar’s (2005:2) call for a politics of place, I center the analysis on 
those spaces in which “women define as their environment and what determines their livelihoods, 
being and identity,” including the body, home, and community. Examining women’s everyday 
place-based practices captures how women’s subjectivities are articulated, reflected, and formed 
in relation to space (Massey 1994), and it help avoids the overemphasis on structure in a social 
reproduction analysis (Ferguson 2008). For example, women often begin home-based work 
because it requires a skill that they already possess (having been taught by their mothers how to 
sew); this is an outcome of structural inequalities that provide women with few work opportunities, 
but it also points to women’s socio-spatial positions that encourages mothers to teach their 
daughters a skill to use in the home. 
Women and the Space of Family 
Woman’s status in her family shifts drastically over the years, more so than that of men. 
Women living in patrilineal and patrilocality cultures, such as in Northern India, experience a 
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distinct rupture when they marry and leave their natal home to join the household of their husband 
(Dube 1997). The bride’s move to her new home is marked by rituals of detachment from her natal 
family and incorporation into her marital family (Lamb 2000). Predicting this future move since 
birth, a daughter is viewed as “someone else’s property” and socially transient since she will 
eventually leave for a new family (Bhasin 1993).53  
Women are thus visitors in both their natal and marital homes (Desai 2007). The 
delegitimization of women’s connection to her home is formalized by the lack of property rights 
for women in India, as women must rely on the generosity of their in-laws or natal male family 
members after abandonment, divorce, or widowhood (Agarwal 1995). This significant physical 
and social transition, with its resulting insecurity, is absent from the lives of men. Women continue 
to experience ambiguity and fluctuation in their relations with their previous family and new one 
for most of their lives, though a woman’s tie with her natal family often decreases over time as she 
builds more connections at her marital home, usually as a result of having children (Lamb 2000). 
This process of socialization and integration relies on the everyday tasks of household chores as 
well as symbolic practices of submission, such as veiling, that are the most stringent when a woman 
first enters the home, but then decrease with time (Dube 1988).  
When a woman enters her husband’s home, she is confronted with a new social, 
psychological, and physical environment (Desai 2007), and her arrival results in changes to current 
relations within the family as well (Shah 1998). I remember a talk I had over lunch with Khyati, a 
SEWA staff researcher, of what it was like to move into a home as a new wife. When she married, 
she joined a large joint household, made up of her parents-in-law, their two sons (including 
                                                
53 Lamb (2000) argues that the transient role a daughter occupies in her natal family does not mean 
that they are unloved or unwanted; rather, parents exhibit added intensity towards their daughters 
because of this looming departure.   
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Khyati’s husband), and their families. Khyati explained that everyone needs to conform after the 
arrival of a new family member, but it is especially difficult for the young woman as she is the one 
who is entering the home. Khyati had to adapt to her family’s way of living, their way of cooking, 
and it took a few years before she was accustomed to the new home. Though Khyati occupies a 
position of privilege, as a highly educated and higher caste woman, her remarks reminded me of 
Nikila’s sister-in-law who participated in this study’s survey. She had been living in Jamalpur for 
a couple of years already, but in contrast to her older sister-in-law, Nikila, who joked with her 
husband and mother-in-law, the younger wife was timid around her relatives. She spoke in a low 
voice and covered her face with the end of her sari when her older brother-in-law entered the room. 
Even after Nikila told her remove it to pose for a photograph, she kept it stretched out so that her 
face was hidden from the side. This performance of a deferential and submissive daughter-in-law 
follows the expectation that woman “should be like pliable mud—to be cast into a shape of his 
choice by the potter,” presumably to more easily discard her old loyalties and habits when adapting 
to her new family (Dube 1988).  
The integration of the daughter-in-law in her new home does not come without 
contestation. Frustration is usually manifested in the relationship between the mother-in-law (sasu) 
and daughter-in-law (putravadhu), as this tends to be the most salient relationship for a new wife 
in her marital family. The mother-in-law maintains control over domestic affairs after her son is 
married, and she decides the daughter-in-law’s daily chores, movements, and interactions, even 
with her husband, but the sasu also holds an important role of welcoming and socializing her 
putravadhu in the family, all the more important since the daughter-in-law will look after her when 
she is older (Lamb 2000:72). This contradictory relationship of tension and tenderness between a 
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sasu and her putravadhu has long been a source of fodder for folk songs, tales, and TV serials 
(Chowdhry 1994; Raheja and Gold 1994). 
In Keshavnagar, Usha and Asha were reticent in their answers during our first visit when 
Usha’s mother-in-law and other older women of the area were in the room. During the interviews, 
however, we were alone with the two young mothers, and they were more outspoken of the 
negative aspects of being a daughter-in-law. Asha was tired of having to give her earnings from 
home-based work to her mother-in-law, while Usha thought that looking after the children could 
be “really troublesome and hectic.” These frustrations were expressed in private, away from their 
elders, but daughters-in-law would sometimes participate in small acts of confrontation against 
family norms in the presence of their in-laws. Kashi, a home-based worker who participated in our 
survey, told us how she was tired of being bossed by her family, telling us, “they treat me like a 
worker, they should treat me like a daughter.” When we went to her home afterwards, her father-
in-law was at home, and, according to the Hindu custom of purdah,54 Kashi was required to pull 
her pallav (the edge of the sari) over her face. Kashi, however, instead of holding the sari with her 
hands or pulling it low enough so that it stayed in place, held the pallav between her teeth, with 
the cloth only barely covering the side of her face. Kashi’s seemingly mundane action followed 
purdah while also resisting the nominal status she held in her household. These micro-resistances 
to feminine ideologies occurred through both silent and visible acts that question assumptions of 
women’s unequivocal submission and compliance, and point to women’s practices as efforts to 
portray an image of feminine domesticity and modesty rather than following them out of belief 
(Lamb 2000:197). 
                                                
54 Purdah, its literal meaning being veil or curtain, is a system of seclusion found in Hindu and 
Muslim cultures that place restrictions on women leaving the domestic space, enforces a separation 
of public and private, and limits interaction between the sexes (Desai 2007). 
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When young women answered that they worked in order to avoid idleness, I wondered how 
much of this was to portray an image of domesticity. The women who shared this view were young, 
lived in joint households, and were responsible for the majority of household chores and childcare. 
Their roles and daily tasks are determined by their status in the family, and, as I noted in the 
beginning, saying that they worked to avoid being idle conflicted with their busy days that left few 
moments of rest. Women in general have fewer hours of rest or leisure than men because of their 
care duties (Floro 1995; Sayer 2005), but time inequality varies among women as well (Lamb 
2000), and this dissertation’s survey reported unequal divisions of domestic work among women 
by age. Women forty years of age or younger were more often responsible for household tasks 
(such as cooking and laundry) and care of others than older women. The only task that women 
above forty years old (the age from which women are likely to have married sons [Lamb 
2000:241]) participate in more often than younger women was grocery shopping. This often meant 
going to the neighborhood market to buy vegetables and other staple foods, but some women 
would travel to larger markets where they would find produce at lower prices.  
The division of tasks among older and younger women is not insignificant as it contributes 
to women’s boundary maintenance, whereby their physical mobility and social interactions are 
controlled by actions and responsibilities beyond seclusion and veiling (Dube 1997:66). When 
shopping for daily produce, women would leave the immediate area of their homes to shop, and at 
times travel to markets outside of their neighborhood—a mobility that was often unavailable for 
younger women, either due to care responsibilities or cultural practices of women’s presence in 
public spaces. The act of buying groceries also pointed to greater autonomy over control of 
household money and consumption. As one daughter-in-law told us, she could not even buy snacks 
for her children without asking her mother-in-law for money. Going to the market was also an 
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opportunity to socialize with women outside of their immediate surroundings. One woman pointed 
out that buying vegetables was a chance to chitchat with other neighborhood women, and she 
would often stay longer than needed. This was also the task that, in the few households where male 
family members helped with household chores, men were more likely to engage in along with 
collecting water—the two daily chores that were conducted outside the walls of the home.  
Young women had stricter standards to follow and could not be seen outside the home 
shopping leisurely to chat with neighbors. Their days were to be filled with chores and, if there 
was time left over, paid work. For young wives, this is the period of a woman’s life that is often 
understood as having the least autonomy, having joined a new, unfamiliar household (Vatuk 1987) 
and having to follow strict practices of modesty (Dube 1988). In their explanations, there was an 
underlying need to portray oneself as an active and contributing female member of the household. 
If they had a couple of hours free after completing their domestic chores, they found ways to make 
those hours productive (remembering previous chapters’ discussion of a production system that 
relies on these gendered divisions of labor in the home). 
I find that women’s preoccupation with the avoidance of “idleness” is connected to their 
social position in the family and points the use of home-based work as a form of boundary 
maintenance for young women. Home-based work shapes and is shaped by women’s social 
relations in ways that maintain or reproduce what scholars have called “domestic femininity,” the 
construction of the ideal Indian (middle-class) woman to have qualities of self-sacrifice and 
devotion (Chatterjee 1989). Chatterjee centered his analysis on the legacy of colonialism, and 
scholars have continued to employ this concept to explain contemporary hegemonic constructions 
of womanhood and femininity in urban India (Radhakrishnan 2009; Ray 2000; Vijayakumar 
2013).  
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In the next sections, I discuss how women learn their skills and their preference for this of 
type work as a reproduction of that femininity. This ideal conflicts with previously understood 
work patterns of women belonging to lower castes, who historically have had to work because of 
their household’s economic condition. However, with the possibilities of economic mobility and 
anonymity that urbanization has brought, there has been an increasing sanskritization in Indian 
society, in which lower castes adopt practices of the upper castes (Shah 2010; Srinivas 1956), such 
as increased restrictions on women’s mobility. Women’s preference for home-based work can be 
understood as aspirations for upward mobility that maintain respectable femininity 
(Radhakrishnan 2009; Vijayakumar 2013).55 
Before continuing though, I should add a note on the limited role of family relations in 
explaining power. Some scholars have noted that mothers-in-law, occupying a status of power 
over the younger women, play a significant role in reproducing the patriarchal order of women’s 
subordination (Chowdhry 1994; Wadley 1995), a sign of what some have called a patriarchal 
bargain (Kandiyotti 1988). Lamb (2000), however, notes the importance of the transient nature of 
family relationships and statuses. Women do gain power and authority with time, enjoying a period 
of autonomy that they did not have as daughters-in-law; however, as they age, they must relinquish 
(not without confrontation) their own position of authority to their eldest daughter-in-law, who 
then continue the cycle of “norms and values of kinship hierarchies” (Lamb 2000:240). Lamb 
argues for nuance in the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relationship, rather than relying on 
caricatures, and to contextualize this relationship within a kinship system of exchange and 
reciprocity. Focusing on relational conflict between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law also 
                                                
55 For more on how home-based work is framed as an opportunity to achieve upward mobility, see 
Chapter 6.  
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misses the many disadvantages that aged women face in India as a result of multiplying structural 
inequalities (Vera-Sanso 2012) and patriarchal hierarchy (Ahmed-Ghosh 2009). Conflict and 
hierarchies between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relationship can be more emblematic 
of women’s limited actions within broader systemic oppression.  
What I aim to show in this chapter is not that family relations are a cause of inequality, but 
rather that the family, as a site of ideological constructions and social organization (Collins 2000), 
is an ideal setting to examine the intersecting inequalities present in society. Women’s 
participation in work and civil society reflects the possibilities and limitations provided within a 
social field, which, in this case, is informed by a history of imperialism and capitalism. Women’s 
actions that maintain domestic femininity is a reflection of which sites they have access to exercise 
agency, and so provides women with a form of symbolic capital (even if not immediately useful).  
A Skill for Home and Work 
Home-based worker’s socio-spatial practices highlight their relations to space—how space 
shapes their daily lives, but also how women’s relations shape their experience with the home. 
Rabia, a SEWA community organizer in Vatva, explained that in their community women are not 
allowed to finish their education and instead learn a skill for the home. Home-based workers are 
performing to an ideal by staying home, but they are of course also working. The sewing skills 
that young women learned, often from their mothers, provided them with a skill for economic 
activity while also reproducing women’s role in the family (Abreu and Sorj 1996). Knowing how 
to sew can be used as an additional source of income for poor households, first at the woman’s 
natal home and then, if married, for her conjugal family. 
Becoming home-based workers often seemed to require just a minor modification from 
their daily tasks as homemakers. Many women already had basic sewing skills, and some even 
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owned a machine for home use. Becoming a worker was then a simple process of finding orders. 
Except for a handful of women who had worked outside the home in small enterprises, starting 
home-based work did not entail any spatial changes; she could remain at home, without 
significantly altering the house or her presence in the house and continue to use a skill she already 
had, but this time for pay.  
How Lata, a 39-year-old homeworker in Amraiwadi, began home-based work was typical 
of most of the women we spoke with. Decisions to start homework often arose from a significant 
life change; for Lata, it was moving out of her parents-in-law’s household. About nine years ago, 
she and her husband had to separate from their joint family household, which was growing after a 
younger brother married, to create a nuclear household with their three young sons. Her husband 
started a tailor shop in their new home, but now they had the responsibility of the entire household 
budget, in addition to the costs of renting their home. They were not earning enough from their 
tailoring, Lata tell us, “So my husband said that if the two of us are working like this and we are 
not getting much money then let’s leave it. He can get a job somewhere, and then we bring this 
home-based work, and I’ll do it.” They decided that her husband would find a job outside with 
more stable income, and, since they already had a sewing machine, Lata would find contract work 
to complete at home. Having learned how to sew as a child, this is the only work that she wants to 
do, “I was interested in this work since I was young. I had decided that I don’t have to learn any 
other work but this.”  
The other women we spoke with echoed Lata’s experience of applying her sewing skills 
for work. Lajvanti, a young woman in Rajivnagar, has also been sewing since she was young; all 
the other women in her family know how to sew, and she learned from them. Shilpa, as well, 
learned from her mother. When she married, Shilpa was able to use this skill in her new household. 
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Having this skill was useful, especially since a wife or daughter-in-law could do this work at home 
along with her household tasks.  
This is what Shanta, a young woman living with her parents in Rajivnagar, is also planning 
for. She left school after the 9th grade to help her mother with household work and to start paid 
work. Shanta does not mind having had to leave school. Unlike her studious younger sister who is 
now in college, she tells us that she did not enjoy school. Shanta is a skilled homeworker; after 
showing us a purse made of cloth scraps that she had designed herself, she boasts that she only has 
to look at an item of clothing to know how to replicate it. 
Jayshree and I visited her home and sat on a cot while she showed us her work. The 
machine was against a wall, not far from the television so that she can watch her favorite TV serials 
while working. Next to the machine, under a window, was the plastic chair she sits on while 
working; when we arrived, there was a pile of cloth on it, orders she still had to complete. We 
asked if she had to make any changes to the home to accommodate her work. Shanta gives a small 
laugh; she has not thought of this. This is her natal home, a transient space for most young Indian 
woman (Desai 2007). It is not Shanta’s place to arrange this house for her work. She is not yet 
engaged, but her parents will likely start discussing marriage opportunities soon. She will enter a 
new home with her future husband and his family, and then, she tells us, she can think about 
arranging space for her work. At her marital home, Shanta plans to continue her home-based work. 
She knows that this work will be useful for her husband’s family.  
Her sister finished school and is now continuing her studies towards a college degree; 
Shanta, instead, learned a skill for work that she could do after completing her household tasks. 
While Shanta will not have a college degree, seen by some parents as a route for “upwards” 
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marriage prospects (Still 2011), when her parents begin their search for her marriage partner, she 
does have this practical skill to offer to her new home (Abreu and Sorj 1996).  
Young women learning how to sew, along with other practices and rituals within the 
family, is part of a socialization process that shapes and constraints their sense of self and their 
possibilities for the future (Dube 1988). Sewing is framed as a skill for the home and so a natural 
learning process for women (Abreu and Sorj 1996). The gendering of the skill devalues its 
economic productivity and allows manufacturers to provide only meager wages to women workers 
as women’s income is seen as secondary to their husbands, a process that Abreu and Sorj (1996) 
calls “the domestication of homework.”  
The practice of learning sewing skills illustrates women’s relations with space through 
gendered socialization in the family. The home is a setting where she learns her gendered activities 
and identity in the domestic and economic sphere. The process is intertwined with her other social 
identities. Belonging to a lower caste, class, or religious minority, her economic activity is 
necessary and planned for as mothers teach their daughters a vocational skill that can be utilized 
within the walls of her home. And it also intersects with the economic production process that 
exploits and reproduces these gendered ideologies to maintain a flexible and low wage workforce 
(Benería and Roldan 1987; Mies 1982). Due to the circumstances in which home-based work 
exists, women gain very little economic stability, and there is a lack of opportunity to challenge 
gender relations in the home (Bose 2007; Ghavamshahidi 1996).  
But where is women’s agency located in this process? In participating in home-based work, 
do we explain their actions as blindly following the image of feminine domesticity, or what Kabeer 
(2000) criticizes as representations of women as “cultural dupes” of a patriarchal system? This 
skill also provided a form of reworking and resilience for women with limited access to resources. 
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Sewing was a resource for themselves in marriage prospects and for their families in times of 
economic need. 
In the next section, I examine women’s explanations of why home-based work is their 
preferred type of work. Through these conversations, women’s agency shows through in both their 
choice of work and their reasoning for why this work is better, despite having to work with very 
limited set of choices. Applying a gendered analysis of habitus, women’s actions, aspirations, and 
possibilities are examined within a matrix of power relations, accounting for the interaction of both 
the subject and the structures in which she finds herself. It accounts for gender as a symbolic 
identification, but also an embodied existence expressed through space and time (McNay 1999). 
The space and time that habitus accounts for is significant here, as women’s actions differ 
according to variations of space and time.  
Preference for Home-Based Work 
In a previous chapter, I discussed Asha and Usha’s story of leaving their job at a factory to 
work at home after they had children. Home-based work was described as a preference—a better 
option in light of the other work available. In comparing home-based work to what it would be 
like if they worked outside, women frame their status as home-based workers through the 
difference from the other jobs available to them in the informal economy. In particular, home-
based workers emphasize the ability to be a “good housewife” while also being economically 
active (Abreu and Sorj 1996). Among the types of informal work available, including home-based 
work, street vending, or labor and service providers (such as domestic worker, waste picker, or 
construction worker), home-based work was their preferred or only choice. Reports on women in 
the informal economy highlight the commonalities as well as particularities of these different 
sectors (Basu and Thomas 2009; Chen and Raveendran 2011). They do not, however, discuss how 
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the different types of jobs compare for the women who participate in them, and how they frame 
work, in this case home-based work, as different from that of other forms of informal work. 
This difference was prominent in Kajal’s explanation of why she preferred home-based 
work. Kajal lives in Rajivnagar, a neighborhood in West Ahmedabad, with her husband and two 
teenage children. Rajivnagar is a mix of pucca (permanent) and semi-pucca (semi-permanent) 
residences. Most are single-story, two-room homes. Some blocks share a water pump; others 
receive water from the city’s water tank trucks, with large plastic containers to hold the water 
dotting the alleys. The residential blocks of Rajivnagar were quiet and clean, with the ubiquitous 
laundry hanging from homes. Outside, the main road is busy with shops and vendors selling goods 
(including the store where women buy their needles and threads), noisy construction, and the 
constant traffic. Jayshree and I had arrived by a road on the other side of railroad tracks, which cut 
the western bank of the city in half. The land on either side of the tracks is used as a dumping 
ground for residents’ trash, but it is also the home for a group of migrants that had come to the city 
for work; plastic sheets held up by strings and poles substitute as homes for these families. Across 
the road is a row of large outdoor wedding venues catering to the upper class of the city. 
Kajal’s husband is a construction worker, but work has been irregular lately; he has only 
been able to bring home Rs. 5,000 a month (US $81). Her 16-year-old son is still in school while 
her daughter, 18 years old, helps with household work, Kajal’s home-based work, and teaches 
sewing courses at the SEWA Academy community center in the neighborhood. 56 Kajal’s eldest 
child, a daughter, married a few years ago and now lives with her marital family.  
                                                
56 SEWA’s community centers, located in neighborhoods and run by a community member, offer 
skills development and vocational training. 
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Kajal has been participating in home-based work for ten years. When we interviewed her, 
she was sewing the buttonholes in blouses, earning between Rs. 500 and Rs. 1,500 a month (US 
$8-24), depending on the season. She supplements this income by selling quilts that she makes 
with scraps of cloth. Despite the low earnings, Kajal prefers home-based work. Many of the women 
in her neighborhood are domestic workers, cleaning homes in Vasna, an affluent locality bordering 
Rajivnagar, just across the tracks. Comparing domestic work and other types of “random work,” 
such as street sweeping or construction, to home-based work, she tells us, “This work is better than 
that. This I only have to do from home, peacefully…outside, I would have to take the time, while 
at home I can sit for the work as per my convenience.” A neighbor sitting with us agreed, adding, 
“You can look after home and do work also.” Kajal brings up the space and time of home-based 
work that makes it desirable, but these characteristics also distinguish her status as a worker 
different from that of other women workers, who leave their home to engage in manual work. 
Similar notions of difference between home-based work and “outside work” were heard in 
Sarkhej, a neighborhood on the western edge of the city. Manisha, a 22-year-old who participates 
in three types of home-based work, sari fall, chaniya choli, and dupatta borders, believes that 
home-based work is more “comfortable” and “better” because it is done at home. When we ask 
what is the difference between home-based work and work completed outside, she points to her 
education as a reason (she had passed the 10th grade, higher than the survey average of 8th grade). 
Her mother was a casual laborer who worked in construction, but she explains, “I am not going 
outside for that type of labor work. I am not able to do such labor work. I am an educated person 
and so I think it is better and feel comfortable working at home, sitting at home and working.” 
In Amraiwadi, Jaya’s reasoning for why she did not work outside also relied on 
comparisons to outside work, but it was rooted in the need to properly care for her daughter. 
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Currently, she was receiving orders from her sister’s husband, who owns a small business 
enterprise. She went to this factory for a month to train, Jaya went to this factory for a month. She 
knew that she could continue working there or elsewhere, but she decided to work at home for her 
5-year-old daughter. She told us that she has to stay home because “the outside is not a good place.” 
Now her daughter is young, but Jaya explains that her responsibilities to her daughter will be 
greater in a few years, alluding to the increased regulation of young girls at the onset of puberty 
(Dube 1988). Jaya expresses anxiety over her ability to care for and protect her only child, a 
daughter, from the “outside.” 
This outside world that Jaya is wary of is not the one in which the modern middle- and 
upper-class Indian woman lives, though Jaya is cognizant of it, as Jaya later tells us her hope is for 
her daughter to go to college and find a formal job. In the case of her daughter’s aspirations, Jaya 
does not want her daughter to be a homeworker; instead, she hopes her daughter will leave the 
house so that she can “know the outside, how there is a city and all. She can go outside; she can 
learn many things.” I discuss Jaya’s hopes for her daughter further in Chapter 7, but here I point 
to the contradiction that Jaya holds for herself—needing to stay home to properly care for a 
daughter—and Jaya’s aspirations for her daughter to leave the house and learn about the “outside.” 
Jaya and the other women assume that when we ask about their working outside, it is in the casual 
labor work that is available to them, but for their daughters, they have other notions of what is 
acceptable work. 
Poor and working class women often have to participate in some type of economic activity 
because of their households’ economic conditions; yet, participants’ explanations of why they 
work at home diverge from common perceptions of the Dalit or low caste and even Muslim woman 
working because of need. They reason that, despite working, they are following an ideal of 
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woman’s dedication to family wellbeing, reminiscent of middle and upper class and caste’s 
feminine domesticity (Chatterjee 1989; Radhakrishnan 2009). Because of their decision to work 
at home Usha and Asha no longer worry about their children and household tasks while working, 
Kajal can look after the home “peacefully,” Manisha reasons that it is appropriate work considering 
her education, and Jaya is fulfilling her responsibility to stay home for her daughter. They construct 
their work as appropriate through a definition of difference from other women in similar social 
positions to themselves. As members of the lower class and caste, their work options are limited 
to the informal economy, but instead of working outside, in other homes as a domestic worker or 
in public spaces as a construction worker, they participate in work that reaffirms Indian femininity. 
This portrayal of difference remains rooted in classed notions of work and space, as it is the menial 
work available to them outside of the home that they do not want. For example, while Jaya works 
at home to better care for her daughter, Jaya hopes her daughter will work outside of the house, 
but in a professional setting. 
Two exceptions to these distinctions that home-based workers employed reveal the 
differences within class that shaped women’s choice of work. In these examples, women did not 
have the option to work from home. Vali migrated to Ahmedabad four years ago from a small city 
in western Gujarat with her husband and three children. They found a small, one-room home to 
rent in Rajivnagar; her husband began work as a sweeper at Ahmedabad’s courthouse, and Vali 
collected paper waste from homes to recycle until she found a contact to provide her with quilt 
orders. Bharti is a widow in Jamalpur. With limited income, she also lives in a one-room home, 
which she shares with her mother-in-law and her two sons. Bharti’s main job is not home-based 
work, but as a night-shift hospital peon, caring for patients. She adds borders to scarves to earn 
extra income, working on it during the day when she is at home. When we asked what others 
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thought of her working at the hospital, especially a nightshift, she answered, “What would they 
think! They think that I take care of my children. The work is good. That’s all.” A neighbor sitting 
nearby added, “If she doesn’t work then how would her house be managed.” Vali and Bharti’s 
situations are such that they have to take these other jobs. For Vali, she was new to the city and 
did not yet have a network to find home-based work. As a widow, Bharti is the sole earner in the 
household and had to find work that would sustain her household. Women who had an investment 
in portraying feminine domesticity, for example, they were better-educated or had young children 
in the home, were more likely to participate in home-based work (Noponen 1987); households 
which were in more precarious conditions did not have that option.  
Work Orders and Gender Roles  
When women participate in economic activity at home, how does this work affect their 
relations in the home? Despite the hope that women’s earnings would be a source of intra-
household bargaining power, increasing women’s access to income does not automatically 
translate into power because of the persistence of social norms in the family (Kabeer 1999). Home-
based work is not seen as offering much empowering potential for women as it does not 
significantly change gender relations in the home (Pant 2000). The isolating nature of this work 
and its physical and symbolic closeness to domestic work result in women having few 
opportunities to develop a worker identity and feel entitled to the money they earn (Kantor 2003).  
I found some examples when home-based work would disrupt traditional gender roles in 
the home, but only because of its precarious and exploitative characteristics. Because of the 
irregularity of the work and moments when large orders had to be completed immediately there 
were a handful of cases when home-based workers would rely on their husbands to help cover 
domestic tasks, if there were no other adult women in the household. 
 163 
Home-based workers were faced with the constant possibility that their work would end, 
but the other possibility was the arrival of a very large order that had to be completed with urgency. 
This could cause significant disruptions, especially since a woman’s day was often filled with other 
duties. However, in a handful of cases, this aspect of the production process would sometimes 
upend traditional gender roles in the home. Out of the hundred home-based workers surveyed, 
only ten women would receive help from male family members, usually husbands and sons. All 
but one of them lived in a nuclear family, and so it was less likely that they could rely on other 
adult women to finish household tasks when large orders arrived. However, of this group, five of 
them told us that men only helped with buying vegetables or collecting water from the water trucks 
or neighborhood pumps. Notably, as I mentioned above, grocery shopping and collecting water 
are tasks completed outside of the home. Of the remaining five women, their husbands and sons 
helped with household chores in the house, such as cooking and cleaning. I spoke with two of these 
women in the interviews about why their husbands would help them, and they both pointed to 
urgent and irregular orders. 
Darshana, a homeworker living in a joint family household in Rajavir, was accustomed to 
the home-based worker’s schedule. In fact, she had started home-based work because of its 
flexibility. Her contract work of packing leggings was in addition to the work she did for her 
husband’s own contract home-based work and looking after the family’s kindling business. With 
the prevalence of gas burners for cooking, the selling of kindling was not bringing in as much 
income as before. As there were fewer customers, Darshana thought to herself that she could take 
on a third job, “When I finish my household work, what should I do? There is work only when a 
customer comes, otherwise I just sit. So I have decided to take this work.” The synthetic leggings 
are popular among younger women in Ahmedabad, a modern alternative to the traditional cotton 
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salwar and churida pajamas. The work was monotonous, ironing, folding, and inserting leggings 
in their plastic packaging, but she could watch over the household easily while working, stopping 
at any moment if she was needed elsewhere, for example, if someone wanted to buy kindling. 
However, there are times, usually once a month, when the orders are quite large and the supplier 
needs them completed with urgency. Her supplier will drop off 700 pairs to be completed 
immediately. Jayshree gasps as Darshana tells her that she needs to wake up at 2 a.m. to finish the 
order. Darshana’s daughters and sons, who were watching television on a cot near ours, laughed 
at our response. “I just wake up. I wake up and finish the orders,” Darshana tells us, “My husband 
helps on those days. I only have to wake up and start to work. He helps prepare the children for 
school.” 
Women still had other tasks to attend to when a large order would arrive. Darshana was 
one of the few women whose husband would help with household tasks if she did not have time 
to complete everything. Daxa was another one. She lives in Nobelnagar, not far from Rajavir. 
Daxa, similar to Darshana, also relies on various sources of home-based work. She receives orders 
from subcontractors for salwar, children’s wear, and ironing garments, as well dress orders from 
neighbors. With different suppliers, multiple orders would sometimes arrive at once. Daxa’s 
husband and her two sons help with cooking and cleaning when she has an urgent order. Her sons 
also iron garments if she receives sewing and ironing orders at the same time (see Figure 12). 
When her sons have school exams, however, Daxa does not let them work. 
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Figure 12. Son helping his mother with orders. 
 
            Photograph by author. 
 
It is only in these moments that male family members would help with household tasks, 
recognizing women’s paid work as a significant economic contribution rather than seeing it as 
secondary to her domestic roles. As urgent orders had a number of consequences for women and 
their work, including the ability to earn money but also the need to maintain good relationships 
with contractors, it was necessary and allowable for women to place productive activities before 
other activities. Yet, we must ask if a man completing his wife’s chores because she wakes at 2 
a.m. to finish a work order is actually destabilizing gender norms in the division of labor at home.  
SEWA, Sewa, and Community Organizing 
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This section examines how relations of power in the home shape women’s experiences 
with SEWA. SEWA Academy community-based centers provide a possible source for women to 
break through oppressive or limiting spatial and social boundaries. Recognizing the difficulty 
women faced in traveling to the organization’s offices, SEWA built a presence within the 
community. These community centers allow SEWA Academy to reach women who would have 
not been able to leave their neighborhood to participate in an unknown organization. A second 
barrier to overcome was getting women to trust the organization, even if a center was in the 
community, and to recognize its utility. Rather than hiring an outsider to run the center, SEWA 
would find a member of the community to organize it. Additionally, SEWA offered services that 
would have a direct and immediate impact on women’s economic and social wellbeing, such as 
literacy classes and vocational skill training. Then they could also use the space to offer other 
capacity-building programs that were just as important but of less immediate value for women, 
such as “SEWA Movement and Leadership Training” or “Civic and Citizenship Training.” It 
would also use the space for meetings to share information of SEWA’s other services. For 
example, on our visit to Sarkhej, a staff member from Mahila Housing SEWA Trust joined us to 
give a presentation about her organization’s housing and infrastructure services for informal 
workers. 
While women’s paid work kept them in the home, their participation with SEWA was an 
opportunity to leave their homes. At SEWA, they could gain practical skills, such as sewing or 
literacy, but it was SEWA’s strategy to provide them with other forms of self-development. The 
organization recognized that there was a need to need to sustain its grassroots leadership base for 
the organization, and encouraging worker members to develop their confidence and leadership 
skills was an important aspect of that goal (SEWA 2009a). The numerous steps SEWA would take 
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to bring women into the organization, provide them with ready skills, and steadily develop their 
leadership capacities is an example of how the organization organizes workers through struggle 
and development (see Chapter 2). In this way, the organization is able to reach women by offering 
tangible resources, and at the same time provides them with opportunities to participate in SEWA’s 
multidimensional strategy of development. 
However, SEWA’s work does not occur in isolation. There are many barriers to overcome, 
and while SEWA addresses some of the core issues affecting women, the organization must work 
within an acceptable set of limits. In this section, I present two examples of how SEWA’s work 
on the ground is shaped by the social relations that exist in the settings where these activities take 
place.  
First, I found that woman’s degree of participation was often linked to her material and 
social relations. Women with limited resources or time were less likely to be active members of 
SEWA; this was especially the case for young mothers living in joint families. Even the centers 
reflected the unequal social relations within the community. For example, out of necessity for a 
large space, most centers were located in the homes of families who occupied a higher status in 
the community; though, SEWA’s governing principle of caste and communal harmony required 
the center would be open to all members, regardless of caste or religion. 
A second way that civil society participation reflects social inequality is the reframing of 
women’s activism as a service. SEWA, an acronym for the organization’s full name, is a play on 
words: the Gujarati and Hindi word sewa (pronounced as and interchangeable with the word seva) 
translates to “sense of service.” Traditionally, sewa signified “service to the husband” for women, 
but the term gained a political dimension during the nationalist movement for Indian independence 
as women appropriated the use of sewa from the home and family to the public sphere (Sarkar 
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2001; Watt 2005). Following independence, women continued employing notions of service to 
create space for their political and social activism while maintaining upper-caste and -class 
feminine respectability (Kumar 2003). Sewa reproduced colonial upper caste and class ideologies 
of sacrifice through servitude to the nation (Watt 2005), and this Gandhian notion of service was 
critiqued for maintaining a hierarchy of benevolent providers and pitied beneficiaries (Skaria 2002; 
Srivatsan 2006). Ciotti’s (2012) study of Dalit women’s political engagement in North India found 
that the idiom seva has been resurrected among low-caste political activists. She argues that the 
rise in the use of seva is linked to upward class mobility among Dalits, but that it is not merely a 
reproduction of upper-caste ideologies (a process of sanskritisation). Rather, Dalit and low-caste 
women appropriate the term for political mobilization and affirmation of their agency.  
The women I spoke with who were active participants and organizers would frame their 
community work as a service. While SEWA emphasizes active verbs in its organizational material 
to describe women’s role in development, such as shakti vekas (capacity building), I found that in 
the field women’s conceptualization of activism as service allows them to participate in political 
action without direct confrontation to and risk from unequal relations and structures of power. The 
use of service, while reproducing class and gender ideologies, provided them with a means to 
participate in community development work to empower themselves and their communities. In 
this section, I argue that, in order to succeed in organizing women within a community, SEWA’s 
work in practice (in contrast to how its programs work in theory57) must rely, in part, on 
reproducing some of the social boundaries that the organization seeks to overcome. 
                                                
57 I distinguish between an organization’s activities “in practice” and “in theory,” to highlight how 
planned goals and strategies often proceed in ways that are not planned or expected in the field.  
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To examine how social identities and relations shape involvement in community-based 
activism, in these next two sections I focus on a four women who are active members of the 
organization and who received training by SEWA to be local organizers and teachers.58 During the 
interviews, these women explained why this “social service” was important and how their active 
participation in SEWA had an impact on themselves as well as the women in their community. 
Organizing within and beyond Boundaries      
Zarina, an older woman in Fatehwadi who lives in a nuclear household with her husband 
and two grown sons, provides literacy lessons at the local SEWA Academy community center. 
She has been a member of SEWA for thirteen years, and, she tells us, is a “seven-star member”—
one star for each of the programs in which she has participated, including Vimo SEWA, SEWA 
Bank, and leadership training. Zarina tells us that SEWA has had an incredible impact on her 
wellbeing, especially when considering what life was like for her when she was younger. When 
she married, she moved to her husband’s village and lived with him and his extended family who 
followed strict Muslim practices of purdah. She had few opportunities to leave her home, “There 
was restriction on where we can go. Even if we had to go to the hospital, we still would have to go 
in purdah.” That changed once she moved to Ahmedabad with her husband. She heard about a 
bank for women and went to learn more about it. As she became involved with SEWA through its 
services, Zarina decided that she would like to help SEWA with its work. From her experience in 
the village and seeing how women were similarly secluded in this urban neighborhood, she 
                                                
58 “Active members” are members who have participated actively in SEWA programs for three 
years or more and have participated in more than one program (Chen et al. 2006). “Leaders” are 
members who receive special training for organizing and to support development in their 
community (Chen et al. 2006). In our survey, of the fifty women who participated in SEWA’s 
programs, 22 women were active members of SEWA, four were literacy teachers, and three were 
local organizers. For this section, I include community teachers and organizers who were involved 
in the second stage of research (the interviews), three literacy teachers and one local organizer. 
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recognized the importance of supporting women’s capacities. Zarina had been fortunate that her 
parents allowed her to finish her schooling up to the 9th grade and that she was literate. 
Neighborhood women would often ask her to read letters that they received, but Zarina wanted the 
women to read for themselves rather than relying on her. Working with the literacy department at 
SEWA Academy, literacy classes began in Fatehwadi and Zarina was one of the teachers.  
As Zarina became more involved with the organization, both her and her husband 
witnessed a change. Her husband tells her that this work is good because now she is more active 
and not as timid as when they lived in the village. She tells us that “Now, I can go anywhere by 
myself only. I have gained this confidence thanks to SEWA.” When she first started participating 
in meetings she was too nervous to speak up and say her name, which would require saying her 
husband’s name.59 Now, Zarina can stand in front of a group of 500 or even 1,000 women and tell 
them her full name without fear.  
Zarina believes that teaching literacy classes is one of her most important contributions. 
Through her literacy classes, Zarina seeks to serve the community. She believes building woman’s 
capacities has an impact not only on that one woman but on her children as well, and so the whole 
community will benefit from it. In her community, “women stay within the four walls of the house” 
and have limited exposure. In contrast to the groups of men one sees gathered around the city’s 
chai stalls, women do not often have the chance to meet and spend time with other women who 
are not family, with their outings being limited to family or religious reasons (Desai 2007).  
                                                
59 It is common for women to avoid uttering their husband’s name out of respect. Instead, a wife 
would use an alternate title, such as “my son’s father.” Encouraging women to say their husband’s 
name aloud and in front of other people is one of the first issues tackled in SEWA’s capacity-
building programs. 
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As a literacy teacher, Zarina uses the opportunity of having an audience of women to “bring 
awareness in them” by conveying the lessons that she learned from SEWA. Undergoing this self-
development does not occur in isolation, but in collaboration. When Zarina incorporates capacity-
building strategies in her teaching, she provides a space for neighborhood women to discuss their 
troubles and share stories, a space that would not normally be available to many women.  
Zarina had the opportunity to be more active in SEWA, for a variety of reasons, including 
her age, status in the family, and, importantly, her husband’s support. Offering literacy classes was 
an opportunity to share what she learned through her participation and role in SEWA with women 
who could not take an active role. Take for example, her neighbor, Biliksha. As a young wife with 
two children and living in a joint family, Biliksha does not have many opportunities to leave her 
home because of restrictive family rules and her caregiving roles. As such, it was difficult for her 
to attend literacy classes and other SEWA programs, but she has learned from the women who 
could participate. We ask her what she learned. Sitting on the floor in Zarina’s house with her 
young daughter on her lap, she is quiet for a few moments and answers, “I can write my own name, 
[pointing to her daughter] her father’s name and all, write down a mobile phone number, and I 
learned how to use the mobile phone. 
Through this community-based organizing, SEWA reaches women that an outsider would 
not have been able to. It would have been difficult for Biliksha to attend SEWA’s programs, 
especially those outside of Fatehwadi. However, because the organization had a visible presence 
in Fatehwadi, with the center around the corner from Biliksha’s home, and a direct association 
with the community because the organizer and many of the teachers where women from the area, 
the work of SEWA became accessible for women like Biliksha. While she did not participate in 
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the organization directly, she learned of topics and issues relating to women from her neighbors 
who could participate. 
Zarina and Biliksha’s stories represent both the possibilities and limitations of SEWA’s 
work. SEWA aims to support and organize women workers, but social and cultural relations exists 
that prevent them from reaching many women, often the most marginalized. Zarina is able to be 
an active participant in SEWA because she has few barriers that prevent her from doing so. She is 
the eldest woman in her family, with no young children. With the salary of the three men in her 
family, her participation in home-based work is not as necessary as that of women who contribute 
to a large share of the household income from their home-based work. Zarina had the desire and 
will to become more involved with SEWA, and because of her social position, she was able to. 
Biliksha, on the other hand, has much more limited autonomy over her day. As a mother of two 
children and a young wife living in a joint household, she does not have much influence in her 
household. However, Biliksha still acquires information through Zarina and the other women who 
are active participants. While she cannot participate in SEWA, and maybe she does not have a 
desire to, she does receive some of its benefits.  
Yet, even Zarina faces limitations because of her social position. Zarina is one of the few 
women whose husband not only allows her to do this work, but also encourages her to be involved. 
However, Zarina admits that if her husband forbade her from participating in the organization, she 
would have had to listen to him, telling us, “If he had a problem [with SEWA], then he wouldn’t 
have allowed me to go!”  
Younger women would also be active participants of SEWA. Shilpa and Usha in 
Keshavnagar were literacy teachers, and both were thirty-years-old and mothers of young children. 
They came to know about the organization because family members and neighbors were involved 
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with it—having a family or neighbor connected with SEWA was often a main source of access. 
Both Shilpa and Usha talked to us of their work’s importance for other women, such as the 
disadvantages that illiteracy brings to women and how learning to sign their name or read bus 
numbers benefits women’s everyday lives, and also how they themselves have benefited from this 
work. As literacy teachers, this “social work” brought them recognition in their community, and 
they experienced a change in status as a result. Shilpa is seen as a “good woman” who has helped 
women in area, and she receives “blessings” from her community, while Usha tells us how she is 
able to interact with older women on a more equal level because of the training and experience of 
teaching. Through this work, Shilpa and Usha resist the passivity expected of the young Indian 
mother. Rather than being seen as “Kiranbhai’s wife,” Shilpa and Usha have a position other than 
that of wife or mother in their community, and are recognized in their community, even by their 
elders, for their development work. 
Does women’s participation in SEWA and their community challenge or reproduce 
relations of power? Zarina, Shilpa, and Usha’s actions and understandings of those actions occur 
within material and social boundaries that inform their relations in their family and community. 
Women framing this work as a form of service temper their participation in an organization that 
seeks to overcome many of those barriers. They define it as “social work” or “good work.” Usha 
explains it as a “desire to serve someone” and Shilpa wanted to “do something that helps these 
women to awaken themselves.” The Indian sociologist Leela Dube (1988:17), in examining the 
socialization of the Hindu girl, writes how women are taught to accept the unequal division of 
labor and care as part of the feminine moral character of privation and sacrifice. Scholars have 
noted the use of service to support women’s political participation and questioned its use in 
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reproducing gender ideologies (Ciotti 2012; Sarkar 2001), similar to the socialization role of 
servitude according to Dube. 
I find that from their responses, their work as literacy teachers remains grounded in 
gendered notions of women’s duty of service, yet they experience a change in themselves and in 
their status in the community. By framing this work as service, literacy teachers experience their 
own empowerment as they witness the change that they help bring to women’s lives and so their 
community. However, for the same reason that they frame this work as a service, these practices 
take place within a generally accepted set of limits on women’s role and status. As I discussed in 
Zarina’s case, her family status allowed her to be more involved with the organization. While 
Shilpa and Usha’s experiences with this work resulted in subtle shifts in their relationship with and 
position in their community, such as Usha teaching older women rather than the more commonly 
assumed order of young women obeying their elders, their use of sewa maintained the broader 
power relations of their community. Women would at times be active in the reproduction on these 
systems of inequality. Zarina, who earlier had lectured us on the negative practices of her Muslim 
community that keep women indoors, told us as we were leaving that her older son had recently 
become engaged. Jayshree and I gave her our congratulations, and I asked how the addition of 
another woman to the household would change things, since Zarina was currently the only woman 
in the house. She answered that it would be very helpful having a daughter-in-law since she would 
help with the household work, providing Zarina with more time to participate in paid work and in 
SEWA’s work, such as teaching classes. Because there remains the need to care, if Zarina decides 
to devote more time to sewa, someone else will have to fill that role. This explains part of the 
reason why it was easier for women with married sons or with older daughters to be community 
organizers, in addition to the status that being the eldest woman in the household provides them in 
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the community. This illustrates how women’s attempts to alter sources of power remain within a 
set of systems that shape both the purpose and action. Zarina’s comment that she would not 
participate in SEWA if her husband did not allow her to and her looking forward to the help of a 
future daughter-in-law, points to how her actions are limited by the social boundaries that are 
shaped by her position in society. Women address issues of inequality and deprivation within the 
limited set of possibilities available to them while avoiding direct confrontation of the structural 
inequalities that shape their relations in the family, community, and work. 
Maintaining Order 
Darshana (the homeworker whose husband helps with cooking and such when she receives 
large and urgent legging orders) was one home-based worker we interviewed who was also a 
SEWA community leader. She works at home for many of the same reasons already discussed, 
economic need, filling the hours of the day, having to stay home, and so on. However, a look at 
how and why she works in relation to family dynamics also reveals that home-based work is a 
device of boundary maintenance; it enforces the home as her appropriate place, it reproduces her 
relations to production as an invisible worker, and it maintains her subordinate position in the 
family. This is in contrast to her family’s reaction to her participation in SEWA, which required 
more time away from the home and her duties in that space. Her story points to experiences with 
work and civil society in relation to the family, and it is also a telling example of how change is 
cyclical, and how progress made can be reversed. 
Darshana lives in a joint family household with her husband, her two daughters, two sons, 
and her mother-in-law; her father-in-law had passed away recently. Above them live her brother-
in-law and his family, whose daughters also sew undergarments for the same contractor as 
Darshana’s husband. Her home is also used as a SEWA Academy community center, offering skill 
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training and literacy classes for the neighborhood women and young girls. This is work that 
Darshana believes is important for her neighborhood, but it is also a source of antagonism between 
her and her mother- and sister-in-law. 
Her father-in-law supported her participation in SEWA,60 which required Darshana to 
make monthly trips to SEWA Academy, in the western part of the city, for meetings, saying that 
his daughter-in-law is educated (she had passed 10th grade, higher than any of the other women in 
the family) and that she should be allowed to go outside to work.61 This caused tension with the 
other women in her family, as they thought she should stay home to better care for the household. 
If she were unable to complete her household work because of a meeting, they would have to finish 
the chores for her. But her father-in-law was adamant in his support. Darshana told us that if she 
would arrive home late at night he would even tell his wife to prepare chai for Darshana, knowing 
that she was fond of tea and had likely not eaten. His wife often refused, resentful of the extra 
attention to this one daughter-in-law, so he would prepare it himself.  
Now that her father-in-law had passed away, there was conflict between Darshana and her 
family members. The other women were more vocal about Darshana shirking her duties, and her 
husband was tired of the arguing. He told Darshana that the family should not fight, and she should 
“do whatever [mother] is saying.” And so, Darshana tells us, she will no longer work as a SEWA 
community organizer, and the training and literacy classes will no longer be offered from her 
home. She tells us how, since becoming involved with SEWA, the other women in the 
neighborhood know her and recognize her as a teacher, but what she will miss the most are her 
                                                
60 Though Darshana did face resistance at the beginning, even from her father-in-law. She told us 
that when she first began going to SEWA, they would lock her out of the house when she returned.  
61 SEWA community center organizers receive a stipend for their work and rent fee for hosting 
trainings at their homes. 
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monthly trips to SEWA when she would meet other women organizers. Instead, Darshana will 
remain at home. In this way, Darshana no longer defies spatial and social boundaries by openly 
participating in community organizing and traveling alone to other parts of the city. Despite the 
fact that Darshana’s work for SEWA was paid and that she only had to make trips outside of the 
neighborhood once a month, this was not acceptable for her mother-in-law. 
Darshana explains home-based work as something to do during her free time, something 
to do while she waits for customers to buy kindling, framing it as a hobby that happens to pay and 
that offers freedom to decide when she will participate in it. This home-based work, rather than 
the more public community work, allows Darshana to portray herself as both the dutiful and 
productive daughter-in-law, completing her household duties and contributing through her home-
based work, while not disrupting the order in her family. Rather, what is allowed is a low-paying, 
monotonous job that, supposedly, would not get in the way of Darshana’s other duties. She will 
complete her household chores on time, care for the kindling business, help her husband with his 
contract work, and, since there will be time left over, pack leggings when orders arrive. Yet, the 
irregularity of this work, lack of control over when orders would come, and the urgency required 
when an order would arrive could interrupt her role and even, at times, alter gender roles as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined relations in the home and how these limited or provided women 
with opportunities to participate in the public sphere. I also discussed the possibilities of women’s 
everyday practices in response to these boundaries as being a reworking, resilience, and resistance 
to power relations (Katz 2001). These place-based practices are indicators of how women’s diverse 
subjectivities shape their experiences in the home, economy, and civil society. In their explanations 
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of why they participate in home-based work, participants relied on a representation of the working 
woman that reflects the cultural practices and material conditions of their gender, class, caste, and 
religion in the modern urban setting. Women’s economic contribution was needed as households 
were in a state of insecurity; yet, their work options were limited by socio-cultural practices. The 
space and temporality of home-based work constructed this work as more legitimate. Women 
could still portray their primary duty as caregivers and frame their economic participation 
differently than that of women who worked outside the home. In this sense, home-based work 
reinforces an ideology of domesticity, reproducing the sexual division of labor while also 
devaluing the productive work of women (Abreu and Sorj 1996; Dedeoğlu 2010). While gender is 
a significant determinant of the type of work available to them, it was also a result of the 
intersection of their class, caste, and religious identities. Jaya’s contradiction of working from 
home to protect her daughter from the “outside” while also hoping that her daughter would attend 
college and find professional work outside of the home to “learn many things” illustrates women’s 
awareness of their limited opportunities in the labor market as they aspired for their daughters to 
escape the class boundaries they faced (in interaction with their gender and other social positions), 
something that I discuss in the following chapter.  
But how does their participation in work affect women in the present? A popular method 
to answer this question is by looking at intra-household bargaining powers (Kabeer 1995, 2000), 
though scholars have noted that women’s economic participation does not inherently translate to 
greater autonomy in the family (Agarwal 1997), and this is especially the case when women’s 
economic participation is based in the home (Kantor 2005; Khattak 2002). Kantor (2005) argues 
that in order for the home-based worker to gain greater autonomy she needs improved access to 
economic resources in tandem with challenging power relations in the home. Participation in paid 
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work alone will not change woman’s status in her household (Khattak 2002). Furthermore, women 
are engaged in practices that perpetuate these unequal power relationships, explaining this as a 
“patriarchal bargain” (Kandiyoti 1988). Pant (2000:99), for example, discusses how women might 
“acquiesce to and actively perpetuate discriminatory practices in intra-household power 
distribution in order to assure their own longer-term security” as they lack access to resources. In 
the Pakistan context, Khattak (2002:38) adds that there is a “shared conceptions of hierarchies” 
that if maintained and reproduced can provide women with respectability, for example, 
participating in low wage and low status work in order to care for the home is valued greater than 
working outside of the home with slightly higher wages, but which requires caregiving sacrifices. 
While critical engagement with bargaining power theory offers a more complete picture of 
the workings of power in the family, I disagree with the framing of women’s actions as a 
“patriarchal bargain” as it does not adequately account for the multiple sites of power. While it 
offers an explanation of the reproduction of power and of women’s own involvement in it, it 
remains focused on one source of domination. A more complete approach is to acknowledge the 
multiple symbolic boundaries that shape women’s access to resources and opportunities. These 
boundaries are informed not only by their gender but also from the multiple sites of subjectivity 
that they occupy. For one, this helps explain the unequal relation of power among women 
themselves in the family. Furthermore, as social reproduction theory would explain, women’s 
strategies are not only limited to the family domain, but are strategies that are very much connected 
to current political economy contexts. Women do not choose home-based work because it allows 
them to complete their domestic duties more easily; rather, it is the best option in a very limited 
set of choices. Lastly, boundaries change, and so, by examining women’s experiences in relation 
to these symbolic and social boundaries, power is not seen as a constant and fixed relationship, but 
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rather as variable, unpredictable, but also capable of being changed by the women themselves. 
Women’s explanations of why they work at home and their participation in SEWA captures how 
women use their symbolic resources, such as notions of femininity and service, to rework and 
shape their social boundaries. Darshana’s story demonstrates how these strategies do not always 
work, and how their impact is not always enduring. 
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Chapter 7. Material and Symbolic Mobility 
 
Mobility, or the lack of it, is central to women’s participation in home-based work. 
Women’s experiences with mobility are tied to the symbolic and social boundaries that shape their 
daily activities. As social actors they reproduce these boundaries, but they also participate in 
reworking or contesting those boundaries. For example, women’s decision to work at home 
provides them with attainable resources at a familial level as they are reproducing notions of 
domestic femininity; at the same time, they are reworking those boundaries by contributing to their 
household’s economic wellbeing. As others have argued, home-based work allows women to earn 
money while reaffirming their gender roles as caregivers (Abreu and Sorj 1996; Pant 2000). 
I build upon this argument by asking how might women’s place-based practices that limit 
their physical mobility become sites of contestation to oppressive relations of power and offer 
potential for future change? I focus on women’s mobility since this has become a site of inquiry 
and concern in the development field, with the tendency being to equate women’s access to greater 
mobility with freedom and progress. The emphasis is on getting women out of the home, and it 
assumes the opportunities this mobility will bring them, often meaning access to work (Law 1999). 
I compare this discourse to home-based workers’ experiences with mobility, and I ask, what does 
women’s construction and negotiation of their mobility convey about their present situation? 
Women do face a number of barriers that prevent and restrict their mobility in the city’s public 
spaces; however, they employ strategies (intentionally or unintentionally) that reconceptualize the 
home as only a private domain. Through their participation in work and SEWA, women rework 
and even resist oppressive social and material relations in ways that transform the meaning home. 
In this way, I question the public and private spheres as distinct locations by reframing the home, 
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a place with a contentious history for women (Bowlby, Gregory, and McKie 1997) and workers 
(Boris 1994; Parreñas 2001), as a space of contradictory meanings. It can also provide 
opportunities for women to redefine their role in the public and private spheres. The potential of 
place to be a site of transformative politics does not necessarily mean looking for overt resistance 
to unequal social relations, but also includes “reappropriation, reconstruction, reinvention, even 
re-localization of places and place-based practices and the creation of new possibilities” (Escobar 
and Harcourt 2005:3). 
Inclusion of mobility in the analysis emphasizes women’s place-based practices, but it also 
requires conceptualizing mobility to include both material and symbolic mobilities. By material 
mobility I mean the physical aspects of mobility, including movement from one space to another, 
but also the infrastructure, physical landscape, and resources that allow or prevent movement. The 
cultural meaning and significance tied to mobility and immobility result in the symbolic meanings 
that mobility holds for women, and, consequently, the meaning of place for women. Massey (1994) 
writes that the meaning of gender is produced through space, but that space itself is also 
constructed by social relations, such as gender. By asking how women experience and 
conceptualize mobility, this chapter offers an example of how social relations of production and 
social reproduction have constructed the home to hold different meanings and possibilities for 
women. 
Next, I present an overview of the development literature and how it frames and uses 
women’s mobility. I compare this to women’s experiences with mobility in Indian cities, and, in 
particular, its significance for home-based workers. The last section asks how might women 
employ mobility to contest their social positions and relations of power. I present findings from 
interviews that illustrate this process, namely, through women’s aspirations for their daughters’ 
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upward social mobility and the importance of outward mobility (leaving the home) in achieving 
this.  
Women’s Mobility in Discourses of Development 
Because of the significance of mobility in determining women’s access to education, health 
care, employment, and political participation, among others (UN Women 2015), policy makers 
and researchers have often included women’s control over their own mobility as one measure of 
women’s empowerment (see Hjorthol 2008; Kronlid 2008; Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender 2002; 
UN Women 2015; World Bank 2012). Women’s experiences with mobility are determined by 
gender norms, norms of women’s role as caregivers, codes of modesty, and codes of honor, as well 
as perceptions of public safety, especially in urban areas (World Bank 2012). Infrastructure and 
access to affordable transportation can also have a significant impact on women’s mobility 
(Kusakabe 2012). In the context of gender and development, mobility has come to mean much 
more than movement from one place to another: it signifies experiences with power in social 
relations. And it is understood to be a central aspect of women’s well-being (Kronlid 2008). 
However, there are two features in the development literature that should make us question the 
current focus on women’s mobility—the emphasis on cultural aspects that affect mobility and the 
use of women’s mobility for the benefit of the accumulation of capital. 
First, despite the array of reasons that affect mobility, the tendency in the development 
literature is to focus on culture at the expense of other dimensions in which power is also present 
and which also determine social norms and practices, such as relations of class and caste. Most 
notably, in the South Asian context, the cause of women’s restricted mobility is often simplified 
to the cultural and religious practice of purdah, and is often constructed as a “pure constraint, and 
as a constraint of such magnitude that individual actors appear totally overshadowed by its 
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workings” (Kabeer 2000:40).62 Attaching women’s mobility to this ideological system obscures 
the possibilities of women’s agency and empowerment in their daily practices. Purdah 
undoubtedly does affect women’s mobility, but it occurs in conjunction with other social factors 
as well.  
The focus on achieving freedom of mobility is one such example of reductive 
interpretations of women’s experiences; for example, the World Bank (2012:95) include “freedom 
of physical mobility” as a dimension of agency, and the UN Women’s Progress on the World’s 
Women (2015) repeatedly focus on “restrictions on” or “limitations to” mobility when discussing 
this topic. In their examples, there is an imbalance on the cultural side of social norms (e.g., codes 
of modesty and honor) rather than seeing mobility as an outcome of intersecting social identities 
and structures. Overlooking the various dimensions of mobility risks simplifying women’s 
experiences with mobility and assuming that every woman shares the same notion of freedom. We 
have to ask how discourses surrounding women’s mobility in the Global South are a reproduction 
of modern colonial discourses that equate women’s freedom to travel as women’s liberation 
(Kaplan 1995).  
This becomes more important when considering the second tendency in the development 
field, the use of women’s labor. How will women’s mobility benefit the global market? According 
to the World Bank (2012:27), women’s mobility, as a measure of agency and empowerment, is 
defined according to the ability of women to access and participate in the market. It also argues 
that global integration, through equitable and efficient policies, will lead to gender equality, 
including greater mobility, and more opportunities for women (World Bank 2012:36). Freedom of 
                                                
62 Kabeer goes on to argue that individuals are social actors who “are mindful of the very real 
boundaries within which their agency must operate,” thus we should not assume that women are 
“cultural dupes” because they follow customs that others see as wholly oppressive (2000:40).  
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mobility is tied to woman’s access to the market; for example, attempts to address women’s 
mobility in gender responsive transportation and urban planning tends to be framed in “journey-
to-work” (Law 1999). Women’s mobility is supported not for meaningful social transformation 
but for the potential to bring women into the market and, as women provide the majority of social 
reproductive labor, for their role in shaping the next generation of workers. As Bergeron (2003) 
argues, the post-Washington Consensus that reflects a shift in policy to inclusive development 
nonetheless remains embedded in the economics of neoliberalism. 
Mobility and the Home-Based Worker 
How do these discussions of mobility compare to the experiences of the home-based 
worker? With the growth of export industries in developing countries and the feminization of its 
workforce, scholars documented the changing role of women as they left their homes to work in 
factories (Elson and Pearson 1981). Employing gender and women’s sexuality to signify constructs 
of the nation (Chatterjee 1989; McClintock 1995), real and imagined reconfigurations of women’s 
roles as a result of globalization was seen as a threat to nations’ boundaries, and the response was 
embedded in “normative prescriptions of gender and sexuality” (Oza 2006:10). In Malaysia, for 
example, a moral panic emerged when young women migrated to urban industrial areas for work; 
the response of regulation and surveillance of women’s movement and behaviors contradicted the 
nation’s encouragement of women’s productive activities (Ong 1991). Anxiety over women’s 
economic participation and entrance in public spheres reveals the contradiction between economic 
and cultural interests, and similar responses are found in various contexts of economic 
liberalization, such as Bangladesh (Kabeer 2000), Sri Lanka (Lynch 2004), and Mexico 
(Fernandez-Kelly 1984). The persistence of home-based work counters the common perception 
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that global economic pressure brings women into the public space as workers and consumers (Ong 
1987; Sassen 1988).  
Home-based work, especially in the form of subcontracting, also became a part of the 
segmented labor market during this time (Benería and Roldan 1987; Mies 1982), and a new pattern 
of accumulation for transnational capital came to rely on a flexible production system of female 
and minority workers that mixed mass assembly in factories and in homes (Ong 1991). As I 
discussed in Chapter 5, the home became appropriated as a setting for capitalist accumulation with 
the transformation of the home, previously associated with nurturance, to being a site for 
entrepreneurialism (Prügl 1999) without threatening cultural ideologies of the nation (Rankin 
2001). In this sense, home-based work pacifies anxieties over women’s changing societal roles as 
a result of the effects of globalization and liberalization in many Asian countries.  
In home-based work, women’s mobility is a significant aspect of why they choose home-
based work, and it reveals the interaction of the individual with culture, structure, and space. While 
there are market forces that encourage subcontracting (Balakrishnan and Sayeed 2002), women 
choose home-based work for a variety of reasons that arise from ideological and social constraints. 
Across borders and cultures, women participate in home-based work to better address their 
domestic responsibilities, from England (Allen and Wolkowitz 1986) to Brazil (Abreu and Sorj 
1996) to Mexico (Benería and Roldan 1987). In the South Asian context, purdah is a significant 
factor (Khattak 2002), but there are other social and spatial realities that make it difficult for 
women to leave their homes for work. For example, Madhiva Desai (2007) expands the various 
ways in which women’s mobility is restricted, including cultural and religious practices, but by 
social conditions as well, such as illiteracy (making it difficult to travel), dependency on public 
transportation (rather than other modes of transport such as bicycles, scooters and cars, which are 
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more likely used by men), perceptions of public space as threatening, and domestic responsibilities 
which limit women’s time. Acknowledging the multidimensional factors involved in women’s 
restricted mobility reveals a more nuanced understanding of gender and power.  
As with Desai’s (2007) list, women in this study provided a variety of reasons why they 
were unable or unwilling to work outside. From the survey, the majority of women chose home-
based work instead of working outside the home because of household and care responsibilities 
(51 percent). Just under half of the women also noted that they were not allowed to work outside 
of the home (44 percent), while one-fifth of the women worked at home because they lacked other 
skills. In the interviews, participants spoke in further detail on why they work at home. They 
discussed the restrictions they face due to cultural practices, such as purdah, but their answers also 
pointed to social relations (including unequal domestic division of labor, perceptions of safety for 
women in public areas, and women’s higher rate of illiteracy, which make it difficult for them to 
travel using public transportation) as well as to infrastructure (distance, lack of reliable or 
affordable transportation).  
Domestic responsibilities remained the most salient reason for being a home-based worker. 
Kaia, a homeworker in Vatva, did not know of any women in her neighborhood who worked 
outside. She imagined that it would be difficult, “Where would I leave my children? If I work from 
home, then the kids are with me. Even if they go to school at 12 pm, then I work quickly in the 
morning, make food, prepare them for school and so I don’t go outside for work.” Similar opinions 
were expressed in Hindu neighborhoods, such as Lata in Amraiwadi, whose response to my 
question of how home-based work was different to that of outside work was, “We can’t go out to 
work. I have three children!” In Sarkhej, Manisha added, “The whole responsibility of the house 
is on me, so I have to fulfill that.” For women who faced restricted access to the public sphere 
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because of their families, they were however allowed to participate in this type of work because it 
maintained spatial limits. Biliksha’s husband allowed her to take on home-based work only 
because it could be completed at home, telling her “You are sitting at home, so it is not a problem. 
You can start.” In Danilimda, Alka’s husband also allowed her to do home-based work because it 
would be completed at home, and it was “only a few hours of work a day.” Women’s experience 
with mobility is shaped by these symbolic meanings of home and care, but, as I discuss in the next 
section, women were also restricted by dominant cultural and physical practices that constructed 
the public sphere as difficult or even dangerous to access. 
Women in the City 
Desai (2007:9) writes that physical structure of the Indian city “reflects and reinforces 
inequalities in its social structure through not being equally accessible to both genders.” The public 
place is designed as a masculine space, constructed as dangerous and unwelcoming for the Indian 
woman (Desai 2007). This was the case in Ahmedabad. I found that, in addition to the gender 
norms that kept women at home, the city was not an easy place for women to traverse. Of course, 
women’s experience with public space varied depending on their social position. In fact, 
Ahmedabad was often noted as being a safe city for women, and the throng of young women 
maneuvering their mopeds on city streets verifies that.63  
At the SEWA office, the young female staff who could afford their own mopeds would 
drive themselves to work daily. But the city was safe and accessible for whom? These women 
belonged to the upper-middle and upper class, with resources that the majority of women in the 
city lack. A friend of mine, a young woman belonging to the middle class, would commute to work 
                                                
63 Gender norms persist even among the mobile in Ahmedabad, as it was rare for women to drive 
cars.  
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by moped, traveling eleven kilometers each way; participants of this study would have found it 
difficult to commute half that distance.  
Distance from city centers contributed to women’s seclusion and the higher likelihood that 
they would not be allowed to work outside of the home. Looking at the survey results between 
neighborhoods, there are four neighborhoods in which the majority of women mentioned 
restrictions on where they could work, meaning, their families did not allow them to work outside 
of the home. While two, Fatehwadi and Vatva, are Muslim neighborhoods, and are communities 
that are often seen as more restrictive on women’s mobility, the other two are Hindu 
neighborhoods, Rajavir and Sarkhej. These four neighborhoods were also located on the outskirts 
of the city, at least ten kilometers or more from the center of the city with limited public transport.64 
A neighborhood’s isolation could exacerbate restrictions on women’s mobility, as travel was more 
difficult. In addition, without access to the other types of work, such as street vending, domestic 
work, or construction, readily available jobs in other parts of the city, the only option was home-
based work. It was not only culture but also location and infrastructure that limited women’s 
mobility. 
Geographic remoteness in the city resulted in a more time-consuming and expensive 
commute. This disadvantage would be a factor when deciding whether or not women would work 
outside. In Nobelnagar, a neighborhood of mostly migrants near the Ahmedabad’s International 
Airport, fifteen kilometers from the city center, Daxa explained that she stayed home to work 
because the high cost of commuting to the city, “My house is far away from the city, so if I get 
                                                
64 While ten kilometers might not be considered far in Western countries or for the better off, in 
India this would be long distance to travel for a woman with few resources, especially if it is a 
daily commute. For example, in a study based in Ahmedabad, “far” is defined as more than 15-
minute walk or 10-minute bike ride (Kantor 2000). 
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Figure 13. The road leading to Sarkhej 
 
       Photograph by author. 
 
work I have to go over there and spend so much money for the travel. I cannot afford to spend that 
much money, so it is better to do home-based work.”  
Illiteracy created another obstacle for women’s mobility. Unable to drive or to afford a 
rickshaw, many poor women in Ahmedabad relied on public transportation, a potentially 
hazardous endeavor since bus drivers had the habit of slowing to a roll without stopping when 
picking up passengers. But to navigate the bus system, they had to read the bus signs.65 Shilpa 
became a SEWA literacy teacher in her neighborhood to help women overcome this obstacle, 
among others. In her neighborhood, she witnessed the many problems that women face because of 
                                                
65 In 2009, Ahmedabad began operating its Bus Rapid Transit System (BRTS). With designated 
lanes and platforms, BRTS is designed to be an alternative to the slower and overcrowded 
municipal buses; yet, at double the price of a municipal bus ticket, it is less likely to be used by 
the poor (Mahadevia, Joshi, and Datey 2013). When I lived in the city, I also noticed that the 
destination indicators on buses used Arabic numerals rather than Gujarati numerals. 
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their illiteracy. She explained to us that women have difficulty traveling because they could not 
read the bus numbers and destinations; they were ashamed to ask someone because they were 
afraid of being laughed at and asked, “You can’t read?” 
In the Muslim communities, some women blamed strict interpretations of purdah. These 
women were older, the matriarchs of their home, and more likely to be involved in SEWA’s 
capacity-building programs. Zarina, for example, believes that women’s illiteracy is due to 
family’s enforcement of purdah, “Some parents teach their daughters, but some don’t in our caste. 
Like here [in Fatehwadi] these ladies are not allowed to leave their house without a burka. They 
teach their daughters up to 7th grade and then stop the school. They don’t allow them to study 
further.”  
Rabia, a SEWA community organizer in Vatva with whom we spoke after completing the 
interviews, encountered difficulty in convincing women to join the center’s programs or leave the 
neighborhood to attend SEWA events. “Women sit at home and are taught to sew so that they 
work from home,” and because of their illiteracy, she tells us, “They are not able to take a bus and 
travel.” There is also a fear of leaving their community. Women were hesitant to visit other areas 
of the city because of fears of the “outside,” as one homeworker put it. In a city plagued by 
communal violence, notably the 2002 riots where over 2,000 Muslims were killed, communities 
became more insular, and the cityscape divided into neighborhoods labeled as “dangerous” for 
different communities (Yagnik and Sheth 2011). With each ethnic conflict and ensuing 
fundamentalist propaganda, women have increasingly become a subject of surveillance and 
policing by their communities (Khan 2007; Robinson 2010). Rabia would have to visit homes a 
number of times to talk to women and their families to convince them that it was safe to leave their 
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community as a group of women, “I had to show them that there is no rift between the Hindu and 
Muslims.” 
 Gender and women’s sexuality has become a central issue in the rise of communal tensions 
and Hindu fundamentalism, and scholars have noted the consequences for women’s political 
activities (Banerjee 2003; Robinson 2010) and their increasing exclusion from public space (Khan 
2007). The 2002 communal riots in Ahmedabad were especially disturbing because of the violent 
and deadly attacks targeted at minority women. A fact-finding mission shortly after the events 
found that the sexual violence against women was planned and organized (Hameed et al. 2002), 
bringing some to question the attacks as having a symbolic purpose of ethnic cleanings (Sarkar 
2002). These social and political currents are not only restricted to the Muslim woman. The alleged 
“Love Jihad,” a claim by the Hindu Right that Muslim fundamentalists have launched a campaign 
to abduct and convert Hindu and Christian women, plays into Hindutva’s campaign against the 
Muslim “Other” by utilizing images of Hindu women’s passivity (Rao 2011). Hindu and Muslim 
women’s sexuality are at the center of what Jeffery and Jeffery (2006) call the “Saffron 
Demography” that employs demographic numbers on Muslims’ high fertility rate and fears of a 
dying Hindu race as a source of divisive politics. Similarly, though in less obvious political ways, 
the presence of home-based work reinforce the construction of public space as masculine and 
unsafe for women, while also reaffirming the role of motherhood to support one’s respective 
community.  
Feminist geographers understand space to be gendered, with the public sphere associated 
with masculinity and the private sphere with the feminine (Massey 1994; McDowell 1999). 
Movements in these spaces are similarly gender coded, with movement seen as masculine and 
passivity or stationary as feminine (Cresswell 2006). While in practice this public-private gender 
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divide is not as neat as it seems, women’s experiences with mobility and space is a reflection of 
how gender is constructed and understood (Massey 1994:179), and so women’s decision or 
constraint to work at home reflects their experiences with mobility and urban space. Their lack of 
mobility arise from a combination of social, cultural, and material restrictions. In addition, the rise 
of Hindu fundamentalism has further contributed to the coding of public space as dangerous for 
both Hindu and minority women. These conditions must be considered in relation to home-based 
worker’s framing of their work choice as a strategy to contribute economically while also 
maintaining and reproducing domestic boundaries as appropriate feminine space. Considering the 
lack of work options available to them and the exclusion of women from public space, working at 
home seemed the best option for women themselves or for their families.  
Contesting Mobilities 
Women’s difficulty accessing public spaces of the city does not mean that they were 
passive in relation to these social and cultural practices. Rather, work and participation in SEWA 
provided opportunities for women to rework and resist oppressive relations of production and 
social reproduction. First, I examine how SEWA’s work contributed to the ability for women to 
challenge their relations to production. As Hill (2010:178) argued in her study of SEWA, the 
organization’s success is due to the development of a worker identity among women, including 
building their self-confidence, self-esteem, and self-respect. She attributes this relationship to the 
possibility of women to engage in work-life reform. Here, I examine this building of a worker 
identity in relation to women’s everyday negotiations with family, work, and community.  
Then, I look how mobility shapes women’s relations to production, and provide an example 
of one homeworker who attempts to lessen her exploitative situation in the subcontracting 
production system by going directly to the city center for work orders. While she still receives 
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home-based work, her movement out of the home and into the city holds symbolic meaning for 
her and her goal of supporting her family, especially so because of her community’s cultural 
practices of purdah. 
Lastly, I discuss how women’s aspirations for their children and the significance of home-
based work in achieving those goals. I have already noted how home-based work is a strategy for 
women to address unequal class and gender relations; here, I argue that women frame their 
participation in work as a route to provide for the possibility of their children’s economic and 
social mobility. Whether or not these goals are achieved is not the focus here (though this question 
is not irrelevant for social scientists), rather, I examine what women’s dream for their children’s 
mobility tells us about their own struggles. This struggle becomes clear when identifying the 
gendered meanings of mobility for their daughters compared to their sons.  
Building Confidence through Community Organizing 
In Sarkhej, a Hindu neighborhood on the western outskirts of the city, Nirmala runs a 
SEWA community center out of her home that offers many of SEWA Academy services. 
Nirmala’s family is relatively well off compared to her neighbors. Unlike many centers that would 
make second use of a living room or terrace for its classes, Nirmala devotes an entire room for 
SEWA’s work. The room has plenty of windows, and it is well lit. Rather than bare cement walls, 
they are covered in white tiles with flower prints. In the corner are two machines. SEWA posters 
and hand-drawn sewing patterns are attached to the walls.  
Manisha, a young woman who had recently moved to Sarkhej after her marriage, learned 
of SEWA’s center from her neighbors. She lives just a few doors down, and decided to take a 
sewing class. She tells us, “[The class] gave me many benefits. I did not know how to sew. After 
learning how to sew blouses and other garments, I can earn money and it helps in the house.” 
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Manisha also gained confidence through her participation at the center. Through the center, she 
met other women in her area, which, as a newcomer, made her more comfortable in her new home. 
Manisha eventually gained enough confidence to confront her contractor over the low pay. She 
went with two other women to the contractor, and demanded that he pay them more money for the 
work. He refused, so they went to another contractor to ask for work, but said that they would only 
accept work if he would provide a reasonable wage. 
Telling us about the experience, Manisha says, “At first, no one was ready to go to [the 
contractor]. We didn’t know what to say after going there. What if he says no? What if he does not 
give any money? We don’t know if we would get work elsewhere or not. But we all went there 
together and we spoke.” Even though the first contractor did not agree to their demands, they now 
had the confidence to stand up for themselves. Manisha tells us that, “Thanks to Nirmala, now I 
am not afraid. If there are any difficulties with the work or with anything else, I can face that 
person, even on my own.”  
As women, and a new daughter-in-law as Manisha was, this fear of confrontation was 
understandable. Their original lack of confidence was not only an expression of the fear of losing 
work; Hill (2010:102–103) applies Honneth’s (1995) theory of moral injury to women working in 
the Indian formal economy, and argues that linking the moral with the material aspects of life 
reveals a holistic analysis of the economic marginalization and vulnerabilities faced by women. 
This marginalization and vulnerability results from women’s “non-recognition” at multiple levels 
of relations: interpersonal (low status in the household and community), state (not counted in 
national economic statistics and policy), and society (formal exclusion and low status) (Hill 
2010:102).  
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SEWA’s programs sought to “renegotiate the social relations of recognition and respect” 
by bringing women out of their isolation (p. 104). When women participated in SEWA’s skill 
training classes, they were learning a skill, but they were also meeting other women in a space 
where they could share troubles and advice. As Rabya, the community organizer in Vatva, noted, 
she earns people’s trust slowly as women participate in the center’s activities. With this trust, 
families become more comfortable with allowing their daughters and wives to participate more 
actively.  
One such activity is the exposure trip. Nirmala had taken the neighborhood women of 
Sarkhej on exposure trips to SEWA Academy’s Manipur center for trainings. These trips are an 
important component in SEWA’s capacity-building programs. In Manipur, women would attend 
training programs with sometimes hundreds of other members. Traveling to new places and 
meeting other women workers helped increase their self-confidence and notions of self-worth; 
they learned that they were not alone in their struggles, and that they are confronted with similar 
problems, despite having diverse caste and religious backgrounds.  
It was trips like this that helped Manisha gather the confidence to confront her contractor. 
When he refused to provide her and the other women with higher wages, she recognized her value 
as a worker, and she decided that she would no longer accept his low wages. Instead, she found 
work from another contractor who would provide higher wages. Manisha’s increase in self-
confidence, self-esteem, and self-respect is related to her engagement in SEWA and actively 
seeking to improve her economic wellbeing (Hill 2010). In fact, in the survey, most women pointed 
to their participation in SEWA as having a positive impact on their confidence, being able to deal 
with a crisis, mobility, and community involvement, more so than home-based work (see Figure 
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14). Remembering Darshana’s reaction to having to discontinue hosting the community center, 
what she will miss the most are her trips to SEWA to meet with other women organizers. 
 
Figure 14. Effects of Home-Based Work and SEWA 
 
 
“Going Directly”  
Women’s spatial practices have a significant role in shaping their work relationships, and 
their restricted mobility made them more likely to have to rely on limited networks for work, such 
as neighbors and family (Mehrotra and Biggeri 2007; Rao and Husain 1987). Nearly all of the 
women we spoke with in the interviews noted that they received their work from someone who 
lived in the neighborhood. If the woman or her family did not know the contractor directly, they 
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would need a contact to introduce them. Nikila, for example, went to a contractor by herself, but 
her request was denied. She asked a neighbor of hers, who was receiving orders from this same 
contractor, to go with her and assure the contractor that she was a good worker. Without many 
options for work, they often acquiesced to the low pay and irregular work orders from their 
neighborhood subcontractors. It was not uncommon for workers in different parts of the city doing 
the same type of garment work to be compensated at very different rates. Dependent on 
subcontractors for their work, homeworkers’ lacked the power or knowledge to demand better 
prices (Carr, Chen, and Tate 2000). 
Some women relied on their kin networks to find work. They would ask family to introduce 
them to contractors or even receive orders directly from family members. Chanda, an eighteen-
year-old in Rajavir, started home-based work four years ago. Her uncle was acquainted with an 
owner of a small enterprise; he introduced Chanda to the employer, and, after she completed ten 
days of training at the shop, Chanda began working from home sewing straps to undergarments. 
Asha maintains a work relationship with one of her former employers, but she also relies on her 
sister-in-law, her husband’s sister, for some work. Asha’s sister-in-law is unmarried and without 
children, so she is still working outside of the home at a factory embroidering and adding other 
embellishments to blouses, as Asha once did before having children. Now, when there are large 
orders, Asha’s sister-in-law brings blouses home for Asha to complete. 
These informal networks of work entail a different sort of relationship between labor and 
capital (Allen and Wolkowitz 1987). The person providing them with work is not the antagonist, 
but a neighbor or family, in similar circumstances as themselves. In addition, homeworkers were 
responsible not only to the subcontractors, but also the neighbors and kin who had provide the 
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contact. Angering the subcontractors could have had an impact on the people who had helped them 
find the work and who often also received work from the same subcontractors.  
Zamila, an astute homeworker, recognized the disadvantages of taking work from a 
subcontractor. Zamila and her family, her husband and three children, moved to Ahmedabad from 
Patan, a district in north Gujarat, nine years earlier. In Patan, Zamila worked at home rolling beedi, 
thin cigarettes of tobacco wrapped in leaf. When she arrived in Ahmedabad, she did not have the 
contacts to continue this work; not that she minded since rolling beedi was tedious and unpleasant. 
The tobacco would stain her fingers and the smell lingered all day. Zamila had also heard of the 
health risks associated with the work and that there were public health campaigns against its use, 
so she reasoned there would be less work.66  
After a few months, Zamila began searching for work in earnest. At the time, they were 
renting their home, and it added to the already high living expenses in the city. It was difficult to 
cover expenses with only her husband’s earnings, a rickshaw driver in a city with an excess of 
them. When asking around, they heard from neighbors that home-based work in this area was low-
paid, and it would be best to go directly to the shops, avoiding the subcontractors who paid lower 
piece rate wages in order to receive their cut. For many women who participate in home-based 
work, receiving orders from subcontractors was the only opportunity to work, unable to leave their 
homes or lacking direct contact with retailers. This was especially the case in Fatehwadi, a Muslim 
neighborhood where most women did not work outside of the home and were not allowed to leave 
the area unaccompanied, though the distance of Fatehwadi from the city center exacerbated this. 
Zamila had decided that she would not let cultural customs prevent her from working. Later in the 
                                                
66 One of the few types of home-based production that is regulated in India (the Beedi and Cigar 
Workers Act of 1966), beedi production in urban areas is now considered a sunset industry, in part 
because of the domestic and international campaigns to regulate its consumption (Agarwala 2006). 
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interview, she mentioned that her family is at a disadvantage because her husband is not educated. 
She blames her mother-in-law’s restriction to the home as a reason for this. Zamila believed that 
she could avoid the same outcome for her own children by working, but, more importantly, she 
was willing to break custom and leave the home for work purposes if it meant better wages, telling 
us: 
“I thought that if I do something then it would be better. It would support me in house. So 
I learned that if you want to get some work, then you go directly [to the shops] only. If you 
go directly, then you would get to know everything!” 
Learning that Shahpur, a neighborhood close to the city center, had a number of markets, 
along with the many small enterprises providing goods for vendors, Zamila and a neighborhood 
woman traveled to the area in search of work. Walking along the busy streets lined by small one-
room shops, she asked around if there was work for someone with hand embroidery skills. 
Someone gave her an address and she went to it, finding a contractor in the garment production 
business. He was not a retailer, but since this contractor was one step higher in the supply chain, 
he offered better wages. Zamila was willing to travel to the city to fetch materials and return the 
products, and so she was able to receive a better price than the women who received orders from 
a subcontractor in Fatehwadi. He needed workers to embroider the neck of tunics with beads and 
other embellishments, and would pay Rs. 30 per piece completed.  
Considering the disadvantages of receiving home-based work through an intermediary, 
Zamila stressed the importance of mobility, of leaving the community to travel to areas where 
there are better work opportunities. This mobility was essential in achieving her goal, saying, “I 
had this inside me that I have to do work and to take more work from [outside]…I can educate my 
children, this was my intention. So I had to go directly.” She recognizes the benefit that “going 
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directly” affords her, noting the differences between her and other women in the area who accept 
work from subcontractors at a lower piece-rate, often patching work together by taking orders from 
different subcontractor. Having a more direct contact with a supplier, she had relatively greater 
security. It was less likely for a supplier to close shop and leave, compared to the subcontractors 
living in the Fatehwadi.67 Zamila and her husband decided that she could leave the home if it meant 
access to more and better paid work. As the eldest woman in her household, with grown children 
and a sympathetic husband, Zamila experienced greater autonomy in this aspect than most women 
in this study. However, Zamila still limited herself to only home-based work; she explains that she 
only wants to work at home. The emphasis that Zamila placed on “going directly” contrasted to 
her equally steadfast resolve that she had to work at home.  
Working for Children’s Education 
Many of the women, including Zamila, saw their work as important because of the 
monetary contributions. Their earnings were often used for daily household needs, such as 
vegetables for the night’s meal. But another significant contribution by women was covering the 
costs of their children’s education. While the value of paying for daily expenses was dismissed, 
women did not devalue their contributions to their children’s education. In fact, for some women, 
such as Jaya, paying for their children’s education was the most important reason for working. She 
would work even more hours at the sewing machine or would take on loans if that were needed 
for her daughter to finish her studies. Bharti, a widow and the sole earner in the household, does 
not save any of her earnings because she decided that she should spend it on her son’s school fees 
instead. 
                                                
67  Most families in the Fatehwadi rented. It was common for subcontractors to move, and 
homeworkers would subsequently lose their source of income.  
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Women home-based workers justified their participation in paid work to fulfill their 
domestic responsibilities. Nurturing and supporting their children’s development was one of these 
duties. While neo-Marxists would explain women’s actions as reproduction of the workforce, in 
the biological and cultural sense, I argue that women’s actions were also resisting class 
reproduction. Education was a means for their children to achieve economic and social mobility. 
Their hopes reveal an acknowledgement of and confrontation against the multiple sites of 
domination that they experienced as women, informal workers, members of schedule castes, and 
religious minorities.  
The need for women to work to support their children’s education is linked to a neoliberal 
model that has affected the country’s public education system. Weakening state support (Jha 2005) 
and increasing privatization of education (Kumar 2008) have contributed to the current abysmal 
state of India’s public education (Chatterji 2015). Despite it being a public education system, there 
are a number of costs, including textbooks, uniforms, tutoring fees, and transportation, which adds 
to the strain on poor households.68 The expense was greater for families that lived on the outskirts 
of the city where a public school was not easily accessible. In Keshavnagar, Usha paid Rs. 600 
(US $10) a month for her two children to ride to school in a shared rickshaw; this took up a sizable 
chunk of her monthly earnings of Rs. 2,400 (US $38). Some families sent their children to private 
schools since the public school was too far away. In Vatva, the workers we interviewed used 
earnings to pay for their children to attend a private school. Because of the low quality of public 
school education, women would also pay additional fees for after-school tutorials. An interview 
with Asha in Keshavnagar was cut short because she had to bring her children to their tutoring 
                                                
68 A study on education expenditure in India found that poor households spend 3 percent of their 
monthly household income on education related costs, a significant increase from fifty years ago 
(Tilak 2009). 
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lessons. The two other women we interviewed that day, Usha and Shilpa, also sent their children 
to tutoring in addition to public school. After the interviews, on our way back to the office, Jayshree 
told me that she sent her two children to a private school, and they go to tutoring after school as 
well. To pay for this, her and her husband go to the markets to sell imitation jewelry every Sunday 
(the only day off in India’s six-day workweek).69 
Women recognized the importance of education, and they believed that, despite caste and 
community disadvantages, educating their children was an opportunity to achieve social mobility, 
a process that was seen as more complicated a few decades ago (Srinivas 2003). They pointed to 
their own lack of education and current situation as proof. Most of the women I spoke with had 
been unable to finish their own education, but they were adamant about providing education for 
their children, even for their daughters. For some, such as Daxa, education was the main motivator 
for participating in home-based work. As one of the most prolific homeworkers, she told us, “Any 
work that would give me income for their education, I will take any of it.” Naseem, whose husband 
had told her that she should look after the children instead of doing this paid work, insisted that 
she work so that she could pay her children’s private school fees. While her husband saw her labor 
as more useful in caring for the children, Naseem believed that she could better support her 
children with home-based work. Zamila, the homeworker who went directly to suppliers, was also 
motivated by education. Pointing to her mother-in-law’s illiteracy and lack of mobility as a reason 
for their current situation, she believes that her participation in home-based work is a route for her 
family’s advancement. That is why she was determined to find work outside of her community: 
                                                
69 Jayshree would often bring jewelry to SEWA Academy to sell to her colleagues. There were a 
few other staff members that would do this as well to earn extra money, bringing in jewelry, 
clothes, or food bought wholesale at a market. 
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We have a great loss because my husband and my brother-in-law are not educated. Because 
my mother-in-law followed purdah, her sons could not do anything, for work and even in 
school subjects. But I felt that this ritual should not be there. I can do something so that my 
children could reach up to college. My elder son is going to college, my daughter studied 
until 12th grade, and my third son is in 9th grade. 
It is not incidental that the women would emphasize the importance of education. Using 
their earnings for children’s education justified their home-based work, and women reasoned that 
this was providing for their children’s needs. The emphasis on education stems from women’s 
desire that their children experience upward mobility; a notion that, with the growing media 
attention on the new middle class in India (see Mustafi 2013, Varma 2013), has entered the 
imaginations of poor Indians. The economic changes in India over the past decades offered new 
opportunities for advancement (Kumar, Heath, and Heath 2002), and education was seen as a tool 
to move ahead (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006).  
Disrupting the Reproduction of Power: Aspirations for Our Children 
In studying social mobility in India, scholars have tended to focus on the causes of mobility 
(Kumar et al. 2002; Mukherji 2012) and the meaning of this new optimism for individuals (Naudet 
2008; Snell-Rood 2015; Vijayakumar 2013). What I am interested in here is what women’s 
aspirations for mobility signify about their current social positions. I argue that their goal for 
educating their children reveals women’s acknowledgement of their own identities and social 
positions, something that is obscured when women speak about their current situation. 
I began asking women about their aspirations for their children after we had already 
completed follow-up interviews at two neighborhoods. We were in Keshavnagar, and our first 
interview was with Shilpa. During the previous interviews, in Jamalpur and Rajivnagar, it had been 
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difficult to find a way for women to speak of their class position as workers. When I asked them 
to compare home-based work to other work, they would compare it to the other forms of work that 
they had access to, such as street vending or domestic work. While the questions elicited interesting 
responses (especially in terms of the embodied and spatial meaning attached to these different 
types of work, as I discussed in the previous chapter), their answers did not address class 
differences. In Keshavnagar, I noticed that Shilpa, who having finished secondary education was 
one of the highest educated women in our study, had made a few comments about her daughters 
and their schooling. I wondered if Shilpa was in tune with the growing possibilities of social 
mobility occurring in India today, and if she herself had upwardly mobile class aspirations, or if 
not for herself, at least for her children. In answering, Shilpa, who was already speaking easily, 
opened up even more. She told us that her daughters wanted to become a teacher and doctor; she  
laughed and added that she had hoped they would fulfill her own childhood dream of becoming a 
policewoman to fight goondas.70 
After her interview we continued asking this question to participants. The response from 
most of the women, 16 of the 20 mothers to whom we asked this question,71 was that they wished 
their sons and daughters to have jobs that were not in the informal economy but in the formal 
economy (see Table 3).72 Some were ambiguous in the type of jobs they wanted for their children, 
                                                
70 Goonda is Indian English slang broadly used for people engaged in anti-social activities, such 
as extortion or bootlegging. Shilpa was inspired to this profession after watching a television show 
whose star was a female police officer.   
71 We also asked three unmarried, young women who were still living with their parents what they 
would have liked to do instead of home-based work; one preferred being a home-based worker, 
another wanted to be a singer, and the third a teacher. 
72 Mothers did not explicitly use the terms “formal economy” or “professional occupations” in 
their answers, but their descriptions of these desired jobs compared to their work point to an 
understanding of the differences between the formal and informal occupations. In recounting their 
answers, I use these terms for ease of reading. 
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others had specific professions, but none of these parents wanted their children to work in the kind 
of employment similar to their own. These job aspirations did not differ by gender, as they hoped 
both their sons and daughters would experience occupational mobility, but the types of jobs were 
gendered. Half of the daughters had professional aspirations in careers traditionally seen as 
feminine, such as teacher and airline steward.73 
 
Table 3. Job Aspirations for Children, by Gender 
  
Female 
Child 
Male 
Child 
Teacher 5 0 
Professional (unspecified) 4 6 
Doctor 2 2 
Airline Stewardess 2 0 
Professor 1 0 
Engineer 0 2 
Accountant 0 2 
Government job 0 2 
Total 14 14 
   
 
As women explained their job aspirations for their children, they employed experiences 
with their own social position in contrast to the possibilities offered by formal employment. When 
speaking of their home and work experiences, women accepted their social and economic 
conditions. Home-based work could be a hassle because of the irregular work orders and finding 
time to finish their caregiving duties, but women were still grateful to have this extra source of 
income for the household. Their only remark when asked what would better their situation was for 
more home-based work. However, when speaking of their hopes for their children, it became 
                                                
73 I was surprised by the answer of airline stewardess; in fact, the actual word they used was “pilot” 
(in English) rather than stewardess. Jayshree later mentioned that airline advertisements often 
depicted airline stewardesses as young women with makeup and dressed in Western-style dress 
suits. She noted that these girls had probably seen those ads and wanted to be those “pilots.” 
 207 
obvious that the women were keenly aware of their class position, and they dreamed of better 
situations for their children. The precarious character of informal work and the consequences for 
everyday life came to the fore in these discussions. This is seen in Jyoti’s explanation of why she 
wants her sons to have government jobs, “If I educate them today so that their life gets settled, 
tomorrow they will get a good job. With good jobs their lives would be better.” When we asked 
her what was the difference between a government job and her own home-based work, she 
responded that, “There is a vast difference. The home-based work we might or might not get. But 
with a government job we would be definitely getting the salary. Even if we stay at home we would 
still be getting the salary.” Mothers wanted their children to have a secure livelihood, in contrast 
to the irregular work and income that they experienced.  
In their answers, women pointed to the importance of education in attaining these goals. 
Hansha, a mother of three children, reflected on the difficulty that she and her husband face 
because of their lack of education and work opportunities, she remarked “There are many problems 
in my house, so I am doing this hard work. I will teach my children well so our economic condition 
becomes better.” Nita expressed regret that her parents did not encourage her to become educated, 
and she did not want to pass the same disadvantages onto her own children. Nita told us that “We 
weren’t educated by our parents, but we can do this for our children.” She hoped that her son would 
become a doctor, and she wanted her daughter to be a teacher, she reasoned that, “If they do good 
in their education, and get good jobs, then it is good for us.” Informal work was also seen as labor 
work, and participants did not believe that labor work was appropriate for an educated person. 
Manjila explained, “If they have studied this much, why do these jobs. They won’t do this 
laborious work. Why I should make them do this laborious work? I have done that. What would I 
get making them do this work?” Looking back at their own lives, they hoped that with education 
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their children would have better opportunities to enter the formal workforce. This would bring 
economic mobility to their children, but it would also secure their own futures. 
Outward and Upward Mobility for Daughters 
The jobs that they wanted for their children were in stark contrast to the opportunities that 
they had experienced themselves. This was especially the case for daughters. For sons, it was 
assumed that they would have jobs, and mothers hoped that they would have professional jobs 
instead of the informal and irregular work as that of their husbands. Their hope was that their sons 
could experience economic mobility. Aspirations for their daughters countered traditional work 
trajectories for their class status as well, but it also countered gendered notions of low caste and 
minority women’s role in society. Hoping their sons would have well-paying, high-status jobs 
addressed the class inequality that these families faced, but having the same hopes for their 
daughters implies a resistance to gender subordination and inequality. This became more apparent 
as women gave different explanations about the advantages of formal jobs for their daughters 
compared to sons. When speaking of their sons, the reasoning was placed on the characteristics of 
the job. For example, Jyoti’s main concern for her two son’s professional aspirations was that they 
find a government job because of the regular salary and the social status that comes with it. In 
contrast, mothers with daughters reasoned that educating their daughters and gaining formal 
occupations would allow their daughters to “move forward” in life.  
In Nobelnagar, Hansha tells us that her daughter, who is now attending college, will receive 
an M.B.A. She is adamant that her daughter will not become a home-based worker, saying, “My 
daughter won’t do this type of work. I will not let her do this. I have spent my life doing this work 
and she should do the same?! She should get educated and I have a dream that she moves ahead in 
life.” Zamila, who attributed her rise in confidence to her home-based work which allowed her to 
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leave the home, and compared her own progress to that of her mother-in-law who followed purdah 
customs, believes her daughter could progress even more by finishing her education and working 
for a “business.”  
Jaya’s explanation also derived from a sense of opportunity to learn. She was more explicit 
about the importance of leaving the home to have this opportunity, “[My daughter] can know the 
outside, how there is a city and all. She can go outside; she can learn many things. While sitting in 
the house we don’t know anything.” Jaya framed formal work outside of the home as different 
because of the space and use of body, “In this work, our strength is going, but in the outside when 
we do the job, we have to just use our mind. Not our hands and legs.” Home-based work was 
located in the home, and one used labor to complete the work. In contrast, she defines desirable 
work to be located outside, in the city, and a job in which one uses the mind; one’s physical strength 
is not expended with this work. Jaya is not only speaking of home-based work when she explains 
that “this work” limits the mind and tires the body. A street vendor who sells vegetables at the 
market explores the city, and a domestic servant works in the homes of the middle and upper class. 
But these are not the jobs she is alluding to when she wants her daughter to leave the home. A 
teacher or airline stewardess has physical jobs that exert energy, but Jaya does not define them as 
such. For Jaya, what she is defining is not so much the work and its requirements, but rather the 
social position that one gains with formal work in contrast to informal work. Remembering her 
comments in Chapter 5 of the dangers of the “outside” as being a reason to stay home and work, 
here we see that Jaya has a different conception of what “outside” means for herself compared to 
educated and professional women.  
Education was an opportunity to enter the professional class and so advance in life, a goal 
that mothers had for both daughters and sons, but this had added meaning for their daughters. 
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While other scholars have linked changing perceptions towards girls’ education to marriage 
prospects, with families educating their daughters in order to find a better suitor (Still 2011, 
Acharya 2008, Vijayakumar 2013), I argue that participants had hopes for their daughters that 
seemed to resist gender norms for women. When speaking of daughters, they hoped their daughters 
would succeed so that they could “come forward” and “stand on their own feet,” an explanation 
that was missing when speaking of sons. In their explanations, they stressed the disadvantages of 
staying home and pointed to the opportunities that the “outside” held. While women strive for 
upward economic and social mobility for their children, for their daughters, the emphasis is also 
on outward mobility.  
Conclusion 
 What does women’s material and symbolic mobility tell us about their experiences with 
institutions of the family, economic, and civic spheres? And how does it account for women’s 
experiences in these spheres because of their intersecting social locations, but also because of their 
relations to capitalism? Social reproduction theory explains subjectivity as a socially mediated 
space that, today, is shaped by capitalist processes (Ferguson 2008); this approach allows for an 
inclusive analysis of both social locations and social relations. Applying this theory to women’s 
mobility, I find that processes of production and social reproduction in capitalism provides a 
flexible and low-wage labor force while reproducing cultural and social inequalities that locate 
women’s proper place to be in the home. The anxiety surrounding women’s changing roles in the 
public sphere as a result of globalization is appeased as work is brought into the home. It is not 
just women’s relations to production at play here, but the intersection of her social positions and 
relations that reinforce each other. This process is tied to the use of space and geography by 
capitalism (Harvey 2001). One’s socio-spatial location determines her experiences with 
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production and social reproduction in capitalist conditions (Ferguson 2008). This is clear with 
home-based work since it is the intersection of women’s social positions that support a 
subcontracting system of production (Benería and Roldan 1987; Mies 1982); I add that women’s 
socio-spatial location in relation to the home is also involved in this process. 
Women’s relations to the home reinforce and, at times, reconceptualize the meaning of 
public/private and production/social reproduction. What is particular about home-based work is 
that it is involved in both reinforcing and reconceptualizing at the same time. This chapter 
discussed the social, cultural, and material practices that restricted women’s mobility. These 
restrictions make it so that women participate in exploitative work conditions so as to maintain 
social and cultural norms (reinforcing dynamics of class, gender, and caste or community). 
However, women also employed strategies to reconceptualize their work in the home. In previous 
chapters, I discussed how women framed home-based work as the best option for them when 
considering their responsibilities in the home and the lack of other desirable work options. Here, I 
presented examples of how women used work and participation in SEWA to reframe their 
relationship with the home and mobility. Zamila insisted on the importance of “going directly” to 
find better earnings, while Manisha, through her participation in SEWA, gained courage to demand 
better pay. Zamila and Manisha reframe the role of women in the private and public spheres, but 
they returned to complete work in the home, reproducing their social relations. The place-based 
struggles that women are engaged in offers transformation (Harcourt and Escobar 2005) but also 
the reproduction of unequal relations. 
Social reproduction distinguishes between work and labor, allowing for women’s 
expressions of agency in their actions. While much of women’s work is appropriated as labor 
(Bakker and Gill 2003), they do engage in practices that respond and address the injustices that 
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they face as a consequence of neoliberal globalization. Retreating state support and exploitative 
capitalist conditions, such as informality, compel individuals, families, and communities to employ 
strategies to ensure their everyday and generational sustenance (Katz 2001a). Women’s 
participation in home-based work, while reproducing the social and material relations of 
capitalism, is one such strategy that highlights how women’s creative activities are still present in 
the labor process. Previously, I discussed how staying home to work was a strategy for women to 
earn while maintaining appropriate symbolic boundaries. Here, however, I find that women’s 
participation in home-based work is also an activity to rework those boundaries and the mobilities 
associated with it through their aspirations for their children.   
Women’s notions of mobility differed when they discuss their hopes for their children. 
These hopes highlight women’s understanding of their social relations in the production process 
that were not observed in discussions of their own experiences with work. Furthermore, I found 
that these aspirations are gendered. Women strive for upward mobility for their sons and daughters, 
but they emphasize the importance of outward mobility, leaving the home, for their daughters. For 
their sons, the idea of them being home-based workers was dismissed, but the reality that their 
daughters might work from home was very real, and mothers were adamant that their daughters 
would not do this work; instead, they would attend college and maybe even have a professional 
career. I argue that in their professional aspirations for their daughters, women are resisting 
dominant gender norms of their community as well as the social and structural inequalities that 
they face as women informal workers. The emphasis on outward mobility points to an 
acknowledgment of the injustices that they face in the home as women and workers. In stressing 
the importance of leaving the home, women did not want their daughters to merely have increased 
physical mobility, but saw it as a symbolic mobility of “moving forward.”  
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Chapter 8. Social Reproduction Challenging Constructions of the Economy 
 
The social turn accompanying the post-Washington consensus (Bergeron 2003) would 
seem to be a welcome change for gender and development scholars and practitioners. The inclusion 
of social dimensions, including gender, to international development attempts to redress 
destructive practices of past decades that emphasized rapid growth over sustainability and to offer 
a solution for a more equitable future (Stiglitz 1999). Global policy institutions, such as the World 
Bank and the UN, have endorsed and promoted this strategy by including gender mainstreaming 
and gender responsive research in their development agendas. Most would agree that economic 
growth cannot be the sole motivator, and that it is just as important to ensure that growth is 
accompanied by inclusivity and sustainability. The increased emphasis on topics such as decent 
jobs (ILO 2002), women’s empowerment (World Bank 2012), and unpaid care (UN Women 2015) 
reveal the significant shift in development analysis from those that were limited to the state and 
market to a more multidimensional analysis of the effects and consequences of poverty and 
inequality.  
Feminist and multi-cultural scholar-activists have undoubtedly had a hand in bringing 
concepts such as intersectionality and care work into the development agenda. However, there is 
a need to pause and reflect on the motivators and possible hidden agendas. Bergeron argues that 
this social turn is an attempt to “disarm resistance to development and globalization,” and that 
despite the World Bank’s inclusion of social and cultural factors, it “continues to frame its 
interventions through an economistic and paternalistic lens” (2003:414). She adds that mainstream 
development practices maintain social and economic spheres as separate and the economic as non-
social, and so avoid the inherent inequality and relations of power in a capitalist system that affects 
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multiple aspects of social life. Thus the relationship between gender, globalization, and capitalism 
remains one of exploitation and appropriation, as economic development comes to rely on 
women’s labor through migration, export industries, and microfinance (Pyle and Ward 2003). 
Feminist economists have offered frameworks that “add on” to neoclassical economic thought, but 
what is needed is a deconstruction of the economy and how goods and services are produced 
(Cameron and Gibson-Graham 2003) and an understanding of how social and economic “spheres 
interact to create gender subjectivities, norms and inequalities” (Bergeron 2003: 415). In this social 
turn, mainstream feminism has been “seduced” by capitalist ideology, while postmodern scholars 
have offered little concrete options for social change (Eisenstein 2009). 
So then, the question is, what kind of analysis would offer a more complete picture of what 
is at stake and the tools to envision alternative economies? Feminist sociologists, political 
economists, and geographers have pointed to the potential of social reproduction theory to address 
material and ideological power relations (Bakker and Gill 2003; Bakker and Silvey 2008; Bakker 
1999, 2007; Bedford and Rai 2010; Ferguson and McNally 2014; Ferguson 2008; Katz 2001, 
2001a). This dissertation employs a social reproduction analysis to examine the experiences of 
women in the informal economy. In doing so, the goal is to avoid representing women’s 
experiences with work within an essentialist structural framework that deprives individuals of 
agency or specificity, while also accounting for the very real presence of a capitalist society that 
shapes our social relations and locations. Next, I review the main findings from this work. I follow 
this by a discussion of unanswered questions and possible directions for future research and policy 
practices that are more attentive to the multiple locations informal workers occupy as social beings.  
Summary of Findings  
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There is a need to reconceptualize women’s roles and relations with the private and public 
sphere, and the related framing of family/work, informal/formal, and even stationary/mobility. 
Scholarship on women and work tends to reproduce the gendered and dichotomous relationship of 
private/public despite efforts to dismantle it, since these analyses do not question the process that 
links social reproduction and production in capitalism. As Cameron and Gibson-Graham (2003) 
note, while feminist economists have offered valuable contributions to reframing what is defined 
as productive and of value to our economy, they reproduce economist models without actually 
critiquing the definitions and methods. The result is an emphasis on care, which obscures the 
relations of social reproduction in capitalism. Delinking this labor from capitalist relations is a goal 
for some, noting that the term “care” is preferable to “social reproduction” as the latter does not 
distinguish biological reproduction from the reproduction of the labor force and of society (see 
Eyben 2012:19). What these scholars miss is that the relationship between the three forms of 
reproduction—biological reproduction (including sexual, emotional, and affective services), 
unpaid production of goods and services in the home, and reproduction of culture and ideology—
is essential to a complete picture of capitalism and its consequences. It is only with social 
reproduction theory that we can adequately examine the interlinked relationship between persisting 
gendered divisions of labor in the household, the classed and racial implications of global care 
chains (Parreñas 2001), and the dismantling of the welfare state in providing and supporting much 
of society’s social reproduction needs (Bezanson and Luxton 2006).  
As I have argued in this dissertation, social reproduction theory provides the tools to move 
beyond assumed notions of work, production, and the economy as defined by capitalism. An 
analytical framework that employs capitalism’s own definition of what counts as work provides a 
limited assessment of the broad spectrum of human activity (Federici 2012; Gibson-Graham 2006). 
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Adopting Gramsci’s work/labor distinction, Bakker and Gill (2003) start with the notion that much 
of human activity or work is a process of mediation and transformation of social and natural orders, 
and frame labor as those activities that are appropriated by capitalism and alienated from the 
broader concept of work. The implication of this is that it provides agency to human beings, rather 
than depicting them as puppets within an omnipresent system, and it also asks us to reexamine the 
meaning of labor, not by the definition that capitalism provides us, but to its relation to a capitalist 
production system.  
Home-based work, and much of informal work, does not fit neatly into the dichotomous 
categories that material and ideological processes have constructed, and so it compels us to re-
examine what we define as work and experiences with it. Home-based work’s links with capitalism 
and patriarchy are clear (Allen and Wolkowitz 1987; Balakrishnan and Sayeed 2002; Benería and 
Roldan 1987), but women also employ strategies to address the social and economic boundaries 
in which they find themselves. While women’s actions reproduce public/private and 
mobile/stationary domains, the entrance of paid work in the home reveals the limitations of 
distinguishing these analytical categories as separate. In Chapter 4, I discuss how women’s 
participation in home-based work is a strategy to address the precarious economic conditions of 
their households while providing for and maintaining the social reproduction needs of the family. 
The spatial and temporal characteristics of home-based work, namely irregularity and its location 
in the home, illustrate how capitalist production does not confine itself to its own constructed 
boundaries of paid and unpaid work; rather, it exploits value-producing unpaid labor expended to 
produce these goods as well as the value produced by women’s social reproductive labor that 
allows for a worker that is always available, even when caring, and easily disposed of.   
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The consequences of this are seen in the proliferation of the “entrepreneurial woman” in 
development literature. Under the guise of empowerment, mainstream development has endorsed 
the use of women’s entrepreneurial skills in addressing poverty and inequality in society, without 
acknowledging the historical processes of how capitalist power works in the present economic 
system. In Chapter 5, I examine the construction of the gendered entrepreneurial woman in relation 
to actual experiences with informality. Rather than enjoying the empowering potential of acquiring 
capital and autonomy, homeworkers use their earnings to pay for the costs of production and have 
to practice self-management in the production process—both of which benefit those higher in the 
supply chain. To explain this, I ask how is home-based work an example of the embodied nature 
of work? This framework questions assumed distinctions of when work is or is not considered part 
of capitalist production, and it highlights the significance of one’s socio-spatial location in this 
production process. I argue that it is women’s socio-spatial location that shapes the social relations 
that restrict them to home-based work and also supports the construction of their place in the global 
economy as that of the entrepreneurial woman. Examining workers’ temporal and spatial practices 
reveals women’s experiences with home-based work diverge from and conflicts with this 
construction. Rather, women point to the “tension” that they hold as they are confronted with 
decisions to divert resources and time away from their social reproduction activities for work needs 
(ironically, to earn more and so better support their family).  
Many of the debates surrounding gender, work, and globalization concern whether to 
attribute everyday realities to structure or agency. While some argue that women working in export 
factories is an expression of their agency (Kabeer 2000; Lim 1990), others have pointed to the 
determining power of globalization and capitalism (Elson and Pearson 1981; Heymann 2006; 
Pearson 1998). This study bridges these distinctions by examining how women’s actions 
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simultaneously reproduce and contest power relations. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is helpful 
here to frame women’s actions as occurring within a field of possibilities; for example, while 
home-based work is a strategy to address the struggles that a capitalist system fosters, it is also an 
example of how women are limited by the economic and social orders in which they find 
themselves. In this study, I bring attention to women’s everyday practices with place, and ask how 
these actions reproduce power but might also be examples of reworking, resilience, and resistance 
(Katz 2001). I examine these practices across three institutions that affect and shape women’s 
symbolic boundaries—the family, economy, and civil society through their participation with 
SEWA. Women’s social locations within these institutions explain their actions; such as learning 
a skill to use in the home, choosing home-based work to provide better care, and framing their 
activities in civil society as service. It is important to contextualize these choices and decisions in 
relation to and within structures of power and domination so that we can understand women’s 
choice to work at home or participation in civil society as occurring within a limited set of options 
and possibilities. 
My final empirical chapter addresses these boundaries by examining women’s notions of 
material and symbolic mobility. Women’s participation in home-based work is undoubtedly an 
outcome of their lack of mobility, whether it is due to economic, cultural, or social forces. 
However, I found that women reworked their experiences and understandings of mobility as a site 
of potential resistance to the boundaries that they faced. While women framed home-based work 
as a preference, they were adamant that their children would not do similar work. Instead, they had 
aspirations for their children to join the formal workforce, and women saw their contributions from 
home-based work as a route to achieve this goal. What is important to highlight for this study is 
not the possibilities of their children achieving economic and social mobility, but what women’s 
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aspirations denote about their own social positions. Women’s awareness of their social position 
becomes clear when listening to their hopes for their daughters. While they had dreams of 
economic and social mobility for all their children, participants wanted their daughters to 
experience outward mobility. In this case, home-based work was not a desirable choice at all as it 
would keep their daughters in the home, something that they were resolutely opposed to. In 
contrast to how women emphasized the need for themselves to stay home to work, their aspirations 
for their daughters point to women’s understanding of their own struggles as a result of their social 
position. While work and care constricted their choices and practices, women hope that their 
daughters would not experience the same restrictive mobility—in the material and symbolic sense. 
Implications for Future Research and Development Practices 
 Focusing on home-based work, I examined the use of women’s labor in the family, work, 
and civil society, and asked in what ways do women construct and employ their subjective 
meanings in these spheres. I argue that social reproduction theory provides a more inclusive 
analysis of the structural, socio-spatial, and agential processes at work. There are three lines of 
research that this study speaks to and opens up new questions for further inquiry: the informal 
economy, international development, and civil society. 
The informal economy is undoubtedly a major phenomenon in many low- and middle-
income countries (ILO 2013), and scholars have argued that the characteristics of this work—
insecurity, informality, and precariousness—are increasingly becoming the norm in employment 
relationships around the world (Breman and Linden 2014; Standing 2011). This move has occurred 
along with the devolution of state support for social reproductive needs (Bezanson and Luxton 
2006). Applying social reproduction theory to other forms of informal work, including examples 
of it in the United States and other advanced capitalist countries, not only addresses the 
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consequences that increasing precarity has on workers and their families, but reveals how 
capitalism relies on and perpetuates socio-cultural and socio-spatial relations of power and 
difference. Further case studies on different forms of informal work as well as macro-analyses of 
national and transnational governance regarding trade and social support are needed to provide a 
fuller picture of the processes of neoliberal capitalism on social life. 
The international community has come to realize that implementation of the Washington 
Consensus has exacerbated inequality within and between countries, and international 
development has increasingly turned to women to address global problems. This study critiques 
the oft-praised initiatives of microfinance and microentrepreneurialism that employ neoliberal 
strategies to use women’s labor for the accumulation of capital. By examining the spatial and 
temporal practices of home-based work, I question the assumed empowering potential of 
entrepreneurialism for women and their communities. There is need for further inquiry that uses a 
critical and feminist sociological framework to uncover unequal relations and structures of power 
in development practices and policies. The shift in development towards social factors and 
sustainability over growth is a welcomed change, but questions remain to what purpose and whose 
values are continuing to be supported by development institutions and organizations. As 
development discourses have begun to include feminist frameworks, scholars that continue to 
critically tackle the neoliberal logic of development have the opportunity to influence current 
practices and even offer alternative agendas. 
Related to this point is the role of civil society in development. People in many countries, 
including in India, rely on civil society for the sustenance of daily and generational life, either 
because the State has never offered such services or because it is withdrawing from this role. The 
increasing significance of civil society, especially in the form of NGOs, requires further 
 221 
sociological inquiry. In particular, despite beliefs that the inclusion of NGOs are leading to greater 
democratization of civil society, scholars have questioned the relationship between these NGOs 
and private interests (Kameet 2004). However, rather than reducing the wide range of 
organizations and movements into either good or bad aspects of civil society, it is more helpful to 
examine how these organizations, whether grass-root or transnational, interact with capitalist 
processes that have come to dominate social life in local and global contexts. As I have argued, 
relations of power exist in both local and transnational settings, and, while SEWA attempts to 
address economic and gender injustices, it exists within fields that hold relations of power and so 
must reproduce some of these relations. Critiquing SEWA’s reliance on development initiatives 
and its relationship to public and private funders does little to support the working women that are 
benefiting from SEWA’s development work today. However, acknowledging that there are 
inherent relations of power is a step towards addressing and overcoming those links. 
 
In concluding, the aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate the usefulness of a social 
reproduction analysis in studies of gender, work, and globalization. This approach accounts for the 
structural inequalities of capitalist economic systems, and also provides space for subjective 
experiences and responses to relations of power. I applied this theory to home-based work in 
India’s garment industry, a phenomenon that reveals the material and ideological connections of 
gender and work in capitalism (Benería and Roldan 1987) and compels us to question assumed 
notions of the interaction between patriarchy and capitalism (Boris 1994; Prügl 1999). Because of 
the rise of international development institutions and the use of women’s labor in development 
practices, I add to this analysis the role of an organization in addressing the needs of informal 
workers. By addressing the ways that capitalism appropriates work as labor, including the relations 
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of power that sustain this process, but also the possibilities of contestation, this study aims to offer 
alternative visions of work (broadly understood) that moves us beyond so-called public and private 
spheres. Home-based work reveals how women’s social relations need to be reconceptualized 
beyond these dichotomies since capitalist production processes certainly do not follow these 
constructions.  
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Glossary  
 
Adivasi Tribal ethnic groups. Along with Dalits, Adivasi have been historically 
discriminated against in India. 
beedi Thin cigarettes of tobacco wrapped in leaf. 
chaniya choli Embellished and colorful outfit worn during festivals, consisting of a skirt 
and blouse. 
chawls Tenement housing set up by the textile mills to house migrant workers. 
churidar Similar to salwar, but tight from the knees to the ankles. 
Dalit Literally, the oppressed, a term to signify the former untouchable castes. 
dupatta Long scarf worn over the shoulders in a women’s salwar kameez outfit. 
goondas Indian-English slang for people engaged in anti-social activities, such as 
extortion or bootlegging. 
Harijan Literally, children of god, the term used by Gandhi to signify the former 
untouchable castes. 
Hindutva Hindu nationalism. 
kucca Traditional dwellings made of mud and a straw roof, but also used to denote 
temporary dwellings made of found material, such as plastic and plywood. 
pallav Decorated end of the sari. Hindu women use this part of the sari to cover 
their face. 
pol Enclosed housing cluster found in the old city of Ahmedabad, often made 
up of one caste or religious group. 
pucca A dwelling made of permanent materials, such as concrete. 
purdah Literally, behind veil or curtain, a system of gendered seclusion found in 
Hindu and Muslim cultures. 
putravadhu Daughter-in-law. 
rakhi A beaded bracelet. Often given as a present from a sister to her brother 
during the Hindu holiday Raksha Bandhan. 
salwar kameez South Asian outfit of loose tunic (kameez) and trouser (salwar). 
sanskritisation Process of lower castes adopting beliefs and practices of the higher castes, 
often with the aim of social mobility. 
sari South Asian outfit worn by women, composed of a long piece of material 
wrapped around a blouse and underskirt. 
sari fall The border sewn to the edge of the sari to add weight and a better drape 
when it is worn. 
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sasu Mother-in-law. 
satyagraha Literally, holding onto truth, practiced as passive resistence in India's 
Independence movement. 
semi-pucca A partly permanent dwelling, often with concrete walls but a tin roof. 
shakti Power, also a Hindu female deity representing power and strength. 
shakti vekas Capacity building. 
swadeshi Promoting indigenous manufacturing, practiced by the Indian independence 
movement. 
swaraj Self-governance or self-rule, concept supported by the Indian independence 
movement. 
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Appendix I. List of Interview Participants 
 
Fieldsite 
and 
Participant 
Age Education 
or 
Literacy 
Level 
Caste or 
Religion 
Family 
Status 
HH 
Size 
Monthly 
HH 
Income 
(Rs.) 
Type of Work 
HBW 
Non-HBW in italics 
SEWA 
Member 
Amraiwadi                 
Parul  45 Illiterate SC Married 
Nuclear 
5 7,500 • Quilts, OA 
• Handbags, OA 
Yes 
Jaya 24 10th  SC Married 
Nuclear 
3 9,200 • Long gloves, Ct No 
Lata 39 3rd  SC Married 
Nuclear 
5 10,472 • Short gloves, Ct No 
Danilimda                 
Alka 30 9th SC Married 
Nuclear 
3 n.a. • Thread cutting, 
jeans, Ct 
No 
Jyoti 32 8th SC Married 
Nuclear 
4 n.a. • Handkerchiefs, Ct Yes 
Manjila  42 4th SC Married 
Nuclear 
5 n.a. • Thread cutting, 
jeans, Ct 
• Blouses, OA 
• Sari fall, OA 
No 
Fatehwadi                 
Zamila 42 9th Muslim Married 
Nuclear 
5 26,160 • Salwar kameez, Ct 
• Embroidery, Ct 
No 
Biliksha 28 9th Muslim Married 
Joint 
8 9,966 • School uniforms, Ct 
• Salwar kameez, OA 
• Family laundry 
business 
No 
Zarina 42 9th Muslim Married 
Nuclear 
4 19,870 • Pillow covers, Ct 
• Dupatta border, Ct 
• SEWA Literacy 
teacher 
Yes 
Jamalpur                 
Jayshree 60 7th SC Married 
Joint 
6 16,360 • Quilt, OA 
• Blouse, OA 
• Petticoat, OA 
Yes 
Bharti 35 8th SC Widow 
Joint 
4 5,440 • Dupatta border, Ct 
• Hospital peon 
No 
Nikila 26 10th  SC Married 
Joint 
8 21,050 • Dupatta border, Ct 
• SEWA Office cleaner 
Yes 
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Keshav-
nagar 
                
Asha 31 7th SC Married 
Joint 
9 9,500 • Embroidery, Ct No 
Usha 30 9th SC Married 
Joint 
6 11,400 • Sari fall, OA 
• SEWA Literacy 
teacher 
Yes 
Shilpa 30 12th SC Married 
Nuclear 
4 12,040 • Necklines, 
nightgowns, Ct 
• SEWA Literacy 
teacher 
Yes 
Nobelnagar                 
Hansha 36 12th OBC Married 
Nuclear 
5 11,008 • Closing buttons, Ct Yes 
Kanku 38 10th  GC Married 
Joint 
4 7,380 • Salwar kameez, OA No 
Daxa 38 10th  GC Married 
Nuclear 
4 10,217 • Salwar, Ct 
• Children wear, Ct 
• Ironing garments, Ct 
• Salwar kameez, OA 
Yes 
Rajavir                 
Lajvanti 22 7th SC Never 
married 
Nuclear 
7 16,700 • Patchwork, Ct No 
Chanda 18 10th  OBC Never 
married 
Joint 
6 20,320 • Sewing straps to 
undergarments, Ct 
No 
Darshana 35 10th  OBC Married 
Joint 
7 13,300 • Sewing straps to 
undergarments, Ct 
• Ironing and packing 
leggings, Ct 
• Family kindling 
business 
• SEWA Community 
organizer 
Yes 
Rajivnagar                 
Kajal 46 7th SC Married 
Nuclear 
4 6,500 • Sews button holes, 
blouses, Ct 
• Quilts, OA 
Yes 
Shanta 21 9th SC Never 
Married 
Nuclear 
6 40,350 • Dupatta border, Ct 
• Chaniya Choli, Ct 
• Handbags, OA 
• Quilts, OA 
No 
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Vali 38 8th SC Married 
Nuclear 
5 10,000 • Chaniya Choli, Ct 
• Pillow covers, Ct  
• Quilts, Ct 
No 
Sarkhej                 
Manisha  22 10th  SC Married 
Joint 
5 9,504 • Sari decorations, Ct 
• Dupatta borders, Ct 
• Chaniya Choli, Ct 
Yes 
Manjula 34 6th GC Married 
Nuclear 
4 7,520 • Dupatta border, Ct 
• Sari fall, Ct 
• Family's pottery 
business 
Yes 
Nita 29 12th SC Married 
Nuclear 
4 10,195 • Chaniya choli, Ct No 
Vatva                 
Mohsina 43 9th Muslim Married 
Nuclear 
5 2,382 • Petticoat, Ct 
• Salwar, Ct 
• Quilt, OA 
• Childcare 
Yes 
Naseem 35 Illiterate Muslim Married 
Nuclear 
6 7,026 • Salwar, Ct 
• Dupatta border, Ct 
Yes 
Kaia 35 Illiterate Muslim Married 
Nuclear* 
5 7,260 • Dupatta border, Ct No 
* Kaia's in-laws (including two brothers-in-law and their families) live in the same home as her and her family, 
but because they keep separate household accounts she categorized her family type as a nuclear household. 
Key: HH, Household; SC, Scheduled Caste; OBC, Other Backward Caste; GC, General Caste;  
HBW, Home-Based Work; Ct, Contract HBW; OA, Own-Account HBW 
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Appendix II. List of Fieldsites 
 
Fieldsite 
No. of 
participants Age 
Education 
Level 
Majority Caste 
or Community HH Size 
Monthly HH 
Income (Rs.) 
Amraiwadi 10 36 8 SC 5 11,497 
Danilimda 5 32 8 SC 4 n.a. 
Dariapur 5 48 7 Muslim 6 8,340 
Fatehwadi 10 38 8 Muslim 5 14,522 
Jamalpur 10 36 8 SC 6 12,202 
Keshavnagar 10 30 10 SC 6 10,612 
Nobelnagar 10 39 9 GC  4 9,969 
Rajavir 10 29 7 SC 6 14,737 
Rajivnagar 10 32 9 SC 5 17,121 
Sarkhej 10 27 9 SC 8 10,585 
Vatva 10 34 8 Muslim 5 9,607 
Total/Average 100 35 8 n.a. 5 11,919 
Key: HH, Household; SC, Scheduled Caste; OBC, Other Backward Caste; GC, General Caste 
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